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INTRODUCTION

Over the past few years, the American Bar Association and numerous state bar
associations have amended or reinterpreted professional ethics rules in ways that
purport to restrict or modify the methods prosecutors and police may use to
investigate crime. Leaving aside the substantive merits or demerits of the rules,
their most notable feature is that they make it unethical for federal prosecutors to
engage in prosecution practices and investigative techniques that conform to
current statutory law, and that the federal courts have held constitutional and
proper.' These ethical rules purport to render prosecutors subject to disciplinary
sanction, even disbarment, for doing things that all three branches of the federal
government - executive, legislative and judicial - have said they may, or must,
do in the performance of their duties.
Three of these rules that will be discussed in this Article are:
(1) A rule that requires prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to grand
juries contemplating criminal indictments. 2 Grand juries traditionally have been
considered investigative or accusatory bodies, whose adjudicative functions are
limited to determining whether the government has presented sufficient evidence
to require an adversary trial. There is presently no requirement that a federal
prosecutor present, or a grand jury entertain, exculpatory evidence before
returning an indictment. The U.S. Supreme Court has expressly held that a U.S.
Court of Appeals may not impose on federal prosecutors in its circuit a
requirement that exculpatory evidence be presented to the grand jury. In effect,
this ethical rule seeks to fundamentally alter the character of the federal grand
jury.
(2) A rule that restricts the ability of prosecutors to subpoena attorneys to the
grand jury to provide information about their clients, even in situations where the3
information sought is unprivileged and not protected by the Sixth Amendment.
This rule creates a procedure of pre-issuance judicial review of attorney subpoe1. While the rules addressed here also affect state prosecutors, this Article is limited to the effort by the
organized bar to regulate federal prosecutors. The limitation to the federal system stems in part from the fact that
these rules are at the center of active and heated controversies between elements of the private bar and the U.S.
Department of Justice, and in part from the fact that the role of state courts in formulating these rules adds to an
already complex topic an additional layer of complexity best left for another day.
2. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(d) (1995) [hereinafter MODEL RULES], read in
conjunction with Rule 3.8 cmt. 1.
3. MODEL RULES Rule 3.8(f) (as passed in 1990).
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nas, sets up what amounts to a presumption of non-disclosure, and mandates
standards of judicial review that are difficult to meet, and which require sweeping
disclosure of grand jury proceedings now secret under federal law. In effect, this
ethical rule also significantly broadens the scope of the attorney-client and work
product privileges, as well as the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, in criminal
cases.
(3) A rule that restricts the ability of prosecutors to contact, openly or
undercover, persons who are represented by counsel, in situations where the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel has not attached.4 If applied as urged by the
organized bar, this ethical rule would significantly modify the Supreme Court's
Fifth and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence regarding government contacts with
criminal suspects, and would also materially restrict the government's ability to
investigate criminal organizations and corporate crime.
My objective here is threefold: (1) to explain these ethical rules and demonstrate how each is in conflict with longstanding principles of federal criminal law;
(2) to explain why these rules are illegitimate, both as rules of ethics and as rules
of positive law; and (3) to offer some observations on how the dispute over these
rules can sharpen our thinking about the nature and proper limits of ethical rules
governing lawyers.
I am obliged to begin by noting that I have been both a state and federal
prosecutor. In common with most of my colleagues, I think the rules under
scrutiny here are, by and large, ill-advised, if sometimes understandable, responses to real concerns. Nonetheless, I hope that my analysis does not turn on
whether the substance of the rules is good or bad. The question for consideration
is not whether these are good rules of criminal procedure, but whether they are
appropriate rules of ethics.
Before getting down to specifics, let me summarize the direction of my
thinking: Standards of ethical conduct for the legal profession have moved over
the last few decades from being primarily (if not exclusively) aspirational
standards of conduct toward their present form as increasingly specific rules
enforceable in professional disciplinary tribunals. As this formalism increases,
the rules are emerging as an alternate source of positive law that co-exists
uneasily with, and may, as in the present instances, conflict with the more
traditional sources of law - statutory, administrative and judge-made law.
In itself, this is not an original observation. 5 However, none of the distinguished scholars who have made it has, to my knowledge, ventured very far in
defining the proper boundaries between bar-generated legal ethics rules and more

4. MODEL RULES Rule 4.2.
5. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1242 (1991) (arguing that the
legalization of ethical norms "has resulted in the disintegration of the profession's sense of self"). Professor
Susan P. Koniak has also written on the subject, expanding on the work of Robert Cover on "nomos and
narrative." Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389 (1992).
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traditional sources of law. My thoughts on this subject flow from what I think is
an unexplored observation - that formalization of ethical standards into enforceable disciplinary rules, administered by ethics regulators who exercise control
over individual livelihoods, can transform what was a defensive response to calls
for increased regulation of lawyer conduct into an offensive weapon employed by
members of the private bar against elements of the national government staffed
by lawyers. Put bluntly, ethics rules are being used to control, or at least modify,
the law of the State. I think the trend embodied in the rules discussed here is an
unfortunate one - contrary to traditional understandings of the proper function
of ethical standards, frankly at odds with the norms of American constitutional
order and ultimately subversive of the enterprise of professional self-regulation.
At a minimum, those who seek to establish bar ethical rules as positive law at
odds with the law of the State are, it seems to me, obliged to submit their
creations to tests of legitimacy that apply to law from any other source. This
Article proposes a three-part test for assessing the legitimacy of ethical rules.
In my view, unless the bar changes the course marked out by the rules
discussed here and learns to measure proposed ethical rules against standards of
legitimacy similar to those proposed below, the federal judiciary will have little
choice but to shoulder a burden it has long shunned - creating and enforcing a
separate code of ethics for lawyers practicing in the national courts.

I. AN ANALYSIS OF THE AMERicAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.3(d), 3.8(f) AND 4.2

Let us begin by discussing the genesis and substance of the ethical rules at
issue here.

A.

MODEL RULE

3.3(d):

EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE IN THE GRAND JURY

The first rule, Model Rule 3.3(d), read in conjunction with the comment to
Model Rule 3.8, purports to place an ethical obligation on prosecutors to present
exculpatory evidence to grand juries. Model Rule 3.3(d) states:
Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal

(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all
material facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make
an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.
Model Rule 3.8, Special Responsibilities of the Prosecutor, is accompanied by
the following Comment:
[1] ... See also Rule 3.3(d), governing ex parte proceedings, among which
grand jury proceedings are included....
HeinOnline -- 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 671 1995-1996
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The clear import of this comment is to bring grand jury proceedings within the
ambit of Model Rule 3.3(d). 6
On the surface, this does not sound all that horrible - indeed, it sounds only
fair. To understand the controversy, we need to examine the historical development of grand juries and their place in modem American criminal practice.
1. The Historical Development of the Anglo-American Grand Jury
a. The Grand Jury in England
Legal historians generally agree that the "presenting juiy," the lineal predecessor of both the modem grand and petit jury, became a formal part of English
practice no later than 1166 at the Assize of Clarendon.7 The presenting jury
created by the Assize of Clarendon, 8 in common with modem grand juries, had
the dual function of gathering information about crimes within its jurisdiction
and of rendering a "medial" adjudication on the truth of the accusations against
one suspected of crime. 9 Those whom the presenting jury believed to be guilty
were subjected to the final guilt-determining stage of the criminal process, trial
by ordeal.'O
In 1215, the Fourth Lateran Council forbade clerical participation in trials by

6. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(d), Rule 3.8 cmt. See, e.g., United States v. Colorado Supreme Court, 871 F Supp.
1328 (D. Colo. 1994), in which the Colorado Supreme Court and bar authorities asserted, in response to a
Justice Department motion to enjoin enforcement of Model Rule 3.3 against federal prosecutors insofar as it
applies to grand jury practice, that the rule applies to federal prosecutors.
7. Jury-like institutions existed in England prior to 1166, and indeed prior to the Norman Conquest. 1 SARA
S. BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:02, at 4; GEORGE J. EDWARDS, THE GRAND

JURY 2-6 (AMS Press 1973) (1906); 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 12 (7th ed. 1956).
The Constitution of Clarendon, promulgated in 1164 during the struggle between royal and ecclesiastical
authority in the reign of Henry II, instituted, or perhaps reinstituted, a form of communal accusation as a
prerequisite to prosecution in ecclesiastical courts. LEROY D. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY 8 (1975). The Assize of
Clarendon, two years later in 1166, brought the same basic reform to courts of the crown. Id. at 8-9.
8. The presenting jury consisted of twelve men drawn from every hundred, augmented by a further four from
every vill (a smaller governmental subdivision). I FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 140-43 (2d ed. 1923); Roger D. Groot, The Jury of Presentment Before 1215, 26 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 1, 3 (1982).
9. The presenting jury was required to report under oath to the court whether any local person was accused
of, or reputed to have committed, any of a group of serious crimes listed in the Assize of Clarendon. EDWARDS,
supra note 7, at 7; Groot, supra note 8, at 1, 3. The jury could base its actions either on personal knowledge or
common rumor and reputation in the community. Id. at 5. The jurors had a duty to report every crime and every
suspect. id.
Professor Groot has argued convincingly that the presenting jury also rendered an opinion on the accusations
that they considered. Thus, the rolls would record that a defendant was "accused," but not "suspected," by the
jury. Id. at 11-12. The finding that the defendant was "suspected" indicated the jury's belief in his guilt. Id. at 23.
The consequence of the finding was that the accused would be subjected to proof by ordeal. Those not
"suspected" escaped the ordeal, though they could still be banished if their ill fame in the community was
sufficiently notorious. Id. at 22.
10. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 8, at 152.
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ordeal. " Without the sanction of the Church, the ordeal lost its power as a method
of proof embodying the judgment of God; in England the ordeal was replaced by
jury verdict as the method of determining the ultimate guilt of those "suspected"
of crime by the presenting jury.' 2
Though we know relatively little about the exact procedures employed by
early English presenting juries, it is clear that they were not forums for
adversarial presentations. Indeed, the source of most of the information on which
they acted was the personal knowledge of their members combined with common
report in the community. 13
By the end of the Fourteenth Century, the grand jury was in place in England
much as we know it today.' 4 Its maintenance and development there over the
ensuing four centuries up to the time of the American Revolution consistently5
reflected two features important to the present discussion: grand jury secrecy'
and presentation only of evidence for the prosecution.
Prominent English legal commentators in the Eighteenth Century insisted that
the grand jury could not serve its function as guarantor of the rights of freeborn
English subjects unless the jury could hear evidence and deliberate in private. 16
As for the source of evidence properly received by a grand jury, in 1769,
Blackstone wrote that:
This grand jury are... only to hear evidence on behalf of the prosecution: for

the finding of an indictment is only in the nature of an enquiry or accusation,
which is afterwards to be tried and determined; and the grand jury are only to
enquire upon their oaths, whether there be sufficient cause to call upon the party

11. See generally John W. Baldwin, The IntellectualPreparationfor the Canon of 1215 Against Ordeals, 36
SPECULUM 613 (1961) (relating the demise of the ordeal first in canon law, and then in secular law).
12. Groot, supra note 8, at 1, 24. At first, the "trial jury" either was the presenting jury itself or might include
members of the presenting jury. .2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 8, at 647-50. Undoubtedly because of
concern that presenting jurors would be predisposed to convict, a statute was passed in 1352 allowing the
accused to challenge any member of the trial jury who had served on the presenting jury. Id. at 649; LEONARD W.
LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 18 (1968).

13. 1 BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 7, § 1:02, at 4.

14. For a description of the institution, known by the end of the Fourteenth Century as the "grande inquest,"
see id.§ 1.02, at 7. The grande inquest had jurisdiction over an entire county. Id. The jurors numbered 24, and
were persons of substance summoned by the sheriff. Id. The grande inquest could issue presentments based on
facts within its own knowledge, or could vote on charges drafted by third parties and transmitted by the judge to
the jury. Id. If the grande inquest believed the charges, it endorsed them as a "true bill." Id. The vote to prefer
charges need not have been unanimous; a majority was sufficient. Id.
15. While the genesis of grand jury secrecy is difficult to date, between the Thirteenth and Seventeenth
Centuries it became customary for the jurors to receive evidence in private, and for them to be sworn to secrecy
about what they had heard. Id. at 12 n.44.
16. 6 See HENRY CARE, ENGLISH LIBERTIES, OR THE FREE-BORN SUBJECT'S INHERITANCE 254 (4th ed. 1719)

(asserting that the jurors must examine the witnesses separately so the jurors can satisfy their own consciences);
JOHN SOMERS, THE SECURrrY OF ENGLISH-MENs LIVES, OR THE TRUST, POWER, AND DUTY OF THE GRAND JURYS OF

ENGLAND (London 1681), reprinted in CLASSICS OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY IN THE MODERN ERA 32-35 (David

S. Berkowitz & Samuel E. Thorne eds., 1979). Somers would later become Lord Chancellor of England. I
BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 7, § 1:02, at 9.
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to answer it. A grand jury however ought to be thoroughly persuaded of the
truth of an indictment, so far as the evidence goes; and not to rest satisfied
merely with remote possibilities: a doctrine, that might be applied to very
oppressive purposes.17

A good deal of scholarly verbiage has been expended over the years in
contending either that the English grand jury was, by design and in practice, an
instrument of state power, or alternatively, that it was a "bulwark of the rights and
privileges of English citizens." 1 8 This is not a debate to which there is a
satisfactory resolution because the English grand jury from its inception always
stood uneasily in the middle. It served both functions, arm of the state and
protector of the individual, in varying degrees, depending on the times and the
cases at issue. Critical for the present inquiry, however, are certain characteristics
that remained constant: (1) English presenting and grand juries received only the
prosecution's case; (2) their proceedings were secret; (3) from 1166 forward,
English grand and presenting juries, in common with the modem American grand
jury, were concerned only with "medial" adjudication, that is deciding whether a
suspect should be obliged to endure the "ordeal," initially literal and then
figurative, of the proof process.
b. The Grand Jury in America
When English colonists came to the New World, they brought many of their
9
legal institutions with them. Among these was the grand jury.' There is evidence
that grand juries were employed in colonial Virginia as early as 1625,20 and their
regular use in other colonies came soon thereafter. 2 1 During the years leading up

17. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 300 (1769) (emphasis added).
18. RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL 2 (1963). The case that is commonly credited with casting

grand juries in the role of protectors of the rights of subjects against the oppression of the Crown was the refusal
in 1681 of grand juries, despite intense government pressure, to indict Stephen Colledge and the Earl of
Shaftesbury for treason. Id. at 2; 1BEALE & BRYSON, supranote 7, § 1:02, at 8; MARVIN E. FRANKEL & GARY P.
NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUTION ON TRIAL 9 (1977). The jurors' steadfastness did Colledge and
Shaftesbury little good. Shaftesbury was driven into exile, while Colledge was indicted by another grand jury
and executed. Helene E. Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the GrandJury, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
701, 714-19 (1972). Nonetheless, the incident stimulated thinking about the grand jury's screening function.
This school of thought began generating hymns of praise to the grand jury at an early point. John Somers, later
Lord Chancellor of England, wrote in 1766: "[Glrand Juries are our only Security, in as much as our Lives
cannot be drawn into jeopardy by all the malicious crafts of the Devil unless such a number of our honest
Country Men shall be satisfied in the truth of the Accusations." SOMERS, supra note 16, at 23. See also SIR JOHN
HAWLES, THE ENGLISHMAN'S RIGHT (London 1688) (expounding the virtues of the jury).
19. YOUNGER, supra note 18, at 2.
20. OLIVER P. CHITWOOD, JUSTICE IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 66-67 (1971).

21. 1 BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 7, § 1:03, at 13. Colonial grand juries often assumed a number of
executive or legislative functions, but their principal responsibility remained the consideration of criminal
indictments and presentments. Id. § 1:03, at 14-15.
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to the American Revolution, grand juries gained considerable popular attention
by refusing to indict fellow colonists for violating unpopular laws.22 The Crown
responded by initiating prosecutions by information.2 3
When independence was won, several factors combined to ensure indictment
by grand jury a place among the rights secured by the U.S. Constitution. First, of
course, was the revolutionary era prominence of grand juries. Revolutionary
propagandists had effectively labelled grand jury indictments the just and
democratic method of initiating criminal cases. Informations filed by prosecutors
were, by contrast, deemed instruments of oppression. Second, the Americans
with legal training who drafted the national and early state constitutions were
deeply influenced by British commentators including Lord Coke,24 Henry Care25
and William Blackstone,2 6 who pronounced grand jury indictments a fundamental protection of English citizens. Consequently, though the Constitution itself
held no reference to grand juries, protests from various quarters led to the right to
indictment for felonies being included among the package of protections embodied in the Bill of Rights.27 What is again key to our discussion is that the
cherished institution that appears in the Fifth Amendment is the grand jury of
medial adjudication that evolved from the 1166 jury of presentment: the grand
jury that hears evidence and deliberates in secret, the grand jury that Blackstone
described in 1769 as receiving only the evidence of the prosecution, the grand

22. The American analogue to Lord Shaftesbury's case was the refusal of three successive New York grand
juries to indict John Peter Zenger, a newspaper publisher, for libel. See JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE
OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER, PRITER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL 17-20 (Stanley N.
Katz ed., 2d ed. 1972). Other grand juries refused to indict the leaders of the Boston Stamp Act riots, and refused
to indict the Boston Gazette for libeling the royal governor of Massachusetts. YOUNGER, supra note 18, at 28.
23. 1 BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 7, § 1:03, at 15. See alSOYOUNGER, supra note 18, at 28-35 (detailing the
role of the grand jury as a battleground for patriots and royal authority).
24. It is said that colonial lawyers were "nurtured" on Coke's Institutes. Julius Goebel, Jr., Constitutional
History and Constitutional Law, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 555, 563 (1938). Coke argued in his Second Institute that
indictment by grand jury was one of the procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Magna Carta. EDWARD COKE,
THE SECOND PART OF THE INsTrrTUrES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 46 (London, Brooke 1797). This view has since
been discounted. See WILLIAM S. McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA, A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING
JOHN 134 (2d ed. 1914) (describing it as "unfounded"). However, the view was current and influential in the
1780s. I BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 7, § 1:04, at 17-18.
25. See CARE, supra note 16 (commenting contemporarily on early British law). Care placed grand jury
indictment among the hereditary rights of free-born Englishmen, and stressed its role "to preserve the Innocent
from the disgrace and Hazards which ill men may design to bring them to." Id. at 252. The pamphlet was
originally produced in England, but was reprinted in Boston in 1721 and Rhode Island in 1774. 1 BERNARD
BAILYN, PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 742-43 n.9 (1965).
26. Blackstone wrote:
[Flor so tender is the law of England of the lives of the subjects, that no man can be convicted at the
suit of the king of any capital offence, unless by the unanimous voice of twenty four of his equals and
neighbours: that is, by twelve at least of the grand jury, in the first place, assenting to the accusation;
and afterwards, by the whole petit jury, of twelve more, finding him guilty upon his trial.
supra note 17, at 301.
27. 1 BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 7, §. 1:04, at 18-19.

BLACKSTONE,
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jury that decides only whether the defendant must face the ordeal of petit jury
trial.
To this day, by command of the Fifth Amendment, no felony charge can be
brought in federal court without an indictment or presentment of a grand jury,
which must find probable cause to believe the defendant committed the crime.2 8
Moreover, the modem federal grand jury is in all material respects the same
institution known to the Framers.
In 1944, the traditional Anglo-American rule of grand jury secrecy was
codified in FederalRule of Criminal Procedure6(e)(2). 2 9 The rule requires that
grand jurors, government attorneys, interpreters, stenographers and other persons
with access to matters occurring before the grand jury keep such matters secret in
the absence of a court order permitting disclosure. 30 Even where disclosure is
permitted, it can only occur after3 the party requesting disclosure has made a
showing of "particularized need." 1

28. U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in
Id.
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger ....
A presentment is a formal charge brought by a grand jury without agreement by the prosecutor. Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 62 (1906), overruled in part by Murphy v. Waterfront Com. of New York Harbor, 378 U.S.
52 (1964). Pursuant to Rule 7 of the FederalRules of CriminalProcedure,all offenses punishable by death, hard
labor or imprisonment for more than one year (that is, all felonies) must be prosecuted by indictment, unless
indictment is waived by the defendant. Rule 7(c)(1) requires that all indictments "be signed by the attorney for
the government." FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1). The practical effect of these provisions is that no prosecution by
presentment is permitted in the federal system. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 935 (1965). For a proposal to reinstate the presentment, see Renee B. Lettow, Note, Reviving Federal
Grand Jury Presentments, 103 YALE L.J. 1333 (1994) (limiting presentments to government officials and
contractors, and providing for declaratory judgment at the option of the accused).
29. "This rule continues the traditional practice of secrecy on the part of members of the grand jury, except
when the court permits disclosure .... " FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) note. See also United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc.,
463 U.S. 418, 425 (1983) ("Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure codifies the traditional rule of
grand jury secrecy."); United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S 677, 681 (1958) (noting "a
long-established policy that maintains the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in the federal courts").
The traditional policy of secrecy rests on a number of interests, among them:
the interest of the government against disclosure of its investigation of crime which may forewarn the
intended objects of its inquiry or inhibit future witnesses from speaking freely; the interest of a
witness against the disclosure of testimony of others which he has had no opportunity to crossexamine or rebut, or of his own testimony on matters which may be irrelevant or where he may have
been subjected to prosecutorial brow-beating without the protection of counsel; the similar interests of
other persons who may have been unfavorably mentioned by grand jury witnesses or in questions of
the prosecutor; protection of witnesses against reprisal; and the interests and protection of the grand
jurors themselves.
In re Biaggi, 478 F.2d 489,491-92 (2d Cir. 1973) (footnote omitted).
30. Prosecutors have a limited power to disseminate grand jury material to non-lawyers assisting them in
their investigations. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii). Grand jury witnesses are not within the ambit of the rule.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) note. The circumstances under which a court may permit disclosure are defined in FED. R.
CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i), (ii), (iv).
31. Sells, 463 U.S. at 443-46. The Sells Court applied to public entities seeking disclosure the same standard
it had earlier imposed on private parties in Douglas Oil v. PetrolStops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979).

HeinOnline -- 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 676 1995-1996

1996]

MISUSE OF "ETHICAL RULES"

2. Exculpatory Evidence in the Federal Grand Jury: Response of the Judicial
Branch
Federal courts have for 200 years consistently rejected attempts to make the
grand jury's decision-making more adversarial by allowing defendants or compelling prosecutors to introduce exculpatory evidence.32 The most recent and
resounding rejection of such efforts came in the Supreme Court's 1992 opinion in
UnitedStates v. Williams.33
The Williams case arose out of the Tenth Circuit, which in 1987 had adopted a
rule that required federal prosecutors to present any "substantial exculpatory
evidence" to the grand jury.34 The court of appeals had upheld the district court's
32. In 1904, the Supreme Court decided Beavers v. Henkel and described the function of a federal grand jury
by quoting Blackstone's declaration from 1769 that grand juries "are only to hear evidence on behalf of the
prosecution." Beavers v. Henkel, 194 U.S. 73, 84 (1904). See also United States ex rel. McCann v. Thompson,
144 F.2d 604, 605-06 (2d Cir.) (holding that a grand jury is not required to permit a defendant to appear before it
as a witness. "To this privilege he was not entitled; the practice was utterly unknown at common law, and,
although grand juries have in recent times occasionally invited persons, whose conduct they are examining, to
appear, they are never obliged to do so .. "),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 790 (1944).
Likewise, an Assistant U.S. Attorney has no legal obligation to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury.
United States v. Y. Hata & Co., Ltd., 535 F.2d 508, 512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976). Failure to
do so does not constitute prosecutorial misconduct, nor does it give rise to a biased grand jury. United States v.
Adamo, 742 F.2d 927,938 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,469 U.S. 1193 (1985). See also United States v. Civella,
666 F2d 1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 1981) (prosecutor not normally "under a duty to disclose facts which would be the
basis of a defense at trial"); United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1394 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1079 (1984) (prosecutor is not required to provide evidence that would negate guilt).
The consistently expressed views of the federal courts have, of course, been no barrier to criticism by
academic commentators of the relationship of prosecutors to grand juries. See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Reforming
the State Grand Jury System: A Model Grand Jury Act, 13 RUTGERS L.I. 1, 9 (1981) (stating that "[tihe most
obvious defect [of federal and state grand jury systems] is the grand jury's complete dependence on the
prosecutor for all its information, advice, and direction.").
33. 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
34. The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Williams, 899 F2d 898, 900 (10th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 504 U.S. 36
(1992), relied on the rule announced in United States v. Page, 808 E2d 723 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S.
918 (1987). The Page court suggested that the circuits that had previously addressed the issue entertained "two
views concerning the duty of a prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury," Page, 808 F2d at
727, and that the Tenth Circuit was choosing the "better, and more balanced rule." Id. at 728. The court's
suggestion that two circuits had previously adopted a "rule" requiring prosecutors to disclose exculpatory
evidence to grand juries on pain of dismissal of the indictment rests on expansive, and in one instance
unsupportable, readings of two previous cases.
In United States v. Flomenhoft, 714 E2d 708 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984), the Seventh
Circuit rejected a defendant's claim that the indictment should have been dismissed because the government
failed to present allegedly exculpatory evidence. It adopted no rule requiring disclosure. The most it ventured on
the subject was to say that "even assuming arguendo" the disputed evidence met the standard for clearly
exculpatory evidence that had been adopted by a district court judge in another case, the defendant's claim
would still have no merit because the evidence had been disclosed. Id. at 712. In its only decision on the issue
after Flomenhoft (issued a year before the Page decision), the Seventh Circuit observed that a duty to present
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury "is not clearly established." Kompare v. Stein, 801 F2d 883, 890 n.8
(7th Cir. 1986).
In UnitedStates v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1979), the Second Circuit denied the defendant's claim
that his conviction should have been reversed and the indictment dismissed because the prosecutor misled the
grand jury. The court wrote "[A] prosecutor is not presently obligated to search for and submit to a grand jury

HeinOnline -- 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 677 1995-1996

GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS

[Vol. 9:665

dismissal of the indictment (without prejudice) due to the alleged failure of the
Assistant U.S. Attorney to present such evidence.35 The Supreme Court reversed.
Justice Scalia's opinion in Williams expressly rejected the assertion that federal
courts have the authority to impose on prosecutors the obligation to present
exculpatory evidence to a grand jury. The opinion began by noting the grand
jury's roots "in long centuries of Anglo-American history,",36 acknowledged the
"grand jury's functional independence from the judicial branch,", 37 and proceeded to a discussion of the unbroken line of authority holding that grand juries
sit "not to determine guilt or innocence, but to assess whether there is adequate
basis for bringing a criminal charge.", 38 In rejecting the rule announced by the
Tenth Circuit, the majority wrote:
The rule would neither preserve nor enhance the traditional functioning of the
institution [the grand jury] that the Fifth Amendment demands. To the contrary,
evidence favorable to the defense or negating guilt, when it has not been requested by the grand jury." Id. at 622.
Later in the opinion the court remarked, "We would add that where a prosecutor is aware of any substantial
evidence negating guilt he should, in the interest ofjustice, make it known to the grand jury, at least where it
might reasonably be expected to lead the jury not to indict." Id. at 623 (emphasis added). Later decisions from
the Second Circuit treated this aspirational dictum as creating a rule authorizing dismissal of an indictment for
prosecutorial violations; however, in each such case, the "rule" was cited only as a prelude to finding there had
been no violation of it. See United States v. Romano, 706 F.2d 370, 374 (2d Cir. 1983) ("to justify dismissing an
indictment for prosecutorial misconduct, the prosecutor must have knowingly withheld 'substantial evidence
negating guilt.., where it might reasonably be expected to lead the jury not to indict' ") (quoting Ciambrone,
601 F.2d at 623); United States v. Dyman, 739 F.2d 762, 768 (2d Cir. 1984) ("The government put forward
enough evidence to establish probable cause that a crime was committed, and that the defendants were
reasonably believed to have committed it. That is all it was required to do.") (citing Romano, 706 F.2d at 374),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1183 (2d Cir. 1989) (indicating
that prosecutor had no duty to present witness when prosecutor could not have expected that his testimony
would "lead the jury not to indict."), cert. denied, 493 U.S..1081, cert. denied, 495 U.S. 923, cert. denied, 495
U.S. 958 (1990); United States v. Leonard, 817 F. Supp. 286, 295 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (dealing with evidence not
qualifying as substantial exculpatory evidence).
35. Defendant Williams was indicted on charges that he made false statements to federally insured banks in
connection with loan applications, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 38
(1992). Immediately after arraignment he moved for disclosure of the grand jury minutes. Id. at 39. He then
moved for dismissal of the indictment on the ground that the government had not introduced evidence that
defendant claimed would support his defense. Id. The allegedly suppressed evidence was Williams' general
ledgers and tax returns, and Williams' testimony in a contemporaneous Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding in
which he claimed that his accounting methods "belied an intent to mislead the banks." Id.
One is moved to wonder how evidence of this sort could properly be termed "substantial[ly] exculpatory."
One of the factors that clearly troubled the Supreme Court was the apparent elasticity of the Tenth Circuit's test.
The Court was disturbed by the observation of the Tenth Circuit that, "[T]he grand jury must receive any
information that is relevant to any reasonable [exculpatory] theory it may adopt." Id. at 52 n.7 (quoting
Williams, 899 F.2d at 902).
36. Williams, 504 U.S. at 47 (quoting Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 490 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in result)).
37. Id. at 48. See also In re Kittle, 180 F 946, 947 (C.C.N.Y. 1910) (Hand, J.) ("A court shows no punctilious
respect for the Constitution in regulating [grand juries'] conduct. We took the institution as we found it in our
English inheritance, and he best serves the Constitution who most faithfully follows its historical significance
38. Williams, 504 U.S. at 51.
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requiring the prosecutor to present exculpatory as well as inculpatory evidence
would alter the grand jury's historical role, transformingitfrom an accusatory
to an adjudicatorybody.39

The Court went on to say that there was no "common law" of Fifth
Amendment grand jury practice that either required or permitted a rule mandating presentation of exculpatory evidence. 40 Likewise, the Court held that the
power
federal courts could not impose such a rule as part of their supervisory
41
them.
before
appear
who
prosecutors
the
and
over grand juries
3. Exculpatory Evidence in the Federal Grand Jury: The Bar's Efforts to
Change the Grand Jury through Congress
It might be argued that, even if the courts lack the power to alter the federal
grand jury's "historical role," perhaps the U.S. Congress possesses such power.
If so, Congress has expressly refused to exercise its authority to impose an
obligation on federal prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence. In August
1977, the ABA House of Delegates approved a package of twenty-five grand jury
principles to be included in ABA-backed efforts at state and federal grand jury
reform.4 2 The third of these principles sought to impose a duty on prosecutors to
disclose exculpatory evidence. 43 The twenty-five principles were conveyed to,
and urged upon, Congress in hearings on federal grand jury reform conducted by
the 95th Congress in 1977-78.44 A provision requiring prosecutorial disclosure of
39. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Scalia's choice of words here implies a slight distortion of history. See
supra notes 9-18 and in the accompanying text. The grand jury has from the beginning been an "adjudicatory
body." However, its role has been and remains to provide "medial adjudication," that is, a determination of
whether the government has presented sufficient evidence to merit a full-scale trial, as distinguished from the
final adjudication yielded by such a trial.
40. Id. at 51-53. Justice Scalia observed that under present law, courts have no authority to review grand jury
evidence for sufficiency, id. at 54 (emphasis added) (citing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363-64
(1956)), much less for whether any possibly exculpatory evidence was omitted.
41. Id. at 55. Justice Scalia emphasized the "grand jury's operational separateness from its constituting
court." Id. at 49. Scalia went on to observe that "any power federal courts may have to fashion, on their own
initiative, rules of grand jury procedure is a very limited one, not remotely comparable to the power they
maintain over their own proceedings." Id. at 50.
42. CRIMINAL JUST. SEC., AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, ABA GRAND JURY POLICY AND MODEL ACT (1977-82) 1 (2d
ed. 1982) [hereinafter ABA GRAND JURY POLICY AND MODEL ACT].

43. Principle 3 stated: "No prosecutor shall knowingly fail to disclose to the grand jury evidence which will
tend substantially to negate guilt." Id. at 4. The ABA had previously announced the same principle as an ethical
standard for prosecutors in the ABA Standardsfor Criminal Justice on the ProsecutionFunction, §§ 3 to 3.6(b).
Id. at 7 cmt. 3. However, the ABA avowed that inclusion of a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence among the
grand jury principles signified the Association's intent that the duty become "a legislative principle, and not
simply a general standard for prosecutorial conduct." Id.
44. The ABA position regarding exculpatory evidence was first conveyed to Congress even before the ABA
House of Delegates had acted on it. On May 2, 1977, the Grand Jury Committee of the ABA Criminal Justice
Section Council recommended the addition of three new grand jury principles, among them a prosecutorial
obligation to present exculpatory evidence, to the package of twenty-three principles that the Council had
approved in November 1976. The Grand Jury Committee's recommendation was immediately forwarded to the
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exculpatory evidence to the grand jury was included in both House and Senate
grand jury reform bills introduced in the 95th Congress. 4 5 The proposed requirement was expressly opposed by both the U.S. Department of Justice 46 and the
National District Attorneys Association.4 7 Neither the House nor the Senate bill
was ever reported out of committee.48
Undaunted, in January 1982, the ABA House of Delegates approved a Model
Grand Jury Act.4 9 Section 101 of the Model Act would impose a duty on
prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence 50 to the grand jury. 5 1 In 1985, the
ABA's ModelAct was introduced, with only minor alterations, as a bill in the 99th
Congress.5 2 Section 101 of the Model Act became, with slight modifications,
Section 3323 of H.R. 1407. 53 The bill was referred to the House Judiciary
House Judiciary Committee. Grand Jury Reform: Hearings on H.R. 94 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Citizenship, and Int'l Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 157-58 (1977)
[hereinafter House Hrgs.]. In June 1977, the ABA Criminal Justice Section recommended to the ABA House of
Delegates that it support grand jury reform principles, including presentation of exculpatory evidence. The
section's recommendation was transmitted to the Judiciary Committee. Id. at 160. Finally, in November 1977,
the ABA forwarded to Congress the grand jury principles, still including presentation of exculpatory evidence,
which had been approved by the House of Delegates that August. Id. at 184, 185.
The same August 1977 report of the House of Delegates was received by the Senate Judiciary Committee
during its grand jury reform hearings in 1978. The GrandJury Reform Act of 1978: Hearingson S. 3405 Before
the Subcomm. on Admin. Practiceand Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 1,749 (1978) [hereinafter Senate Hrgs.].
45. A provision requiring disclosure of exculpatory evidence was included in H.R. 94. House Hrgs., supra
note 44, at 198. A similar provision was in S. 3405. Senate Hrgs., supra note 44, pt. 2 app. at 25.
46. See Testimony of Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of
Justice before Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Senate Judiciary Committee, Aug. 22,
1978, in Senate Hrgs., supra note 44, pt. 1, at 51, 54, 106-07. The Justice Department's primary objection was
that the proposed rule "would transform the grand jury into an adversary or adjudicatory proceeding." Id. at 54.
This is precisely the rationale adopted fourteen years later by the Supreme Court when it rejected judicial
imposition of the exculpatory evidence disclosure requirement in United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
See supra notes 35, 39 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and the Court's decision in the Williams
case).
47. See Testimony of Edwin L. Miller, Jr., National District Attorney's Association, in Senate Hrgs., supra
note 44, at 110-12, 118-21, 122-23.
48. For history of H.R. 94, see 2 Cong. Index, 95th Cong. (CCH) 34,501 (1978). For history of S. 3405, see I
Cong. Index, 95th Cong. (CCH) 20,530 (1978).
49. ABA GRAND JURY POLICY AND MODEL ACT, supra note 42, at 16.

50. In the Model Act, "exculpatory evidence" is defined as "evidence which, if believed, tends to negate one
of the material elements of the crime ..... Id.
51. Id.
52. On March 5, 1985, Representative John Conyers, Jr. introduced H.R. 1407, A Bill to Amend Chapter215
of Title 18 of the United States Code with Regard to the Grand Jury. On May 8, 1985, George J. Moscarino
testified on behalf of the ABA in favor of H.R. 1407, noting that it "parallels our model act on the grand jury."
Grand Jury Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 7 (1985) [hereinafter House Subcomm. Hrgs.].
53. Compare Section 101 of the Model Act with Section 3323 of H.R. 1407:
(1) Both Section 101(l) of the Model Act and Section 3323(a) of H.R. 1407 would require a
prosecutor to disclose and "if feasible present" evidence tending to negate a material element of the
crime.
(2) Both Section 101(2) of the Model Act and Section 3323(b) of H.R. 1407 would require a
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Committee, hearings were held54 and the bill died in committee. 5 Since the quiet
demise of H.R. 1407, the ABA has apparently abandoned its effort to convince
Congress to modify the federal prosecutor's duties of disclosure before the grand
jury.
4. Exculpatory Evidence in the Federal Grand Jury: The Response of the
Executive Branch
The United States Department of Justice has long recognized that it is desirable
for prosecutors to inform grand juries of evidence favorable to the defendant.
After all, the mission of the Department of Justice as an institution and of federal
prosecutors as individuals is to do justice, an objective that can hardly be
accomplished if people are convicted of, or even indicted for, crimes they did not
commit.5 6 In consequence, the United States Attorneys' Manual advises that
federal prosecutors should inform the grand jury if they are "personally aware of
substantial evidence which directly negates the guilt" of a person against whom
an indictment is being sought. 7 The U.S. Attorneys' Manual employs much
narrower language than that in Model Rule 3.3(d), and it is explicit in creating no
legal rights.5 8
5. The Federal Prosecutor's Dilemma
The upshot of all this is that a federal prosecutor licensed in a state that has
adopted Model Rules 3.3 and 3.851 is faced with this situation:
(1) No federal statute requires presentation of exculpatory evidence to a grand
jury. Indeed, Congress has twice expressly declined the invitation to pass such a
statute.
(2) The U.S. Supreme Court says the Constitution does not require the
prosecutor to inform the grand jury of the existence of, and their right to call for, evidence that "bears
upon a possible affirmative defense,"
(3) Both Section 101(3) of the Model Act and Section 3323(c) of H.R. 1407 would authorize a judge
to dismiss an indictment for knowing failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.
54. Hearings were held intermittently between May 1985 and September 1986. House Subcomm. Hrgs. 1.
55. For history of H.R. 1407, see 2 Cong. Index, 99th Cong. (CCH) 35,016 (1986).
56. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (Sutherland, J.) (defining a prosecutor's interest in a
criminal prosecution as ensuring justice will be done, not winning a case; thus, "guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer.").
57. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-11.233, at 18 (July 18, 1985) [hereinafter
UNITED STATES AT-rORNEYS' MANUAL].

58. Id. at § 1-1.100.

59. At present, federal prosecutors are required to be licensed in at least one state in order to represent the
Department of Justice in federal courts. Pub. L. No. 102-395, 106 Stat. 1828, 1838 Sec. 102(a) (1992). See
discussion infra note 447 and accompanying text (describing the prohibitions and history of the statute). Local
U.S. District Court rules often require federal prosecutors to be members of the bar of the state in which they
work. See, e.g., U.S. FED. LocAL CT. RULES (E.D. Va.) Rule 7(A); U.S. FED. LoCAL CT. RULES (D. Maine) Rule
5(a), (c).
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presentation of exculpatory evidence to a grand jury, and that no federal court can
order it. 60 Moreover, the Williams court said that the institution of the federal
grand jury is incompatible with such a requirement. 6'
But the federal prosecutor's state bar association says he must abide by Model
Rules 3.3 and 3.8, which require disclosure of exculpatory evidence, or face
disbarment.
6. The Unenforceability of Model Rule 3.3(d)
The absurdity of the prosecutor's dilemma is compounded by the practical
impediments to enforcement of the rule. In order for a bar disciplinary committee
to determine whether a prosecutor had failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, it
would need to have before it, at a minimum, the complete record of all grand jury
proceedings in the case under scrutiny, including both the testimony and the
colloquy between the grand jury and the prosecutor.6 z Rule 6(e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits disclosure of "matters occurring before
the grand jury" except in narrowly limited circumstances.6 3 The only one of these
60. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
61. Id. at52.
62. The bar committee would need the colloquy, as well as the evidence, because it would need to determine
whether the prosecutor advised the grand jury of the existence of potentially exculpatory evidence that was not
thereafter formally presented. In general, a prosecutor cannotforce grand jurors to receive evidence that they do
not wish to hear. Id. at 53 (recognizing that a grand jury can choose not to hear evidence offered by the
government). But see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3 1-6-11(B) (Michie 1995) (prosecutor "shall present evidence that
directly negates the guilt of the target where he is aware of such evidence"). On the other hand, grand jurors
cannot call for potentially exculpatory evidence unless they are aware of it. See, e.g., Johnson v. Superior Ct. of
San Joaquin County, 539 P.2d 792, 796 (Cal. 1975) ("[U]nless so informed by the district attorney, the grand
jury ordinarily has no 'reason to believe that other evidence within its reach will explain away the charge.' ").
While actual presentation of potentially exculpatory evidence is thought desirable by those who favor applying
Model Rule 3.3(d) to prosecutors in the grand jury, the rule requires only that the lawyer "inform the tribunal
[the grand jury] of all material facts known to the lawyer." MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(d) (emphasis added). The
distinction between presentation and disclosure of evidence to the grand jury is also recognized in the ABA
Model Grand Jury Act, § 101, which would require a prosecutor to "disclose and if feasible present"
exculpatory evidence. ABA GRAND JURY POLICY AND MODEL ACT, supra note 42, at 16.

I say that the bar committee would require "at a minimum" both the testimony and the colloquy, because it
would undoubtedly require a good deal more. A proper assessment of the claim that exculpatory evidence was
withheld would inevitably demand an exhaustive review of the prosecution's entire case, including materials
never used in the grand jury, or perhaps even at trial.
63. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) prohibits disclosure of "matters occurring before the grand
jury" except:
(a) to a government attorney "for use in the performance of such attorney's duty," FED. R. CRIM. P.
6(e)(3)(A)(i);
(b) to government personnel deemed necessary by a government attorney for the performance of
"such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law," FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii), (B);
(c) "when so directed by a court preliminarilyto or in connection with ajudicialproceeding," FED. R.
CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i) (emphasis added);
(d) at the defendant's request, "upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the
indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury," FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(ii);
(e) by a government attorney to another federal grand jury, FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(iii); and
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circumstances which has ever been held to apply to state bar disciplinary
proceedings is Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i), which allows a court to release grand jury
material "preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding." There is
uncertainty, however, about when and whether state attorney disciplinary actions
should be considered "judicial proceedings" within the meaning of the rule.'
The real obstacle to disclosure, however, is the requirement that one who seeks
disclosure under Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) must make a showing of "particularized
need." ' 65 Even in circuits that consider release of grand jury materials to attorney
(f) at the request of an attorney for the government, "upon a showing that such matters may disclose a
violation of state criminal law, to an appropriate official of a state ... for the purpose of enforcing
such law," FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(iv) (emphasis added).
64. The difficulty arises because of the quasi-judicial character of attorney discipline proceedings and the
diverse forms that these proceedings take. One of the seminal cases interpreting the term "judicial proceeding"
in Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) is Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1958). Judge Learned Hand approved
disclosure of grand jury materials to the Grievance Committee of the New York City Bar Association, finding
the New York disciplinary procedures to be "judicial" in nature because they were presented before the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court. For Judge Hand, the touchstone of the rule was to be
whether the proceeding was ultimately "determinable by a court." Id. at 120.
Commentary has been critical of Judge Hand's formulation. See, e.g., Mark R. Kmetz, Note, Disclosure of
Grand Jury Materialsto ForeignAuthorities Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), 70 VA. L. REv.
1623, 1638-39 n.84 (1984). Nevertheless, Doe v. Rosenberry proved enduringly influential and moved several
other circuits to agree that attorney disciplinary proceedings were "judicial proceedings." See, e.g., In re Barker
v. Oregon State Bar, 741 F.2d 250, 253 (9th Cir. 1984) (relying on Doe v. Rosenberry and agreeing with
characterization of a disciplinary investigation by the Oregon State Bar as "preliminar[y] to ... a judicial
proceeding" and permitting release of grand jury materials to investigators); In re Disclosure of Testimony
Before the Grand Jury, 580 F.2d 281, 285 (8th Cir. 1978) (citing Doe v. Rosenberry to support the proposition
that lawyer disciplinary actions are judicial proceedings). See also United States v. Sobotka, 623 F.2d 764, 766
(2d Cir. 1980) (relying on Doe v. Rosenberry to characterize an investigation as preliminary to a judicial
proceeding but requiring particularized need for grand jury testimony); In re Federal Grand Jury Proceedings
(Doe), 760 F.2d 436, 438 (2d Cir. 1985) (relying on Doe v. Rosenberry to characterize an investigation as
preliminary to a judicial proceeding but requiring the court to balance the goal of a just result in a judicial
proceeding against the countervailing policy of grand jury secrecy); In re Petition to Inspect and Copy Grand
Jury Materials, 735 F.2d 1261 (11th Cir.) (analyzing the disclosure to the Investigating Committee of the
Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit of materials regarding the misconduct of a sitting federal judge), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984); In re Sealed Motion, 880 F.2d 1367, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (discussing application
of a witness who was to be named in a report issued under Independent Counsel Act). But see United States v.
Bates, 627 F.2d 349, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding that Federal Maritime Commission inquiry into antitrust
violations is not a "judicial proceeding"); In re J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc., 622 F.2d 166, 170-72 (5th Cir.
1980) (holding that Federal Energy Regulatory Commission investigation was not a "judicial proceeding").
The Sixth Circuit, however, reached a contrary result in In re Grand Jury 89-4-72, 932 F.2d 481 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 958 (1991). The court observed that United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476 (1983), casts
doubt on expansive readings of the term "judicial proceedings." In Baggot, the Supreme Court found that an
IRS civil tax audit was not "preliminary to a judicial proceeding," and noted, "It]he fact that judicial redress
may be sought, without more, does not mean that the Government's action is 'preliminary to a judicial
proceeding.' "In re Grand Jury 89-4-72, 932 F.2d at 485 (quoting Baggot, 463 U.S. at 480). The Sixth Circuit
found that Michigan attorney discipline procedures are not judicial proceedings or preliminary thereto because
they are conducted by a "privately funded agency" from whose findings there is only a limited right of appeal to
the Michigan Supreme Court. Id. at 485. The most that can be said at present is that a state attorney disciplinary
tribunal may, or may not, be eligible to receive grand jury materials pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i), depending on
the local federal court's view of the tribunal's structure and relationship to the judicial process.
65. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing this requirement).
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disciplinary tribunals permissible in principle, an application for disclosure of
grand jury hmaterials by a bar committee seeking to enforce the local version of
Model Rule 3.3(d) against a federal prosecutor would be a request to enforce a
rule of conduct that the U.S. Supreme Court said in Williams is inconsistent with
the character of federal grand juries.66 It is difficult to conceive of a federal court
finding that a state bar committee had a "particularized need" for grand jury
material to conduct an inquiry that the Supreme Court has said is forbidden to the
federal courts themselves. If the state attorney disciplinary authorities have no
way to investigate whether a violation of Model Rule 3.3(d) has occurred because
they have no access to records of federal grand juries, the rule is a nullity.
7. Exculpatory Evidence in the Federal Grand Jury: A Summary
At the end of the day, regardless of one's perception of grand juries, making
disclosure or presentation of exculpatory evidence to the grand jury an ethical
requirement of federal prosecutors is deeply problematic. One may disagree with
the Supreme Court's view of the historical role of grand juries in AngloAmerican practice as expressed in Williams.6 7 One might also feel that the
historical grand jury of "medial adjudication" embraced by the Court in Williams
is an anachronism which ought, in the name of fairness and good government, to
be changed into something more adversarial. 68 But there is no escaping the
conclusion that the conceptual model of grand jury practice that informs Model
Rules 3.3(d) and 3.8 is at odds with eight centuries of Anglo-American legal
history and is in direct conflict with current, binding federal law as enunciated by
the highest court in the land. Moreover, because of the secrecy provisions of
FederalRule of CriminalProcedure6(e), a rule requiring disclosure of exculpatory evidence is, as a purely practical matter, unenforceable against federal
prosecutors by state disciplinary authorities.
B.

MODEL RULE

3.8(f):

THE ATTORNEY SUBPOENA RULE

In February 1990, the ABA House of Delegates approved Model Rule 3.8(f),
which made it an ethical violation for a prosecutor even to issue a subpoena to an
attorney for information "about" a client unless the prosecutor obtained prior
judicial approval after an adversary hearing at which the court would inquire into

66. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text (discussing the Williams case).
67. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (reviewing the Williams Court's historical analysis of
grand juries).
68. Similar views have shaped modifications of various state grand jury systems. See, e.g., DEBORAH DAY
EMERSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GRAND JURY REFORM: A REVIEW OF KEY ISSUES 16-17 (1983) (noting factors

contributing to states' decisions to revise their grand jury systems including awareness of abuse at the federal
level, the stand of the ABA and a desire to modify their entire criminal code).
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a number of specified factors. 69 This rule has been controversial since its
inception. It has been adopted by only nine states, and as a local rule by some
federal district courts within those states. 70 The rule is so deeply flawed that on
August 9, 1995, the ABA House of Delegates voted to remove one of its central
features, the requirement of pre-issuance judicial approval. 7' Nonetheless, as of
this writing, variants of Model Rule 3.8(f) remain in effect in all those states and
federal districts that previously adopted them.72 Whether these jurisdictions will
follow the lead of the ABA in deleting the requirement of prior judicial approval
remains to be seen. Even if they do, the amended rule retains many of the defects
of the original.
1. The Perceived "Crisis" on Attorney Subpoenas
In the mid-i 980s the perception arose that federal prosecutors were employing
subpoenas directed to defense attorneys to collect evidence about clients to a far

69. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ANNOTATED Rule 3.8(f) commentary at 408 (1992) [hereinafter MODEL RULES ANN.]. The rule reads as follows:
RULE 3.8 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: ...
(f) not subpobna a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past
or present client unless:
(1) the prosecutor reasonably believes:
(i) the information reasonably sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable
privilege;
(ii) the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution;
(iii) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information; and
(2) the prosecutor obtains prior judicial approval after an opportunity for an adversarial
proceeding.
MODEL RULES ANN. Rule 3.8(0.
70. Those states that have adopted some form of Model Rule 3.8(f) are Alaska, Colorado, Louisiana,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Tennessee and Virginia. ALASKA CT. R. PROF. CONDUCT
Rule 3.8(f) (1995); COLO. CT. R. PROF. CONDUCT Rule 3.8(f) (1995); LSA-R.S. foll. 37:221, Rule 3.8(f) (1995);
OKLA. ST. R. PROF. CONDUCT Rule 3.8(f) (1995); PA STAT. R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.10 (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 3, R. 3:08 (Law Co-op. 1994); R.I. SUP. CT. ART V Rule 3.8(f) (1994); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 8, DR 7-103(c)
(1994); VA. Sup. CT. R Pt. 6, Sec. II, DR 8-102(A)(5) (1994). For discussion of federal district courts that have
adopted the rule, see infra notes 192-257 and accompanying text.
71. ABA Leaders Endorse Affirmative Action But Spin Wheels on Internal Governance, 64 U.S.L.W. 6 d19
(Aug. 15, 1995) [hereinafter ABA Leaders].
72. In the pages that follow, references to Model Rule 3.8(f) are, unless otherwise specified, references to the
version of the rule passed in 1990, and not to the rule in its recently amended form. I take this approach in part
because the version of Model Rule 3.8(f) actually in effect in those jurisdictions that adopted it is some variant of
the 1990 rule, and it remains an open question whether those jurisdictions will follow the action of the ABA
House of Delegates by deleting the requirement of prior judicial approval. In addition, when considering the
broader questions of ethics regulation, the fact that the ABA originally enacted Model Rule 3.8(f) with a
requirement of prior judicial review has significance independent of the reactions of the state bar organizations
to the newly amended Model Rule.
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greater degree than had previously been the case.7 3 This perception may have
arisen in part from an actual increase in the absolute numbers of federal grand
jury subpoenas issued to attorneys 74 and in part from a spate of reported cases in
the early 1980s in which defense counsel challenged such subpoenas.7 5
2. The Response of the Federal Judiciary to Attorney Subpoenas before Model
Rule 3.8(0
Unease in the defense bar about attorney subpoenas grew as the 1980s
73. See, e.g., Seymour Glanzer & Paul R. Taskier, Attorneys Before the Grand Jury: Assertion of the
Attorney-Client Privilegeto Protecta Client'sIdentity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1070, 1070 nn.l-2 (1984)
(listing numerous investigations as evidence that attorneys were more frequently summoned to testify before
federal grand juries); Ellen R. Peirce & Leonard J. Colamarino, Defense Counsel as a Witness for the
Prosecution:Curbingthe Practiceof Issuing GrandJury Subpoenas to Counselfor Targets of Investigations,36
HASTINGS L.J. 821, 824-25 (1985) (describing the disapproval of a number of federal courts toward subpoenaing
defense attorneys to furnish evidence and appear before grand juries); Robert N. Weiner, Federal Grand Jury
Subpoenas to Attorneys: A Proposalfor Reform, 23 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 95, 95 (1985) ("Increasingly, federal
prosecutors have subpoenaed attorneys before grand juries to testify and produce documents concerning their
clients."); John R. Wing & Maranda F Fritz, Subpoenas to Lawyers, 4 LEGAL NOTES & VIEWPOINTS 25, 26
(1984) ("the practice of hauling lawyers before grand juries to testify or produce records about their clients
appears to be on the rise"); William J. Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 781, 804-14 (1988)
(discussing a survey of the members of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers purporting to
show that a dramatic increase in the government's use of subpoenaing defense attorneys before grand juries
occurred between 1983 and 1985); Max D. Stern & David Hoffman, Privileged Informers: The Attorney
Subpoena Problem anda ProposalforReform, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1783, 1787-88 (1988) (referring to both the
survey of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and a survey by the Department of Justice to
show the increase in the number of attorney subpoenas in the mid-1980s); Koniak, supra note 5, at 1398
("By 1985 the number of criminal defense lawyers being subpoenaed before grand juries had risen
dramatically .... ).
74. There are no figures available on the numbers of federal subpoenas issued to attorneys from 1980 to
1985. The claims of dramatic increase during this period made by academic commentators are based on
inherently imprecise data such as a survey of defense attorneys. See, e.g., Stern & Hoffman, supra note 73, at
1788 n. 19. Hard numbers on federal attorney subpoenas only became available after 1985, the year the Justice
Department instituted an internal policy requiring preclearance of such subpoenas. See UNTrED STATES
ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.161 (a) (describing the procedure for obtaining approval of attorney subpoenas); see
also infra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing adoption by Department of Justice of pre-issuance
clearance procedures for attorney subpoenas). In 1986, the Justice Department approved roughly 400 attorney
subpoena requests. Stern & Hoffman, supra note 73, at 1788 n. 19. During fiscal years 1988-94, the numbers of
attorney subpoenas approved were as follows: 1988 (523), 1989 (649), 1990 (695), 1991 (851), 1992 (1041),
1993 (975) and 1994 (1028). Telephone interview with Edgar Brown, Chief Witness Immunity Section, U.S.
Department of Justice (Aug. 18, 1995).
The cause of the increased number of attorney subpoenas can be debated, but one fact of obvious significance
is that the Justice Department has doubled in size over the last decade. In 1985, there were approximately 2,200
Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSAs). 1985 U.S. ATr'YS' OFFS. STAT REP. chart 14. By 1994, there were 4,064
AUSAs. 1994 U.S. ATT'ys' OFFS. STAT REP. at 1. Although the statistics are not available for a precise
year-by-year comparison, it is plain that the ratio of AUSAs to attorney-subpoenas has remained roughly
constant over the past decade. Moreover, the incidence of use hardly suggests the conversion of a once-rare
device into a regular tool that is suggested by critics of the Justice Department. In FY 1994, for example, only
one attorney subpoena was issued for every four AUSAs. Or, to look at it another way, between 1986 and 1994,
on average each AUSA in the United States issued one attorney subpoena every four years.
75. See, e.g., Weiner, supra note 73, at 95 n. 1 (cataloguing cases involving challenges to federal grand jury
subpoenas on attorneys between 1982 and 1984).
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progressed because the prosecution's right to issue and enforce compliance with
such subpoenas was consistently upheld. Attorneys who wished to resist a
subpoena seeking information about a client raised a number of arguments.
a. Claims of Privilege
The reflexive response to an attorney subpoena is, of course, to assert that the
material sought is protected by a privilege, most commonly the attorney-client or
work product privileges. However, as will be discussed below, there have always
existed broad categories of information that an attorney may possess about a
client that are not covered by any privilege.76
b. Constitutional Arguments
Where the information sought by a subpoena is not covered by an evidentiary
privilege, defense counsel have commonly made the constitutional claim that
subpoenaing the lawyer of a criminal suspect is violative of the suspect's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel 77 in two ways. First, they argue that the Sixth
Amendment is implicated even if the specific information sought is unprivileged
because the subpoenaed lawyer becomes a witness who cannot ethically continue
representing the defendant. 78 Hence, the defendant may be deprived of the
lawyer of his choice. 79 Alternatively, it has been claimed that the mere issuance
of a subpoena to a lawyer can have an unconstitutionally chilling effect on the
attorney-client relationship. 80 These arguments have met with little success. The
courts have held that:
76. See infra notes 141-53 and accompanying text (discussing the work product privilege).
77. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings 88-9 (MIA), 899 F.2d 1039 (11th Cir. 1990) (discussing the
client's motion to intervene and to quash the grand jury subpoena alleging that the subpoena violated his Sixth
Amendment right to assistance of counsel).
78. Testimony by an attorney about a client may create a conflict of interest which, under either federal
substantive law or the rules of ethics, may require withdrawal of a testifying attorney. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 692 (1984) (holding that client has right to conflict-free representation); United
States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1072 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding that client may seek disqualification of
former attorney from representing co-defendant), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984). Both Model Rule 3.7 and
DR 5-102(B) of the Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility mandate withdrawal of an attorney under certain
circumstances if the attorney is or obviously will be called as a witness. MODEL RULES Rule 3.7; MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102(B) (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].

79. See, e.g., In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 1983). (discussing situation where defendant
argued compliance with the subpoena would create a conflict of interest denying defendant the counsel of his
choice, but the court did not reach issue); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Doe), 781 F.2d 238, 244-45 (2d Cir. 1985)
(rejecting defendant's claim that grand jury testimony of defense attorney would "set the stage for his attorney's
forced withdrawal"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986).
80. See, e.g., Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d at 594 (noting defense argument that an attorney providing evidence
against a client would be destructive of the "trust and confidence essential to the [attorney-client] relationship,"
but not reaching the issue); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Doe), 781 F.2d at 244-45 (rejecting defendant's claim
that grand jury testimony of defense attorney would "chill his potential Sixth Amendment rights," and would
cause the attorney-client relationship to be "undermined irreparably"); In re Sturgis, 412 F. Supp. 943, 946
(E.D. Pa. 1976) (discussing how an attorney's presence in the grand jury room may plant "doubts in the client's
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(i) Indicted defendants have a right to counsel, but no absolute constitutional
right to the particular lawyer of their choice. 8 ' In the pre-indictment grand
jury stage of a federal criminal investigation, the stage during which disputes
over attorney subpoenas tend to occur, criminal suspects have no constitutional
right to any lawyer at all. 82 Consequently, if an attorney possesses relevant and
unprivileged information, the client's interest in a particular lawyer will generally
and adjudication of
be outweighed by society's interest in the investigation
83
criminal cases based on all available evidence.
(ii) In situations where there does exist a constitutional right to counsel, even
information within the scope of the attorney-client privilege enjoys no particular
constitutional protection because the privilege itself is not guaranteed by the
U.S. Constitution,8 4 either under the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 85 or
under the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.?6
The fact that courts have created a zone of privilege to protect the attorneyclient relationship gives the privilege itself no independent constitutional
status.

87

(iii) As for the claim that mere issuance of a subpoena to an attorney "chills"
the relationship with his client, the courts have been even less receptive.
Defendants have no right to a "meaningful attorney-client relationship," even
post-indictment. 88 With a single notable exception, federal courts have consis-

mind"); see also Fred C. Zacharias, A CriticalLook at Rules Governing GrandJury Subpoenas ofAttorneys, 76
MINN. L. REV. 817, 921-22 (1992) (exploring several scenarios involving attorneys subpoenaed to testify
against clients and the consequences of that testimony).
81. See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988); Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983);
United States v. Kitchin, 592 F.2d 900, 903 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,444 U.S. 843 (1979) ("A defendant's right to
counsel of his choice is not absolute and must yield to the higher interest of the effective administration of the
courts."); United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825, 827-29 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 906 (1982).
82. The right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment "attaches only at or after the time that adversary
judicial proceedings have been initiated." Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972). See also Doe v. Troisi,
459 S.E.2d 139, 148 (W.Va. 1995) (relying on Wheat and Kirby to hold that attorney for putative defendant may
be subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury without any showing of compelling need or circumstances).
83. See, e.g., In re Klein, 776 F2d 628, 633-34 (7th Cir. 1985) (discussing that a defendant may not be
permitted to elect as his representative anyone he likes).
84. See Abbott Labs v. Baxter Travenol Labs, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 831, 833 (N.D. 11.1987) (stating that the
attorney-client privilege has no arguable constitutional basis and will not unless a general constitutional right of
privacy is recognized).
85. See Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673, 682-83 (5th Cir. 1981) (contrasting behavior that is detrimental to
the attorney's effective representation of his client, which is protected by the Sixth Amendment, and
attorney-client privilege, which is not protected), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1003, cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007
(1982). See also PAuL R. RICE, ATroRNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE INTHE UNITED STATES § 2:7, at 72 n.83 (1993)
(listing additional cases).
86. See United States v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365, 366 (M.D. Ga. 1955) ("The right of a lawyer not to disclose
the confidential communications of his clients and the right against self-incrimination are different rights.").
87. See notes 117-140 and accompanying text (concerning the process by which the boundaries of the
privilege are defined).
88. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983).
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tently held that there is no constitutional basis for the claim that solicitude for the
attorney-client relationship requires prosecutors to make a special showing
before issuing a subpoena to a lawyer for client information. 89 Likewise,
once a subpoena has been served, attorney witnesses may not make blanket
assertions of privilege, but must appear and make a specific assertion of privilege as to each question, or at least subject matter, as to which they claim a
privilege. 90
While courts exhibit instinctive concern over the sensitivity of subpoenas
directed to lawyers for information about clients, 9 ' and a marked dislike for
motions to disqualify counsel based on such subpoenas,9 2 if the courts are
satisfied that the subpoenas are not being used as a subterfuge to disqualify a
nettlesome opponent, the justice system's interest in obtaining all relevant
evidence not protected by privilege outweighs the defendant's interest in having
one particular lawyer.9 3 Throughout the 1980s, the federal courts consistently
rejected arguments that sought to exempt lawyers from the disclosure of

89. See infra note 184 and accompanying text (listing federal cases holding that government need make no
prior showing to justify issuance of grand jury subpoenas); notes 204-257 and accompanying text (discussing
opinions of First Circuit upholding requirements of prior showing).
90. Federal Rule of Evidence 1101(d)(2) provides that the law of privilege applies to the grand jury.
Nonetheless, a witness claiming a testimonial privilege must appear and assert it as to each question, or at least
subject matter, as to which he claims it applies. FED. R. EvlD. 1101(d)(2); see, e.g., In re Grand Jury Matters, 751
F.2d 13, 17 n.4 (1st Cir. 1984) (stating, in dictum, that attorney-client privilege must be asserted specifically as
to each individual matter); In re Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d 359, 362 (9th Cir.1982) (noting that
blanket assertions of attorney-client privilege are "extremely disfavored"); United States v. El Paso Co., 682
F.2d 530, 539 (5th Cir. 1982) (rejecting blanket assertion of attomey-client privilege), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 944
(1984); In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir.) (finding elements of attorney-client privilege must be
established as to each record sought and each question asked), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980). See also
United States v. Rodriguez, 706 F.2d 31, 37 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that courts should not accept blanket
assertions of privilege); United States v. Arnott, 704 F.2d 322, 324-25 (6th Cir.) (finding that district judge
should not rule on a claim of privilege until the witness has asserted privilege in response to particular
questions), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 948 (1983).
91. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 1984) (discussing requiring the government
to show with some particularity why the grand jury's investigation requires a subpoena of the attorney); United
States v. Perry, 857 F.2d 1346, 1350 (9th Cir. 1988) (considering how the needs of the grand jury must be
balanced with possible Sixth Amendment concerns of the attorney and client).
92. Professor Zacharias has remarked on this phenomenon, and has observed that the most common remedy
for concerns about abuse is heightened judicial scrutiny for signs of a search for tactical advantage. Zacharias,
supra note 80, at 942 n.97; Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of ProsecutorialTrial Practice: Can
ProsecutorsDo Justice?44 VAND. L. REv. 45, 72 n. 118 (1991).
93. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160 (holding that the interest of federal courts in "ensuring that criminal trials are
conducted within the ethical standards of the profession" outweighs a defendant's interest in the services of an
attorney with a conflict of interest). This is not to say that a government subpoena to a defense attorney could
never implicate constitutional concerns. Certain types of "egregious" government interference with the
attorney-client relation can impugn the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Perry, 857 F.2d at 1349 (quoting
United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 1189 n.18 (9th Cir. 1980)). The court in Perry intimates, but does not
hold, that an intentional and successful effort by the government to manipulate the defendant's choice of counsel
through service of a subpoena on the attorney might be sufficiently egregious to constitute a per se violation of
the constitution. Id. at 1349-52.
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unprivileged client information 94 or to expand significantly the scope of existing
evidentiary privileges to increase the protection afforded client information.9 5
In sum, just as had been the case with the exculpatory-evidence-in-the
grand-jury rule, the defense bar tried and failed to convince the federal courts to
impose significant new limits on subpoenas to attorneys. It is important to
understand that the controversy over attorney subpoenas does not arise from
attempts by the prosecution to obtain information protected by the attorney-client
privilege, or any other recognized privilege. Nor does it spring from any recent
judicial constriction of the traditional reach of privileges protecting the attorneyclient relation. Critics of attorney subpoenas are not claiming that prosecutors are
securing information to which the government would in the past have been
unentitled. Examined carefully, the complaint is that the government is using a
tool it always had, more often than had formerly been the case, to get information
to which it always had a right.
3. Attorney Subpoenas: The Bar Appeals (Sort of) to the Executive and
Legislative Branches
a. Response of the Justice Department
In addition to seeking redress in the courts, the bar expressed its concerns
about attorney subpoenas to federal law enforcement officials. In response, in
1985, the Justice Department adopted internal procedures for approval of such
subpoenas. 96 While these guidelines require federal prosecutors to satisfy department superiors of the existence of six factors, including all those embodied in
Model Rule 3.8(f), such guidelines create no legal rights and are not enforceable
against the government in court. 9 7 This effort at self-regulation did not satisfy the
bar.
b. The Bar Skips the Congress
Interestingly, and quite unlike its approach in attempting to change grand jury
practice concerning exculpatory evidence, the bar made no effort to seek
congressional legislation on attorney subpoenas before turning to the path of
ethical regulation. There was no reference to attorney subpoenas in the ABA
Grand Jury Principles adopted by the House of Delegates in August 1977, and

94. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d at 19 ("There can be no absolute rule that frees an attorney,
merely because he is such, to refuse to give unprivileged evidence to a grand jury.").
95. See infra notes 117-40 and accompanying text (discussing the attorney-client privilege), infra notes
141-53 and accompanying text (discussing the work product doctrine).
96. UNITED STATES ATroRNEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.161(a). The need for such procedures was suggested by,
among others, Robert Weiner. Weiner, supra note 73, at 125-33.
97. In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 635 (7th Cir. 1985).
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forwarded to Congress later that year.98 Nor was the issue addressed in the 1982
ABA Model Grand Jury Act, 99 which influenced the drafting of H.R. 1407 in
1985.'0°
The first report by an ABA Committee to the ABA House of Delegates
concerning the problem perceived to be created by attorney subpoenas was
presented in 1986. l0 l Despite the fact that the problem identified, both in this
report and by academic commentators, was an increase of federal grand jury
subpoenas to lawyers, 10 2 so far as can be determined, the ABA made no effort to
secure legislation from Congress to address its concerns.' 3
4. Model Rule 3.8(f): An Ethical Regulation in Conflict with Federal Law
As noted above, Model Rule 3.8(f) was promulgated in 1990. As originally
enacted, the rule made it unethical for any prosecutor to subpoena a lawyer to
present evidence "about a past or present client" without obtaining prior judicial
approval "after an opportunity for an adversarial proceeding."' 04 The rule also
contained standards by which the court was to judge the application. It required
98. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (discussing efforts by the ABA to make legislative changes
in other areas).
99. ABA GRAND JURY POLICY AND MODEL ACT, supra note 42, at 16-19.

100. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (discussing the content and legislative history of HR
1407 and comparing it to the Model Act). The issue of attorney subpoenas was mentioned by witness George J.
Moscarino, who appeared for the ABA in the 1987 House Judiciary Committee hearings on H.R. 1407, but the
bill did not address the issue and Moscarino made no proposal to address his concern. House Subcomm. Hrgs.,
supra note 52, at 8.
101. See MODEL RULES ANN., supra note 69, commentary at 409 (stating that "the ABA House of Delegates
adopted a resolution in February 1986 patterned after Massachusetts Supreme Court Rule 3:08, Prosecution
Function 15, requiring prior judicial approval to subpoena a lawyer before a grand jury to testify about a
client").
102. Id. at 408; see also supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing the increase in federal grand jury
subpoenas of attorneys).
103. The only indications of congressional interest in the issue were the actions of one senator and one
congressman. On Aug. 10, 1988, Sen. Paul Simon introduced a bill that would have required pre-issuance
judicial approval of attorney subpoenas. See S. 2713, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); 134 CONG. REC.
21,599-21,600 (1988) (statement of Sen. Simon). Sen. Simon was apparently acting at the behest of a group
calling itself the "National Network for the Right to Counsel," which included various academics, but which
seemed to have no affiliation with any component of the organized bar. Id. No hearings were ever held on the bill
during the 100th Congress. 134 CONG. REc. INDEX 2396 (1988). There is no indication that Sen. Simon revived
the idea.
In the House of Representatives, a single subcommittee chairman held a one-day hearing on May 10, 1990.
This hearing came three months after the February 1990 adoption of Model Rule 3.8(f) by the ABA House of
Delegates. Exercise of FederalProsecutorialAuthority in a Changing Legal Environment: Hearing before the
Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations,
101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (May 10, 1990). Representatives of both the ABA and the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers testified. Id. at 39, 204.
This hearing resulted in a committee report, but no legislation. HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS,
FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL AUTHORITY IN A CHANGING LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: MORE ATTENTION REQUIRED, H.R.
REP. No. 986, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990).
104. MODEL RULES Rule 3.8(f).
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that the court be satisfied that the prosecutor have reasonable grounds to believe
that "(i) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege; (ii) the evidence sought is essentialto the successful completion
(iii) there is no other feasible
of an ongoing investigation or prosecution;
05
alternativeto obtain the information." 1
By contrast with Model Rule 3.3(d) which conflicts with only a single, albeit
ancient, line of authority, application of Model Rule 3.8(f) to federal prosecutors
would require the abandonment or modification of well-established principles in
several different areas of federal criminal law. As will be demonstrated in detail
below, the primary departures from current federal law embodied in Rule 3.8(f)
are these:
(1) As written, the rule changes material aspects of federal privilege law
concerning the attorney-client relation. Consequently, as a state ethics rule,
Model Rule 3.8(f) violates the Supremacy Clause 10 6 by contravening Congress'
express delegation of power to the federal courts to fashion privilege law in
federal criminal cases. If adopted as a local rule of a federal district court, Model
Rule 3.8(f) offends the same act of delegation because Congress made clear that
federal courts were to fashion privilege law case-by-case as common law judges,
and not in the exercise of any rule-making power, much less the interstitial power
to make local rules on "matters of detail" pursuant to FederalRule of Criminal
Procedure57.
(2) Model Rule 3.8(f) offends the Supreme Court's general prohibition,
expressed in United States v. Williams,10 7 against attempting to regulate grand
jury procedure through the application of "ethical rules" to federal prosecutors.
As a state rule, it violates the Supremacy Clause; as a local federal district court
rule, it exceeds the court's rulemaking authority. Model Rule 3.8(f) would
inappropriately limit the traditional scope of grand jury power in three ways:
(a) By reversing the burden of proof as to the availability of traditional
privileges and by imposing hitherto-unheard-of conditions on the disclosure of
information by attorneys about clients, the rule would expand the scope of
protection historically afforded the attorney-client relation and restrict the grand
jury's power to collect evidence.
(b) By requiring adversarial hearings at which prosecutors would be required
to disclose substantial portions of their evidence to attorneys who would often be
representing subjects or targets of the grand jury investigation, the rule would
violate the tradition of grand jury secrecy and specific provisions of FederalRule
of CriminalProcedure6(e).

105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. U.S. CONST. art. VI ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
107. 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
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(c) Requiring the prosecutor to make a pre-compliance showing of relevance
or need for subpoenaed information is in direct violation of Federal Rule of
CriminalProcedure 17(c), as that rule has been interpreted by the Supreme Court
in United States v. R. EnterprisesInc.'0 8

a. Model Rule 3.8(f) Would Impermissibly Redefine the Boundaries of
Evidentiary Privileges Protecting the Attorney-Client Relationship
The 1990 passage of Model Rule 3.8(f) was an effort to engineer a significant
de facto expansion of the sphere of evidentiary privilege surrounding the
relationship between attorney and client. Historically, the confidentiality of
various aspects of the attorney-client relationship has been protected by two sets
of rules - the ethical rules of the bar and the law of evidentiary privilege created
by courts and legislatures acting for the state. 10 9 In effect, the bar ethics rules and
the law of evidentiary privilege created two layers of protection. The outer, more
expansive, layer was the province of the bar; ethical rules defined a sphere of
information connected with the attorney-client relationship that could not ethically be disclosed by the attorney, unless a court ordered the disclosure.tt0
Sanctions for violating the bar's rules about client confidentiality were levied by
the bar on the attorney who held the confidence. A lawful court order compelling
disclosure was an absolute defense to a claim of ethical breach. The inner layer of
protection was the law of privileges (in modern times, principally the attorneyclient and work product privileges "'), in which the state designated certain types
of information, a smaller subset of the types of information protected by ethical

108. 498 U.S. 292 (1991).
109. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An HistoricalPerspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege,66
CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1063-66 (1978) (discussing the scope of the ethical and evidentiary rules governing the
attorney-client relationship); Edna S. Epstein & Michael M. Martin, The Attorney-Client Privilegeand the Work
Product Doctrine, A.B.A. SEC. LiT. 6-7 (2d ed. 1989) (explaining the relationship between the privilege and an
attorney's ethical obligations).
110. Both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
provide exceptions to their strict confidentiality rules when a court orders disclosure of information. MODEL
RULES Rule 1.6 cmt. ("The lawyer must comply with the final orders of a court or other tribunal ... requiring
the lawyer to give information about the client [and] a lawyer may be obligated or permitted by other provisions
of law to give information about a client."); MODEL CODE DR 4-101 (C)(2) ("A lawyer may reveal confidences
or secrets when.., required by law or court order."); see also Epstein & Martin, supra note 109, at 6-7 ("Both
ethical codes allow an attorney to reveal his client's intent to commit certain wrongful acts and ... to reveal
confidences when necessary in collecting a fee or defending against an accusation of wrongful conduct.").
111. There is debate over whether the protection afforded attorney work product should be labelled a
"privilege," a "doctrine" or an "immunity." Those who object to the term "privilege" contend that the
protection afforded material covered by a "privilege" is absolute, but that much work product material is given
only conditional protection from disclosure under current law. Resolution of this debate is not necessary for
present purposes. As a matter of convenience, I will refer to the protections afforded attorney-client
communications and work product materials as "privileges."
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rules concerning client2 confidentiality, which even judges would not order
attorneys to disclose." t
For at least four centuries, judges in England and America have viewed claims
of evidentiary privilege as necessary, but nonetheless as subversive of the courts'
primary function of discovering the truth.' 3 American judges have been even
less disposed to accept restrictions on the truth-seeking powers of grand juries. 114
Consequently, evidentiary privileges have been created grudgingly and construed
narrowly." 15 Moreover, and critical to the present discussion, the invariable rule
in England and America has been that one who seeks to invoke a privilege, as the
bears the burden of
party attempting to deny the tribunal access to information,
6
1
privilege.
the
of
availability
the
establishing
proof in

112. Recognized evidentiary privileges also generally apply when some other appropriate arm of the state
such as a legislative committee is seeking information. See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950)
(concerning power of congressional committee to require testimony).
113. In 1904, Dean Henry Wigmore wrote, "For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a
fundamental maxim that the public ... has a right to every man's evidence. When we come to examine the
various claims of exemption, we start with the primary assumption that there is a general duty to give what
testimony one is capable of giving, and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so
many derogations from a positive general rule." Id. at 331 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § SCE 2192 AT 70 (EMPHASIS ADDED). The power to compel testimony before courts was
established in England by statute no later than 1562. STATUTE OF ELIZABETH, 1562, 5 ELtZ., CH. 9, § 12 (ENG.). In
1612, Lord Bacon observed that all subjects owed the king their "knowledge and discovery." COUNTESS OF
SHREWSBURY'S CASE, 2 How.ST.TR. 769, 778 (1612). The maxim, "The public, has a right to every man's
evidence," was coined by Lord Chancellor Hardwicke in 1742 during the parliamentary debate on the Bill to
Indemnify Evidence. 12 COBBEr'S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY 675, 693 (1742), cited in 8 WIGMORE, supra,
§ 2192, at 71. See also Draughtfor the Organizationof Judicial Establishments,in 4 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 320 (Bowring ed., 1843). In the United States, see Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)
("Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges ... must be strictly construed and accepted 'only to the very
limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending
the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.' " (quoting Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))).
114. "[T]he longstanding principle that 'the public.., has a right to every man's evidence'.., is particularly
applicable to grand jury proceedings." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974) (quoting Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682, 688 (1972)).
115. For a sampling of the extensive U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence evincing a reluctance to create or
broaden evidentiary privileges, see University ofPa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 188-89 (1990) (refusing to create a
common law privilege for academic peer review materials); Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50-53 (significantly
narrowing the adverse spousal testimony privilege); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979) (declining to
create editorial privilege under First Amendment); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (rejecting
President Nixon's claims of executive privilege); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding grand
jury witnesses had no Fourth or Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to give voice exemplars); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703-04 (1972) (declining to create First Amendment "newsman's privilege" permitting
reporters to refuse disclosure of sources to grand juries).
116. See, e.g., In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir.) (stating that with all privileges the person claiming
the privilege has the burden of establishing all its essential elements), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973);
Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 156 F.R.D. 45,49 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the burden is on party claiming protection
of a privilege to establish the essential elements of the privilege); Bowne of New York City, Inc. v. AmBase
Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that the burden is on the party claiming a privilege to
establish all its elements); Wilson v. Martin County Hosp. Dist., 149 F.R.D. 553, 556 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (same);
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Model Rule 3.8(0 is an attempt to alter settled law of evidentiary privilege, and
thus to narrow, or even obliterate, the gap between the inner and outer spheres of
protection afforded the attorney-client relationship.
i. The Attorney-Client Privilege
17
The attorney-client privilege, the oldest of the common law privileges,"
began its evolution in England in the Sixteenth Century." 8 The development of

Buffington v. Gillette Co., 101 ER.D. 400,403 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (same); Earle v. Grout, 46 Vt. 113, 123 (1873)
(expressing that the burden is on party who seeks to have evidence suppressed because of a privilege to prove
the facts establishing the privilege). See also STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 674
(1980) (stating that although usual privileges can be raised before a grand jury, the burden is on the proponents
of the privileges to prove them in order to preserve them).For authorities citing this principle in the
attorney-client privilege context, see CHRISTOPHER MUELLER & LAIRD KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 5.27, at 434

(1995) ("The claimant must show that an attorney-client relationship existed between the communicants.");
RICE, supra note 85, § 11:9, at 971, 975 (observing that, because attorney-client privilege is an exception to the
rule that law is entitled to every man's evidence, courts place the burden of establishing each element of the
privilege by a preponderance of the evidence on the proponent); United States v. White, 950 F.2d 426, 430 (7th
Cir. 1991) ("The burden falls on the party seeking to invoke the privilege to establish all the essential
elements."); United States v. Schaltenbrand, 930 F.2d 1554, 1562 (lth Cir.) (noting that "the party invoking
the attorney-client privilege has the burden of proving that an attorney-client relationship existed and that the
particular communications were confidential"), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1005 (1991); United States v. Abraham,
905 F2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1990) (denying privilege where claimant's showing of elements was "meager,
amorphous, and ultimately inadequate"); In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that
claimant has burden to establish privilege with reasonable certainty); In re Grand Jury, 482 F.2d 72, 82 (2d Cir.)
("the person claiming the attorney-client privilege has the burden of establishing all essential elements"
(citation omitted)), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973).
The principle that the party invoking a privilege bears the burden of proving its existence is applied by courts
to the other privileges as well. These include: the work-product privilege, e.g., Nutmeg Ins. Co. v. Atwell, Vogel
& Sterling, 120 F.R.D. 504, 510 (W.D. La. 1988); the marital communications privilege, e.g., United States v.
Hamilton, 19 F.3d 350, 354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 480 (1994); the spousal testimony privilege, e.g.,
United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 514-15 (4th Cir. 1995); the physician-patient privilege, e.g., Bryant v. Hilst,
136 F.R.D. 487, 490 (D. Kan. 1991); the psychotherapist-patient privilege, e.g., People v. Cabral, 15 Cal. Rptr.
2d 866, 869 (Ct. App. 1993); the clergy-penitent privilege, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374,
385 n. 15 (3d Cir. 1990), and In re Possible Violations of 18 U.S.C. 371, 641, 1503, 564 F.2d 567, 571 (D.C. Cir.
1977); the journalist privilege, e.g., von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,481 U.S.
1015 (1987); and the accountant-client privilege, e.g., State ex rel. Schott v. Foley, 741 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987).
117. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 113, § 2290, at 542 (observing that attorney-client privilege is oldest of
confidential communication privileges); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 116, § 5.8, at 357 (contending
that attorney-client privilege was recognized in English cases as early as 1577); Berd v. Lovelace, 21 Eng. Rep.
33 (1577) (holding that solicitor served with process to testify is not compelled to be deposed).
118. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 313 (4th ed. 1992) (noting that the first traces of English
attorney-client privilege doctrine appeared during the reign of Elizabeth I). An attorney-client privilege did not
arise, and probably was not required, in England until the Sixteenth Century, when English courts first began the
practice of compelling witnesses to testify in court or by deposition. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 113, § 2290, at
542-43. See also RICE, supra note 85, § 1:2 at 2 (tracing origin of the attorney-client privilege in English
common law); Hazard, supra note 109, at 1070-73 (arguing that the attorney-client privilege originally
protected the lawyer rather than the client). By the early 1700s, English judges based the privilege on the need
for candor between the client and the attorney who was to represent him in pending litigation. The need for full
disclosure by clients to their attorneys was particularly acute in early suits at law in which the parties were
disqualified from being witnesses in their own cases. Since litigants could not by law speak for themselves, they
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the attorney-client privilege in America before 1900 was heavily influenced by
English doctrine." 9 However, virtually immediately upon the 1904 publication of his
exhaustive evidence treatise, Dean Henry Wigmore became the predominant0
influence in the development of American law on the attorney-client privilege. 12
Wigmore recognized that the attorney-client privilege, like all other evidentiary privileges, was an obstruction to the discovery of the truth. ' 2 ' He laid down
had no choice but to retain counsel and speak candidly to him about their affairs. See Hazard, supra note 109, at
1082-83 (suggesting that the reason for the privilege was to prevent courts from obtaining a party's testimony
indirectly when the testimony could not be adduced directly). The courts felt that the threat of disclosure of
client communications would discourage communication, simultaneously damaging the client's interest in
effective legal representation in the adversary system and society's interest in having clients receive competent
representation in the courts. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & SusAN P. KONIAK, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING
185 (1990); see also Hazard, supra note 109, at 1079-81 (discussing the evolution of the attorney-client
privilege). English courts gradually expanded the privilege beyond the litigation setting as they recognized that
the need for guarantees of secrecy to encourage client candor existed in equal measure when lawyers performed
as advisers and counselors. See, e.g., Lord Brougham's 1833 opinions in Bolton v. Corporationof Liverpool, 39
Eng. Rep. 614 (1833) (extending the privilege to a case involuntarily laid before counsel) and Greenough v.
Gaskell, 39 Eng. Rep. 618 (1833) (discussing evolution of privileges at English common law). For discussion of
Bolton and Greenough, see Hazard, supra note 109, at 1084-85.
119. HAZARD & KONIAK, supra note 118, at 186; Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules,
Balancing, and ConstitutionalEntitlement, 91 HARv. L. REV. 464, 466 (1977) [hereinafter Note, Privilege];
Hazard, supra note 109, at 1087 n.120; 8 WIGMORE, supranote 113, § 2294, at 564; RICE, supra note 85, § 1:12
at 37; see, e.g., Dixon v. Parmelee, 2 Vt. 185, 188 (1829) (describing the English origins of the attorney-client
privilege). See also In re Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ("In the eighteenth century, when the
desire for truth overcame the wish to protect the honor of witnesses and several testimonial privileges
disappeared, the attorney-client privilege was retained, on the new theory that it was necessary to encourage
clients to make the fullest disclosures to their attorneys, to enable the latter to properly advise the clients. This is
the basis of the privilege today."), aftd,306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
120. Wigmore's work was hailed immediately as "the best treatise on the common law of evidence." Joseph
H. Beale, Book Review, 18 HARv. L. REV. 478, 480 (1905) (reviewing JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE INTRIALS AT COMMON LAW (1904-05)). By 1924, a reviewer of Wigmore's second edition
wrote that since its first publication, the treatise had become more than a statement of the law: "During the
intervening years, it has become something greater. It has created law." Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review, 37
HARv. L. REV. 513, 521 (1924) (reviewing JOHN H. WIGMORE, ATREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (2d ed. 1923)). A modem scholar has remarked that, "[O]ne of the
difficulties of debating with Wigmore was that, so great was his influence, once he had perpetrated a doctrine on
the basis of little or no authority, precedents would soon follow to fill the gap." WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF
EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 111 (1985); see also WILLIAM R. ROALFE, JOHN HENRY WIGMORE: SCHOLAR
AND REFORMER 77-81 (1977) (describing the rapid and widespread acceptance of Wigmore's treatise among
scholars and practitioners); David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in
FederalCourt Today, 31 TtJL. L. REV. 101, 111 (1956) (noting Wigmore's "monumental contribution to the law
of privileges").
Wigmore's influence has been particularly pervasive on the attorney-client privilege. He has been called "the
great champion and architect of the privilege." I MCCORMICK, supra note 118, § 87, at 315. By 1913, the U.S.
Supreme Court was citing Wigmore as the only necessary authority on the scope of the privilege. Grant &
Burlingame v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 79 (1913); see also Note, Privilege, supra note 119, at 466 ("The
entrenchment of this utilitarian formulation of the [attorney-client] privilege may be traced, in large measure, to
its remarkable codification by Professor Wigmore in his treatise on evidence."); Note, Developments in the Law
-Privileged Communications:III. Attorney-Client Privilege, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1450, 1503 (1983) [hereinafter
Note, Developments] (same).
121. Wigmore said of the privilege that "[ilts benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain
and concrete." 8 WIGMORE, supra note 113, § 2291, at 554.
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the often-quoted limitation that the privilege "ought to be strictly confined within
122
the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle."
Wigmore understood the "principle" of the privilege to be that clients would not
communicate information about their legal difficulties honestly and completely to
their lawyers unless "the apprehension of compelled disclosure" by the lawyers
were removed.' 23 His understanding of this principle led to his classic formulation:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose,
(4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently
by himself or by the legal adviser (8) except the
protected (7) from disclosure
24
protection be waived.'

While this formula has been rephrased and clarified from time to time, it
remains in its essentials the defining statement of the privilege even today.' 2 5 The
privilege as conceived by the old English judges, refined by Wigmore and
embodied in modem federal evidence law is expressly utilitarian. 126 It exists
because lawyers cannot perform their useful social function without candid
disclosure from clients; its limits are just so wide as to induce client candor, but
no wider. Hence the requirement that protected communications be made in
confidence. ' 27Consistent with the policy of narrow confinement of the privilege,
courts have identified numerous types of information that an attorney may
possess or collect about his client, or his representation of the client, that are not

122. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 809 F2d 1411, 1415 (9th Cir. 1987), affd in part, 491 U.S. 554
(1989) (quoting 8 WIGMORE, supra note 113, § 2291, at 554); United States v. Pipkins, 528 F.2d 559, 563 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 952 (1976) (same); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
867 (1973) (same); United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 282 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964)
(same); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 FR.D. 377, 384 (D.D.C. 1978) (same); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas
Served Upon Field, 408 F. Supp. 1169, 1173 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (same).
123. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 113, § 2291, at 545.
124. Id. § 2292, at 554.
125. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983, 731 F.2d 1032, 1036 (2d Cir.
1984) (quoting Wigmore's definition verbatim as the law of the Second Circuit); United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950) (containing Judge Wyzanski's frequently quoted opinion
in which he essentially reformulates Wigmore's elements). For a listing of cases citing Judge Wyzanski's
definition, see RICE, supra note 85, § 2: 1, at 48 n.7.
126. 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 118, § 87, at 314; Note, Developments, supra note 120, at 1503 ("Wigmore
crystalized this utilitarian justification and separated it from prior rights-based theories.").
127. 8 WIGMORE, supranote 113, § 2285 at 527. As Professor Rice has pointed out, some early cases suggest
that the privilege should extend to all communications made within the sphere of the attomey-client
relationship, irrespective of whether the communications were confidential in the sense of being made privately
out of the hearing of third parties. RICE, supra note 85, § 6:3 at 386. Wigmore came down firmly on the side of
courts that extended protection only to confidential communications. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 113, § 2285, at
527. He reasoned that "unless confidentiality is essential to the relationship being fostered by the privilege, the
suppression of relevant evidence is unjustified." See RICE, supra note 85, § 6:1, at 384. His influence insured
that the requirement of confidentiality became, as it is today, a core element of the privilege. Id. § 6:3 at
397-401.
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protected by the privilege. Examples of unprivileged information or material
include:
128
(a) The name of the client and the existence of an attorney-client relationship;
(b) The amount and source of the fee received by an attorney from his client;,29

128. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 113, § 2313, at609-10. Although the name of the client is usually not considered
privileged, all circuits recognize exceptions to this rule. The prevailing view has become that the exception
exists in instances when disclosure of client identity would result in disclosure of other "confidential
communications." See, e.g., Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951
(1963) (holding that client identity or fact that individual has become client are matters that attorney must
disclose even though these facts may be used as evidence against the client); In re Grand Jury Matter, 926 F.2d
348 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that, absent evidence that fee arrangements were themselves confidential
information, the attorney-client privilege did not preclude attorneys from producing documents pertaining to
such arrangements); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 926 F.2d 1423 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that if the disclosure of
the client's identity will also reveal the confidential purpose for which he consulted an attorney, the court will
protect the confidential communication and the client's identity as privileged); In re Grand Jury Proceeding
(Cherney), 898 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that client's identity is privileged because revealing it
would disclose the reason the client sought legal advice, which is a confidential communication); Rails v. United
States, 52 F.3d 223 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the privilege is invoked when disclosure of the client or
fee-payor identity would infringe upon privileged communication); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Anderson),
906 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that information relating to representation of a client is not confidential);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Newton), 899 F.2d 1039 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (stating attorney-client privilege did not
exist to protect a client's name because the client did not hire the attorney with reasonable anticipation that such
information would not be disclosed). The limits of the confidential communications exception were initially
somewhat muddled, in part because several circuits interpreted the Ninth Circuit's decision in Baird v. Koerner,
279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960), as establishing a "legal advice" exception, protecting the client's identity when a
strong probability existed that disclosure would implicate the client in the very matter for which he sought legal
advice. See, e.g., United States v. Strahl, 590 F2d 10, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1978) (distinguishing from Baird for lack
of furthering the policies behind attorney-client relationship), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 918 (1979); In re Grand
Jury Investigation, 631 F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir. 1980) (suggesting that disclosure of third party paying legal fees
would not violate attorney-client relationship), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 (1981); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings in Matter of Fine, 641 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that disclosure of a client's name
would violate privilege only if it would implicate the client in criminal acitivity for which legal counsel was
sought); In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447, 452 (6th Cir. 1983) (adopting the "legal
advice" exception from Baird), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984); United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F2d
1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating an exception from Baird where a client's identity and nature of client's fee
arrangement may be privileged where person invoking the privilege can show that strong probability exists that
disclosure of such information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice
was sought). However, most of these courts later questioned or narrowed these holdings in favor of a
confidential communications exception. See In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591,593 (9th Cir. 1983) (suggesting that
a client's name may be considered confidential communication where incriminating substance has previously
been revealed).
Another exception to the general rule that identity of the client is not privileged, the "last link" doctrine,
which purported to protect client identity where disclosure would constitute the "last link" in a chain of proof of
the client's wrong-doing, has generally been abandoned in favor of a confidential communications analysis. See
In re Grand Jury Subpoena for Attorney Representing Criminal Defendant Reyes-Requena, 913 F.2d 1118,
1124-25 (5th Cir. 1990) (rejecting last link in favor of confidential communications exception), cert. denied sub
nom. DeGuerin v. United States, 499 U.S. 959 (1991); In re Grand Jury Matter No. 91-01386, 969 F.2d 995, 998
(1 1th Cir. 1992) (accepting the last link doctrine, but concluding it only applies to confidential communications); In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35 (Durant), 723 F.2d 447, 453-54 (6th Cir. 1983) (noting the
fairness of last link doctrine, but rejecting it), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984).
129. United States v. Sims, 845 F.2d 1564, 1568 (11 th Cir.) ("This circuit has consistently held that matters
involving the receipt of fees from a client are not generally privileged."), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 957 (1988); see

HeinOnline -- 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 698 1995-1996

1996]

MISUSE OF "ETHICAL RULES"

(c) The general subject of the consultation or nature of the work performed by
the attorney. 30
(d) Pre-existing documents
given to the attorney by the client;' 3'
132
(e) Physical evidence;
(f) An attorney's notification to his client
concerning the date by which the
33
1
required;
is
court
in
appearance
client's
134
(g) Information obtained from third parties;
(h) The independent personal observations of the attorney,
including observa35
tions of the client's physical condition or appearance;
36
(i) Statements of the client made in the presence of third parties;
also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Thurs. Special Grand Jury Sept. Term, 1991, 33 F.3d 342, 354 (4th Cir. 1994)
(stating that the attorney-client privilege normally does not extend to the payment of attorneys' fees and
expenses); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Goodman), 33 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir.) (noting that information
regarding the attorney-client fee arrangement is normally not privileged communication), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 187 (1994); In re Grand Jury Subpoena for Attorney Representing Criminal Defendant, Reyes-Requena, 913
F.2d 1118, 1123 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 959 (1991) ("We have long recognized the general rule
that matters involving the payment of fees and the identity of clients are not generally privileged."). The general
rule that fee information is not privileged remains true even if disclosure of the information would tend to
incriminate the client. United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935 F.2d 501, 505 (2d Cir. 1991); In re
Witnesses Before the Special March 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir. 1984).
130. See, e.g., Behrens v. Hironimus, 170 F.2d 627, 628 (4th Cir. 1948) ("[the client or the attorney may be
permitted or compelled to testify as to the fact of his employment as attorney, or as to the fact of his having
advised his client to a certain matter, or performed certain services for the client"); see generally RICE, supra
note 85, § 6:21, at 464-66 (maintaining that the factual context of each consultation and communication may
give rise to an attorney-client privilege).
131. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,403-04 (1976).
132. "The privilege is not generally viewed as affording the attorney license to withhold evidence from the
judicial system." 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 118, § 89, at 328 n. 12; see also, e.g., In re January 1976 Grand Jury,
534 F.2d 719, 722 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that the privilege was inapplicable to money turned over to an
attorney by clients suspected of bank robbery).
133. United States v. Innella, 821 F.2d 1566, 1567 (11 th Cir. 1987); United States v. Clemons, 676 F.2d 124,
125 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); Walsh v. United States, 623 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994
(1980); United States v. Freeman, 519 F.2d 67, 68 (9th Cir. 1975).
134. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 113, § 2317, at 619; see also United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F2d 280, 282 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied,377 U.S. 976 (1964).
135. See, e.g., 8 WIGMORE, supra note 113, § 2306, at 590 (explaining that information coming to an
attorney's attention by mere observation without any action on the client's part is not "communications" of the
client, and thus not privileged); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 116, § 5.12, at 375 (stating that the
"privilege cannot be claimed to prevent the attorney from testifying to observations about the client's
appearance, dress, physical condition, demeanor, or conduct, at least where such matters are generally
observable by others"); United States v. Pipkins, 528 F.2d 559, 563 (5th Cir.) (holding that physical
characteristics observable by anyone are not privileged), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 952 (1976); Darrow v. Gunn,
594 F.2d 767, 774 (9th Cir.) (same), cert.denied, 444 U.S. 849 (1979); United States v. Kendrick, 331 F.2d 110,
114 (4th Cir. 1964) (same).
136. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 113, § 2311, at 599-603; see also United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 553
(10th Cir. 1985) (stating that a communication between defendant's companion and his attorney in defendant's
presence was not confidential); United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641, 645 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that
disclosures made in multidefendant cases between defendants and their counsel must be made in circumstances
that indicate they were made in confidence); United States v. Landof, 591 F.2d 36, 39 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding
that an attorney who was present at a meeting between defendant and his counsel was not acting as an attorney
or agent at that meeting, and therefore the communication did not come within the attorney-client privilege).
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(j) Communications originally privileged as to which the privilege has been
waived37due to subsequent disclosure by either attorney or client to a third
party;

1

(k) The "crime-fraud" exception, that is, communications that would otherwise be protected by the attorney-client privilege, but which lose their privileged
status because
they are made in furtherance of an ongoing or contemplated crime
38
or fraud.'
Modern American courts have measured claims for inclusion within the
attorney-client privilege against its utilitarian justification. 139 There is universal
agreement that the policy underlying the privilege is one of promoting candid
so the attorney-client relationship can function in
attorney-client communications
40
a socially beneficial way.'

137. 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 118, § 93, at 347-48; see also Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. Sweeney, 29
F.3d 120, 125 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that the attorney-client privilege was waived when the client transmitted
allegedly privileged documents to parties outside of that relationship); Ward v. Succession of Freemen, 854 F.2d
780 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that defendants did not automatically waive the attorney-client privilege by
attempting to use privileged communications to demonstrate good-faith reliance on counsel's advice concerning
tender offer, where district court had compelled disclosure of privileged communications), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1065 (1989); In re Von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 100-07 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that publication of book by
attorney waived privilege as to communications revealed).
138. 1 McCormick, supra note 118, § 95, at 351 n.3 ("The privileged communications may be a shield of
defense as to crimes already committed, but it cannot be used as a guard or weapon of offense to enable persons
to carry out contemplated crimes against society.") (quoting Gebhardt v. United Ry. Co., 220 S.W. 677, 699
(Mo. 1920)); see also United States v. Davis, 1 F.3d 606, 610 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that the attorney-client
privilege is waived when the client uses the attorney-client relationship to engage in fraudulent or criminal
activity rather than merely to defend against charges), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1216 (1994); In re Federal Grand
Jury Proceedings 89-10 (MIA.), 938 F.2d 1578, 1581 (lth Cir. 1991) (stating that post-crime repetition or
discussion of such earlier communications, made in confidence to an attorney, may still be privileged even
though those earlier communications were not privileged because of crime-fraud exception).
139. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) ("[S]ince the privilege has the effect of
withholding relevant information from the factfinder, it applies only where necessary to achieve its purpose.
Accordingly, it protects only those disclosures - necessary to obtain informed legal advice - which might not
have been made absent the privilege."); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) ("privilege 'is
founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge
of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from
the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure' ") (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888));
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985) (noting that since the
attorney-client privilege promotes full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients, it
encourages observance of the law and aids in the administration of justice).
Various commentators have suggested that the attorney-client privilege ought to be justified and applied
(usually, in the view of such authors, more expansively) on other, non-utilitarian, grounds. The most common
alternative justification is a privacy theory. See, Note, Developments, supra note 120, at 1503-04, (summarizing
the leading alternative theories). Such efforts have "achieved only very little recognition in the courts." I
MCCORMICK, supra note 118, § 87, at 315-16. One observer recently proclaimed the "death of the rights-based
arguments for the attorney-client privilege," saying, "IT]he former solicitude for personal rights no longer
animates discussions of the attorney-client privilege. Instead, commentators now debate the merits of the
utilitarian rationale." Note, Attorney-Client and Work ProductProtection in a UtilitarianWorld: An Argument
for Recomparison, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1697, 1704-05 (1995) [hereinafter Note, Utilitarian].
140. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Class Actions: Fashioning An Exception to Promote
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ii. The Work Product Privilege
The other legal doctrine that protects from disclosure information an attorney
may have concerning a client is the work product privilege. This privilege is of
recent origin. It springs from the Supreme Court's 1947 decision in Hickman v.
Taylor.141
Hickman established three basic propositions: (1) Material collected by
counsel in the course of preparation for possible litigation is protected from
disclosure in discovery. (2) That protection is qualified, in that the adversary may
obtain discovery on showing sufficient need for the material. (3) The attorney's
thinking - theories, analysis, mental impressions, beliefs, etc. - is at the heart
of the adversary system, and privacy is essential for the attorney's thinking; thus,
the protection is greatest, if not absolute, for materials that would reveal that part
1 42

of the work product.

While the work product privilege is applied primarily in civil cases, 143 its
protection is available in criminal cases, at both the grand jury 44 and trial
stages. 14 5 In both civil and criminal cases, the normal principle applicable to all
assertions of privilege applies to the work product area. That is, one who claims
46
the benefit of a privilege bears the burden of proving that the privilege applies.'
Work product protection is in some respects broader, and in other respects

Adequacy of Representation,97 HARv. L. REv. 947, 948 (1984) (noting that the attorney-client privilege does
not bar an inquiry into disputed underlying facts, but only blocks a source of evidence concerning those facts).
141. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The Hickman opinion is not only the seminal statement on the work product
doctrine, but its occasionally delphic pronouncements remain the standard against which "work product"
claims must still be judged. See 1 McCoRMICK, supra note 118, § 96, at 358-59. This is so because the rule of
Hickman has been partially, but only partially, codified in both the federal civil and criminal rules. FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(3); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a), (b)(2). Hickman extends protection beyond the limits of those rules.
142. Epstein & Martin, supranote 109, at 102.
143. Epstein & Martin, supra note 109, at 109 ("[Mlost work-product issues arise in the context of civil
discovery .... "); see generally Jeff A. Anderson et al., The Work ProductDoctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 760,
785 (1983) (pointing out that the work-product privilege is designed to preserve the benefits of the adversarial
process without frustrating the goals of open discovery).
144. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 810-11 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Duffy), 473
F2d 840, 843-44 (8th Cir. 1973).
145. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975).
146. Epstein & Martin, supra note 109, at 107. See also Nutmeg Ins. Co. v. Atwell, Vogel & Sterling, 120
F.R.D. 504, 510 (W.D. La. 1988) (noting that the burden of proving the existence of the attorney-client or
work-product privileges rests on the party claiming the privilege); Shiner v. American Stock Exch., 28 F.R.D.
34, 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (asserting that an individual cannot defeat discovery simply by claiming that everything
he knows is privileged). As with the attorney-client privilege, blanket claims of work product immunity will not
be entertained; such claims must be specific. Id. Once the party opposing disclosure makes a prima facie
showing that the material sought is work product, it is protected from disclosure unless the party seeking
disclosure can make an adequate showing of need. Epstein & Martin, supra note 109, at 108. The difficulty of
the required showing of need increases to virtual impossibility the nearer the material sought approaches the
"opinion work product" category. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (stating that the party requesting work-product
information must show substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party
is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means); Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 399-401 (198 1) (stating that oral statements made by a witness to an attorney
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narrower, than that afforded by the attorney-client privilege.' 4 7 It bears emphasis
that there is a wide spectrum of material and information that an attorney may
have concerning a client that is protected by neither the attorney-client nor the
work product privilege.
Finally, the justification for work product protection, like that for the attorneyclient privilege, is expressly utilitarian. 148 Indeed, the Supreme Court appears to
view the justifications for the two doctrines as nearly identical. 149 In Upjohn Co.
v. United States,150 the Court relied upon work product precedents, particularly
Hickman v. Taylor, to justify its delineation of the proper scope of the attorneyclient privilege. 15' It is fair to say that the Supreme Court sees the two privileges
of privacy 152
as two tools employed in a common project of fashioning a zone
within which the attorney-client relationship can flourish without simultaneously
choking competing systemic imperatives such as the tribunal's right to every
modem preference for open discovery in both
man's evidence and the increasing
1 53
civil and criminal cases.
iii. The Power to Create and Define Evidentiary Privileges in Federal Criminal
Cases is Reserved to Congress and the Federal Courts
When performing the utilitarian calculus used to define the scope of evidentiary privileges in federal criminal cases, the Supreme Court is exercising a
power expressly reserved by Congress to itself and to the federal courts acting as
would only be discoverable in rare cases); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809-10 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that
"extraordinary justification" is required for production of attorney work product).
147. For example, the work product privilege is limited to materials created in anticipation of litigation,
where the attorney-client privilege extends to confidential communications made during any of the various
types and stages of attorney-client interaction: counselling, legal advice, etc. Conversely, within the litigation
context, the term work product may encompass a number of things (memoranda, briefs, etc.) that neither are nor
contain confidential attorney-client communications.
148. The work product doctrine "is an intensely practical one, grounded in the realities of litigation in our
adversary system." Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 358 (1989); see also
Note, Utilitarian, supra note 139, at 1704 (arguing for a re-evaluation of the differences in scope between the
attorney-client privilege and the work product immunity doctrine in light of the modern shift toward wholly
utilitarian justifications for each protection); Anderson et al., supra note 143, at 785 (pointing out that the
work-product doctrine is designed to preserve the benefits of the adversarial system without frustrating the goals
of open discovery).
149. See Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1605,
1623-24 (1986) (indicating that the court in Upjohn blends attorney-client and work product ideas); Note,
Utilitarian, supra note 139, at 1700 (noting that courts have grounded attorney-client and work product
protections in the same rationale).
150. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
151. Id. at 391-97.
152. "[It is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy .. " Id. at 397-98 (quoting
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,511 (1947)).
153. "Commentators and courts agree that the function of work product immunity is to preserve the benefits
of adverse representation without frustrating the goals of open discovery." Anderson et al., supra note 143, at
785.

HeinOnline -- 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 702 1995-1996

19961

MISUSE OF "ETHICAL RULES"

common law judges. In 1972, the Supreme Court promulgated a proposed set of
uniform Federal Rules of Evidence 154 that contained provisions listing nine
separate testimonial privileges,' 5 5 including the attorney-client privilege. 156 The
new rules of evidence were supposed to take effect in July 1973,157 but Congress,
in large measure because of concerns about the sections on privileges, stepped in
and prohibited the rules' adoption without congressional approval.' 58 After
extensive debate and revision, Congress finally approved the Federal Rules of
Evidence in January 1975.159
The key aspect of the congressionally revised rules is that Congress deleted
every one of the specific privilege rules that had been initially promulgated by the
Supreme Court, leaving in their place a single rule, Rule 501.160 Rule 501 merely
states, in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court

pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principlesof the
common law as they may be interpretedby the courts of the United States in the
light of reason and experience. 161

The legislative history of Rule 501 is crystal clear that the law governing the
availability of testimonial privileges in federal criminal cases is to be federal
common law - rules developed by federal courts in the adjudication of actual
cases or controversies. 162 Following the adoption by Congress of the revised
154. In 1934, Congress had conferred upon the Supreme Court the authority to promulgate rules regulating
the practice and procedure of federal courts. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended,28 U.S.C.
§§ 2071, 2072 (1970) ("the Rules Enabling Act"). Before 1934, the general rule was that each federal trial court
conformed its practices to those of the state courts where it sat. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges
in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed FederalRules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 62 (1973);
PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, 56 F.R.D. 184, 230-61 (1972). The Court acted quickly to create rules
of civil and criminal procedure, but hesitated to create rules of evidence in some measure due to doubts about
the scope of its authority under the Rules Enabling Act.
155. PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE at 234-55.

156. Id. at 235-37 (proposed rule 503).
157. Id. at 184.
158. Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973).
159. Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 3, 88 Stat. 1949 (1975).
160. Id.
161. FED. R. Ev1D. 501 (emphasis added).
162. The House Judiciary Committee wrote, "The Committee amended Article V to eliminate all of the
Court's specific Rules on privileges. Instead, the Committee, through a single Rule 501, left the law of
privileges in its present state and further provided that privileges shall continue to be developed by the courts of
the United States under a uniform standard applicable both in civil and criminal cases." H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973) (emphasis added).
The Senate Judiciary Committee wrote, "The committee agrees with the main thrust of the House
amendment: that afederally developed common law based on modern reason and experience shallapply except
where the State nature of the issues renders deference to State privilege law the wiser course, as in the usual
diversity case." S. REI. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974) (emphasis added).
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FederalRules of Evidence, the Supreme Court confirmed this understanding of
congressional intent. In Upjohn,163 the Court rejected the idea that it should
"undertake to draft a set of rules which should govern challenges to investigatory
saying that "[a]ny such approach would violate the spirit of [F.R.E.]
subpoenas,"
- 164

501."

In 1988, Congress made its intentions regarding the development of federal
privilege law even more explicit. It enacted Title Twenty-eight, United States
Code, Section 2074, concerning the procedure to be followed by the Supreme
Court in enacting rules of procedure and evidence. Section 2074(b) reads as
follows: "Any such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary
65
privilege shall have no force or effect unless approvedby an Act of Congress." 1
In sum, changes in the law of evidentiary privilege in federal criminal cases
can occur in only three ways: (1) federal courts can make changes through
evolution of federal common law; (2) Congress can make changes by statute; and
(3) the Supreme Court, but not lower federal courts, can make changes by rule
with the express permission of Congress.
iv. Summary: Model Rule 3.8(f) and Federal Privilege Law
Model Rule 3.8(f), as adopted in 1990, would radically alter the common law
of evidentiary privilege developed over the past four centuries. Moreover, it is an
attempt to substitute the judgment of state bar regulators for that of Congress and
the federal courts in making privilege law in federal cases, a result Congress has
expressly forbidden.
Consider the particulars of the rule. 166 The most immediately striking feature
of the rule is subsection 3.8(f)(1)(i), which provides that a prosecutor may not
even issue a subpoena unless "the prosecutor reasonably believes ...the
information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege." 167 When read in conjunction with the subsection 3.8(f)(2) requirement of
"prior judicial approval" of the subpoena, this passage plainly means that the
prosecutor must satisfy a judge of the non-existence of any privilege before the
subpoena can issue.' 68 This provision alone turns 400 years of Anglo-American
The conference committee was still more explicit: "Rule 501 deals with the privilege of a witness not to
testify. Both the House and Senate bills provide that federal privilege law applies in criminal cases." H.R.

CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974) (emphasis added).
163. 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981).
164. id.
165. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
166. See supra note 69 (citing the full text of Model Rule 3.8(f)).
167. MODEL RULES Rule 3.8(f) (emphasis added).
168. See id. The rule does not say this in plain terms, but the interpretation is inescapable. Subsection (f)(1)
sets out three categories of reasonable belief that a prosecutor must have before issuing the subpoena.
Subsection (0(2) requires judicial approval of the subpoena after an adversary hearing. The rule clearly intends
that the subject matter of the hearing, the issue on which the judge must pass before approving the subpoena,
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privilege law on its head. As discussed above, the ancient and universal rule
governing both the attorney-client and work product privileges is that the party
seeking the protection
of a privilege must bear the burden of establishing its
69
1
applicability.
Moreover, Model Rule 3.8(f) does not limit its coverage to privileges designed
to protect the attorney-client relationship. The prosecutor must disprove the
existence of "any applicable privilege" so long as the witness is an attorney and
the information sought is "about a past or present client." 170 Accordingly, this
rule would reverse the burden of proof even if the subject of the subpoena was,
for example, crimes committed by an attorney against his client and the privilege
potentially at issue was the attorney's own Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.
In addition, Rule 3.8(f) protects material far beyond the limits of the attorneyclient privilege in any of its forms. The rule covers, without limitation, all
"evidence about a past or present client."'' 7 t There is no requirement that
protected information have been imparted by the client "in confidence," or even
that the information have any connection with a communication either from or to
a client. Thus, to embrace Rule 3.8(f) is to abandon the utilitarian calculus that
was at the core of Wigmore's thought, which the U.S. Supreme Court embraced
in Upjohn, and which numberless lesser American courts have employed for
nearly a century to determine the scope of the attorney-client privilege.
As for the work product privilege, Rule 3.8(f) contains no limitation either to
material created in anticipation of litigation, or to material revealing lawyers'
mental processes. Indeed, the rule is not limited to information acquired during,
or even as a result of the existence of, an attorney-client relationship. The rule
simply creates a blanket, albeit conditional,
presumption against any lawyer
72
1
client.
any
against
evidence
giving any

will be the reasonableness of the prosecutor's beliefs as to the existence of the factors enumerated in subsection
(f)(1). Consequently, the prosecutor has no option but to prove to the judge, among other things, why no
privilege applies.
169. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (stating this rule and citing supporting authority); see also In
re Certain Complaints Under Investigation, 783 E2d 1488, 1518 (11th Cir.) (listing cases stating the principle
that proponent of attorney-client privilege bears burden of establishing its applicability), cert. denied, 477 U.S.
904 (1986).
170. MODEL RULES Rule 3.8(f) (emphasis added).
171. MODEL RULES Rule 3.8(f) (emphasis added).
172. It might be argued that Rule 3.8(f) does not really expand the attorney-client or work product privileges
because it does not categorically prohibit a prosecutor from seeking or obtaining information outside the scope
of those privileges as currently construed. This is true, but sophistical. All privileges are conditional. They say,
in essence, that certain kinds of information will be exempt from the usual insistence that courts are entitled to
every person's evidence if specified conditions are met. Any definition of a privilege is, rightly considered,
merely a list of the conditions. In the past, the list of conditions under which a prosecutor could not obtain
information from an attorney about a client was the list in Wigmore's, supra note 124 and accompanying text, or
Judge Wyzanski's, supra note 125, definition of the attorney-client privilege, or the description of the reach of
the work product privilege in Hickman, supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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The rule would accomplish all these changes through mechanisms that are in
themselves unprecedented. First, the rule incorporates in an ethical standard a
form of evidentiary privilege. Next, the rule seeks to give the ethical rule the
force of law: (a) by, in effect, requiringjudicial participation in contemporaneous
determinations of whether the standards of the ethical rule have been violated,
and (b) by imposing sanctions, not on the attorney holder of the client confidence,
but on the government attorney seeking disclosure.
b. Model Rule 3.8(f) Is Inconsistent with Established Federal Grand Jury
Practice and Procedure
Not only would Model Rule 3.8(f) alter federal privilege law, it violates two
fundamental principles of federal grand jury practice ' the independence of the
grand jury and the secrecy of its proceedings - and is, at a minimum,
inconsistent with the FederalRules of CriminalProcedure.
i. Independence of the Grand Jury / Rule 17(c) of the FederalRules of
Criminal Procedure
The first principle of federal grand practice violated by Model Rule 3.8(f) is the
"grand jury's functional independence from the judicial branch," which is
manifested in its broad investigative powers. 17 3 Defense counsel have argued that
grand jury subpoenas to various classes of witnesses, not only attorneys, should
be subject to pre-compliance judicial review of their relevance and reasonableness. In response, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, because of the
independent character of the grand jury, witnesses have no right under the Fourth
Model Rule 3.8(f) alters the list of pre-conditions for obtaining client information in two ways: First, as noted
above, it reverses the normal presumption applicable to all claims of privilege by requiring that the prosecutor
make a preliminary showing of the non-existence of each of tl e traditional conditions defining a testimonial
privilege. See supra notes 166-69 (comparing the burdens in Rule 3.8(t) to traditional formulations of
attorney-client and work product privileges' burdens). Second, it adds to the accepted lists of conditions:
prosecutorial showings of necessity (MODEL RULES Rule 3.8(f)(1)(ii)) and exhaustion of other sources of
information (MODEL RULES Rule 3.8(f)(l)(iii)).
173. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 48 (1992). A grand jury "can investigate merely on suspicion
that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not." United States v. Morton Salt,
338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950), quoted with approval in Williams, 504 U.S. at 48. It is not required to identify the
person it suspects, or even "the precise nature of the offense" it is investigating. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S.
273,282 (1919). Grand juries are empowered to receive and consider information from virtually any source and
are not constrained by the rules of evidence. FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(2) (exempting grand jury proceedings from
rules of evidence other than those respecting privileges); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974)
(observing that grand juries are generally "unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules
governing the conduct of criminal trials"); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956) (holding an
indictment valid even if based purely on hearsay). Even though they may not compel evidence or testimony in
violation of a recognized constitutional or common law privilege, Williams, 504 U.S. at 49, they may hear
evidence previously obtained in violation of a target's constitutional rights. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349-52.
Moreover, a witness will not be heard to complain that the evidence requested from him is merely cumulative.
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 13 (1973).
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Amendment, to challenge the relevance or reasonableness of grand jury subpoenas. 174 Witnesses do have the right under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
17(c), to move to quash or modify subpoenas duces tecum "if compliance would
be unreasonable or oppressive."' 175 However, the Court has recently construed
even this rule-based avenue of attack very narrowly.
In United States v. R. Enterprises,1 76 the Supreme Court reviewed a decision
by the Fourth Circuit concerning grand jury subpoenas to distributors of "adult
entertainment." 177 The Court of Appeals imposed a requirement that the government make a preliminary showing that the targets of the subpoena were subject to
prosecution in the district and that the materials sought would be relevant and
admissible at trial against the subjects. 178
The Supreme Court reversed. 179 The Court disapproved of the Fourth Circuit's
reliance on United States v. Nixon, 180 which held that when a trial subpoena
duces tecum is challenged under FederalRule of Criminal Procedure 17(c), the

government is obliged to establish three things to avoid quashal: relevance,
admissibility and specificity. 18 ' The Court also specifically forbade the application of the Nixon test to grand jury subpoenas. 182 The Court went on to say:
[A] grand jury subpoena issued through normal channels is presumed to be
reasonable, and the burden of showing unreasonableness must be on the
recipient who seeks to avoid compliance. Indeed, this result is indicated by the
language of Rule 17(c), which permits a subpoena to be quashed only "on

motion" and "if compliance would be unreasonable." To the extent the Court
of
83
Appeals placedan initialburden on the Government, it committed error.1
174. Dionisio,410 U.S. at 15; United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973).
175. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c). The apparent conflict between the Court's Fourth Amendment cases and Rule
17(c) is resolved by recognition that the word "unreasonable" is being used in two different senses. In Dionisio
and Mara, the Court holds that grand jury subpoenas are not searches or seizures covered by the Fourth
Amendment, and are therefore not reviewable under Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" standards. Dionisio,
410 U.S. at 15; Mara, 410 U.S. at 22. Rule 17(c), by contrast, uses "unreasonable" in its ordinary sense of being
burdensome, oppressive or intrusive. See United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 303 (1991)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
176. 498 U.S. 292 (1991).
177. In re Grand Jury 87-3 Subpoena Duces Tecum, 884 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 292
(1991).
178. 884 F.2d at 778-79. The decision was seemingly moved by the prospect that the subpoena might violate
the distributor's First Amendment rights. Id. at 777.
179. R. Enterprises., 498 U.S. at 297.
180. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
181. Id. at 699-700.
182. R. Enterprises,498 U.S. at 300.
183. Id. at 301 (last emphasis added). The Court went on to consider the standard of proof that should be
imposed on a witness once he has made a proper motion under Rule 17(c). It viewed a claim of lack of relevance
as a type of Rule 17(c) unreasonableness argument, saying "where, as here, a subpoena is challenged on
relevancy grounds, the motion to quash must be denied unless the district court determines that there is no
reasonable possibility that the category of materials the Government seeks will produce information relevant to
the general subject of the grand jury's investigation." Id. The Court suggested, without expressly so holding,
that "a court may be justified in a case where unreasonableness is alleged in requiring the Government to reveal
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The Supreme Court's ruling in R. Enterpriseswas consistent with the virtually

unanimous refusal of lower federal courts to require pre-compliance showings84by
1
the government of the relevance or reasonableness of grand jury subpoenas.
The principle of grand jury independence is also manifested in the deference
given its determination of probable cause. A federal grand jury's determination
that probable cause exists to believe that a person committed an offense is not
reviewable, even after an indictment has been returned. 185 Yet Model Rule
3.8(f)(1)(ii) purports to require a district court to review the progress of an
ongoing investigation to determine not merely whether evidence is relevant to
"essential" to an indictment the grand jury
that investigation, but whether it is 86
'
future.
the
in
return
to
decide
might

the general subject of the grand jury's investigation before requiring the challenging party to carry its burden of
persuasion." Id. at 302 (emphasis added).
184. Before R. Enterprises,every circuit but the First and Third had rejected such requirements. See, e.g., In
re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 243-44, 246-47, (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1108 (1986); In re Grand Jury Matter, 926 F.2d 348, 350 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Grand Jury Subpoena for
Attorney Representing Reyes-Requena, 913 F.2d 1118, 1127, 1129 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 959
(1991); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Hellmann, 756 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
84-1-24 No. 1, Battle, III, 748 F.2d 327 (6th Cir. 1984); In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir. 1985); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 791 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1986); In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 594 n.l(9th Cir. 1983);
In re Grand Jury Proceeding, Schofield, 721 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Anderson),
906 F.2d 1485, 1495-96 (10th Cir. 1990); Inre Grand Jury Proceedings, 88-89, 899 F.2d 1039 (1 th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Sims, 845 F.2d 1564, 1568-69 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 957 (1988); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817, 825 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); Inre
Grand Jury Proceedings, Freeman, 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11th Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Bowe,
694 F.2d 1256, 1258 (1 1th Cir. 1982); In re Slaughter, 694 F.2d 1258, 1260 (1 th Cir. 1982).
In In re Grand Jury Proceedings(Schofield 1), 486 F.2d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 1973), the Third Circuit imposed a
requirement that the government make a minimal showing of relevance after a witness had received a subpoena
and made a motion to quash under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c), but it has since repeatedly
rejected invitations to impose any requirement on government attorneys before the subpoena is issued and
served. See United States v. Oliva, 611 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding that Schofield I "did not deal with
procedural safeguards surrounding the issuance of grand jury subpoenas"); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(McNab), 658 F.2d 211,213 (3d Cir. 1981) (Schofield I did "not purport to encompass the appropriateness of an
appearance before the grand jury.") (emphasis in original). In Backiel, the Third Circuit specifically refused to
require the government to show that a subpoenaed attorney is the only practical source of the demanded
information and that there is a heightened need for the evidence because such requirements "would obviously
impair the efficiency of grand juries." In re Grand Jury Matter (Backiel), 906 F.2d 78, 88 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 980 (1990). Finally, in the wake of R. Enterprises,the Third Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's
holding in that case to rule that Pennsylvania could not apply a state ethics rule analogous to Model Rule 3.8(f)
to federal prosecutors. Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 975 F.2d 102 (3d Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1578 (1993). For a discussion of Baylson, see infra notes 193-203 and
accompanying text.
The work of the First Circuit, the only circuit court to approve of pre-issuance judicial review of grand jury
subpoenas, is discussed infra notes 204-57 and accompanying text.
185. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362-63 (1956); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 342-45
(1974); United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 36 (1992) ("[I]t would make little sense to abstain from
reviewing the evidentiary support for the grand jury's judgment while scrutinizing the sufficiency of the
prosecutor's presentation.").
186. MODEL RULES Rule 3.8(f)(l)(ii).
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ii. Grand Jury Secrecy

Model Rule 3.8(f) would violate the traditional rule of grand jury secrecy. 18 7 In
order for there to be an "adversary proceeding" at which the recipient of the
subpoena could litigate the questions of whether the requested evidence was
"essential to the successful completion of [the] investigation" 1 88 or whether
there was any other "feasible alternative" to the subpoena,18 9 the prosecutor
would be obliged to lay out his entire case in the hearing of an attorney who
would often be counsel to one of the targets of the grand jury probe. 190
c. Model Rule 3.8(f) in Conflict with Federal Law: The Cases
Because only nine states have adopted Model Rule 3.8(f) or some analogue,' 9 '
the occasions for federal court challenges to the rule have been few. The handful
192
of cases that have considered the issue are worthy of some discussion.
i. The Third Circuit: Baylson
In Baylson v. DisciplinaryBoard,19 3 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit invalidated Rule 3.10 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional
Conduct,19 4 a rule similar to Model Rule 3.8(f), t 9 5 as it applied to federal

prosecutors.
187. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the rule of grand jury secrecy).
188. MODEL RULES Rule 3.8(f)(l)(ii).
189. MODEL RuLES Rule 3.8(f)(l)(iii).
190. Proponents of the rule undoubtedly view this implicit requirement of disclosure as a good thing, either
because it provides grand jury targets with a broad avenue for discovery or because the desire of prosecutors to
avoid such discovery will deter the issuance of attorney subpoenas. But that, of course, misses the present point.
Even if such unprecedented disclosure would be a good thing, it is still an unprecedented thing and contrary to
existing federal law.
191. See supra note 70 for a list of states.
192. In addition to the cases discussed below, the Department of Justice sought declaratory judgment in
Colorado federal district court that the ColoradoRules of ProfessionalConduct concerning attorney subpoenas
(Rule 3.8(f)) and providing exculpatory evidence to the grand jury (Rule 3.3(d)) were unenforceable against
federal prosecutors. The district judge declined to rule on the merits of the department's application on the
ground that it was not ripe because no actual state ethics complaint had been brought against a federal
prosecutor under the rules at issue. United States v. Colorado Supreme Court, 871 F. Supp. 1328, 1329 (D. Colo.
1994).
193. 975 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied 113 S.Ct. 1578 (1993).
194. PA. STAT. ANN. RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.10 (1994) [hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA RULES].
195. Rule 3.10 is similar to Model Rule 3.8(0, but its operative language is broken into two parts - the text
of the rule itself, which contains the simple injunction that a prosecutor shall not subpoena an attorney to
provide evidence about a current or former client without "prior judicial approval," followed by a "Comment."
Id. The unique feature of Rule 3.10 appears in the comment, which begins as follows:
It is intended that the required "prior judicial approval" will normally be withheld unless.., the court
finds (1)the information sought is not protectedfrom disclosure by Rule 1.6, the attorney-client
privilege or the work product doctrine ....(Emphasis added.)
PENNSYLVANIA RULES Rule 3.10 cmt.
What makes this provision striking is the fact that Rule 1.6 defines an attorney's ethical obligation of
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Following the adoption of Rule 3.10 by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, all
three of the federal judicial districts in Pennsylvania revised their local rules to
prevent its application in their courts. 19 6 Federal prosecutors from all three
Pennsylvania districts then joined in a single suit contending that they were
rule.1 97 The U.S. District Court for the
exempt from the operation of the state 198
agreed.
Pennsylvania
of
Eastern District
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed, finding that Rule 3.10 "falls outside the
rule-making authority of the district courts, and its enforcement as state law
violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution." 1 99 It based its
holding on two conclusions: First, Rule 3.10 "seeks to establish a broad
mechanism for pre-service judicial review of attorney subpoenas, with attendant
rules of procedure and rules of evidence," and it therefore exceeds the power of
district courts under FederalRule of Criminal Procedure57 to make local rules
concerning "matter[s] of detail. ' ' 200 Second, Rule 3.10 is contrary to the
principle derived from the Supreme Court's rulings, in R. Enterprises and
Williams, that a "district court may not under the guise of its supervisory power
of substantive restraint on the
or its local rule-making power, impose the sort
' 21
3.10.
Rule
by
contemplated
is
that
grand jury

non-disclosure of client information. PENNSYLVANIA RULES Rule 1.6. In short, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
explicitly and unambiguously set out to convert an attorney's personal ethical obligation of non-disclosure into
an evidentiary rule equal in stature to the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine and enforceable
against the government in the person of the prosecutor.
196. Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd., 764 F Supp. 328, 331 (E.D. Pa. 1991), affd, 975 F2d 102 (3d Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1578 (1993). Each of the district courts had previously adopted the PennsylvaniaRules
of Professional Conduct as local rules under 28 U.S.C. § 207 l(a) and FederalRule of Criminal Procedure 57.
After review of Rule 3.10, each court specifically excluded Rule 3.10 from the rules of professional
responsibility earlier adopted. 764 F. Supp. at 331.
197. Id. at 332.
198. Id. The district court began its opinion by finding that the actions of the federal judges in expelling Rule
3.10 from their local rules had been ineffective because they had failed to give adequate public notice of the
change under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 2071 (b). Id. at 333. Consequently, the court embarked on its
analysis from the premise that Rule 3.10 remained a part of the local rules of all three federal districts. Id. at 336.
The district court's general findings were that Rule 3.10 was "not compatible with the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure or well-settled grand jury practice," id. at 336, that it was invalid as beyond the local
rule-making powers of federal district courts, id. at 348, and that it constituted a violation of the Supremacy
Clause as a state ethics rule applied to federal prosecutors, id. More particularly, the court ruled:
(1) That Rule 3.10 is a rule of criminal procedure in the guise of an ethical rule. Id. at 337;
(2) That "engrafting Rule 3.10 onto the.., local disciplinary rules would place them in conflict with
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)" because the rule would violate principles of grand jury
secrecy. Id. at 338;
(3) That "by interposing impermissible substantive restraints on the grand jury's ability to gather
evidence, Rule 3.10 subverts the authority and autonomy of the grand jury system." Id. at 340;
(4) That Rule 3.10 impermissibly expands the scope of the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 344-45;
(5) That Rule 3.10 violates FederalRule of Criminal Procedure17. Id. at 346-48.
199. Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd., 975 F.2d 102, 104 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 1578 (1993).
200. Id. at 108-09.
201. Id. at 110.
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Beyond the result itself, the most notable aspect of Baylson is its recognition
that the arguments of the proponents of Rule 3.10 are "argument[s] of public
policy" ' 20 2 whose merits must be addressed by Congress or the Supreme Court
acting at the national level. 2 °3
ii. The First Circuit Cases: Klubock and Whitehouse
The only U.S. Court of Appeals that has sustained an ethical rule requiring
pre-issuance judicial screening of attorney subpoenas is the First Circuit. It has
done so twice, first in United States v. Klubock,2° 4 and again more recently in
Whitehouse v. District Court.2 °5 Because the work of the First Circuit in these
cases has been, and will no doubt continue to be, relied upon heavily by
proponents of attorney subpoena rules,20 6 a detailed exegesis is necessary.
(A) Klubock
In Klubock, the First Circuit addressed an ethical rule known as Prosecution
Function 15 ("PF 15"), which had been adopted in 1986 by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts at the urging of the Massachusetts Bar Association.20 7
After the adoption of PF 15, the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts amended
its local rules to include PF 15 as a rule of the district court. 20 8 The Justice
Department brought a declaratory judgment action to enjoin the enforcement of
the rules against federal prosecutors;2 0 9 it was unsuccessful in the district
court. 210 The First Circuit panel that initially heard the case upheld the validity of
202. Id. at 106.
203. Id. at 110-11. The court also observed that, "[W]hatever balance which needs to be stricken [sic]
between the grand jury and the attorney-client relationship, it cannot be achieved by means of the limited power
of the federal district and circuit courts to prescribe local rules." Id. at 112.
204. 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir. 1987) (amended panel), vacated and withdrawn on reh'g, 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir.
1987) (en banc).
205. 53 F.3d 1349 (1st Cir. 1995).
206. See, e.g., MODEL RULES ANN. commentary at 409 (citing to only one federal case, Klubock, in the
annotations to Model Rule 3.8(f)). See also 134 CONG. REc. 21,589-90 (1988) (comments of Sen. Simon on the
occasion of introducing S. 2713, "a bill to provide procedural standards with respect to the issuance of
lawyer-client subpoenas," and noting the decision of First Circuit in Klubock). For further discussion of Sen.
Simon's bill, see supra note 103.
207. Klubock, 832 F.2d at 650; MASS. SuP. JUDICIAL CT. R. 3:08. PF 15 is a lineal predecessor of ABA Model
Rule 3.8(f). According to the annotated version of the Model Rules, published by the ABA itself, the first
resolution concerning attorney subpoenas passed by the ABA House of Delegates was "patterned after
Massachusetts Supreme Court Rule 3:08, Prosecution Function 15 ....
"MODEL RULES ANN., supra note 69, at
409. Nonetheless, PF 15 is different from Rule 3.8(f) in material respects. It says, "It is unprofessional conduct
for a prosecutor to subpoena an attorney to a grand jury without prior judicial approval in circumstances where
the prosecutor seeks to compel the attorney/witness to provide evidence concerning a person who is represented
by the attorney/witness." Id. (quoting MASS. SuP. JUDICIAL CT. R. 3:08).
208. Klubock, 832 F.2d at 650.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 650-51.
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the local rule. 2 " The matter was then reheard en banc. The en banc court split
3-3, with the result that the original district court opinion upholding PF 15's
validity was affirmed by an equally divided court.2 2
(B) Klubock: The "Majority" Opinion
Because PF 15 had been adopted by the local federal district court and thus
became a form of federal law, the First Circuit did not decide the question of
whether application of state bar rules to a federal prosecutor would violate the
the
Supremacy Clause. It focused instead on whether federal district courts had
21 3
power to adopt a rule of this character under its local rule-making authority.
As the Klubock majority itself noted, the power to make local rules is confined
to "(1) procedural rather than substantive matters; (2) which are not inconsistent
with the Federal Rules; or (3) with Federal statutes.", 2 14 The decision to affirm the
district court rested on two premises:
(1) The first premise was that PF 15 does not conflict with federal law because
it is not "inconsistent" with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.215 Judge
Torruella (who wrote both the panel and prevailing en banc opinion) made two
arguments in support of this premise:
(a) He claimed that PF 15 is not inconsistent with Rule 17 because Rule 17(a)
grants authority to the district court clerk to "issue" grand jury subpoenas to
prosecutors upon request, but does not address the right of a prosecutor to serve
the subpoenas once issued.21 6 PF 15, said Judge Torruella, is acceptable because
it imposes a requirement of judicial approval of service on attorneys of subpoenas
already "issued" by the clerk.21 7 As Judge Campbell charitably remarks in his
211. Id. at 658.
212. Id. at 665. The opinion in Klubock is unusually confusing because an "Amended Panel Opinion" is
published at 832 F.2d 649, just before the en banc decision at 832 F.2d 664. While the court says that the panel
opinion has been vacated by the grant of rehearing en banc, id. at 665, both the author of the prevailing
three-judge contingent of the en banc court and Judge Campbell in dissent incorporate their earlier remarks in
the panel opinion by reference. Id. at 665,668. Accordingly, this discussion will treat the amended panel opinion
and dissent, and the en banc opinions and dissents, as it appears they were finally intended, as parts of an
integrated whole.
213. 832 F.2d 649, 652-56, 667. Title 28, United States Code Section 2071 authorizes federal courts to
promulgate rules "for the conduct of their business" that "shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of
practice and procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1988). FederalRule of Criminal
Procedure57 grants each district court the authority to adopt local rules "governing its practice not inconsistent
with these rules." FED. R. CRIM. P. 57 (emphasis added).
214. 832 F.2d at 652 (citations omitted).
215. Id. at 655-56.
216. Id. at 655. Rule 17(a) states, in pertinent part:
For attendance of witnesses; Form; Issuance. A subpoena shall be issued by the clerk under the seal of
the court .... The clerk shall issue a subpoena, signed and sealed but otherwise in blank to a party
requesting it, who shall fill in the blanks before it is served.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a).
217. 832 F.2d at 655-56.
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panel dissent,
"This is far too fine a distinction to provide a convincing
2 18
rationale."
Indeed, the distinction will not survive even momentary scrutiny. Judge
Torruella is saying Rule 17(a) means nothing more than that the clerk has the
power to give a piece of paper to the prosecutor, but that judges retain virtually
plenary authority over whether the prosecutor can convert the paper into a legally
binding subpoena by serving it. This reading not only renders Rule 17(a) a nullity,
but is in direct conflict with firmly entrenched federal case law.Every federal
court to address the question, including the First Circuit, has concluded that Rule
17 means prosecutors have the power to "issue" grand jury subpoenas without
the prior concurrence of the grand jury itself.21 9 When these cases speak of the
prosecutor's power to "issue" a subpoena under Rule 17, they refer to the power
to identify the witnesses and evidence to be presented to the grand jury, and the
necessary concomitant power to draft and serve subpoenas to compel the
production of the evidence desired.2 2 °
The Klubock court confuses matters further in a peculiar passage of the
amended panel opinion:
PF 15 is not aimed at grandjury action. It deals solely with prosecutorial
conduct in the prosecutor's capacity as a member of the bar. If, in fact, a grand
jury acting independently of any prosecutorial influence issues a subpoena
against an attorney/witness, the attorney/witness must honor it, or move to
quash the subpoena in an appropriate manner. Such independent action by a
grand jury has no relevance to PF 15 because none of the ethical concerns
previously mentioned are implicated.221

This distinction fails because it rests on the assertion that federal grand juries
have some inherent authority through a mechanism other than that described in
218. Id. at 660 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
219. For examples of jurisdictions that permit issuance of grand jury subpoenas without prior authorization
of the grand jury, see United States v. Anglian, 784 F.2d 765,769 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 841 (1986);
Doe v. DiGenova, 779 F.2d 74, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1985); United States v. Santucci, 674 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1109 (1983); United States v. Simmons, 591 F.2d 206, 210 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Melvin,
546 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1976); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 593 F. Supp. 92, 94-95 (S.D. Fla. 1984); United
States v. Kleen Laundry & Cleaners, 381 F. Supp. 519, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v. Culver, 224 F
Supp. 419, 432 (D. Md. 1963); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 216 F. Supp. 250, 257 (D. Minn. 1962), affid,
382 U.S. 44 (1965). For additional information, see generally First Nat'l Bank of Tulsa v. Department of Justice,
865 F.2d 217, 220 (10th Cir. 1989) (summarizing cases outlining the scope of federal prosecutors' subpoena
powers); see also BEALE AND BRYsoN, supra note 7, § 6:10, at 60 ("[T]he federal courts have universally
rejected the claim that the prosecutor must secure the prior authorization of the grand jury before he can issue
the subpoena.")
220. Indeed, the First Circuit's reading of Rule 17(a) in Klubock is directly contrary to its own previous
interpretation of the same rule in In re Melvin. There the court wrote, "The United States Attorney may obtain
subpoenas issued in blank by the court, fill in the blanks, and have the witness served without consulting the
grand jury." Melvin, 546 F.2d at 5 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. Rule 17(a); 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrICE 17.06)
(emphasis added).
221. 832 F.2d at 658 (second emphasis added).

HeinOnline -- 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 713 1995-1996

[Vol. 9:665

GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS

Rule 17 to both "issue" and "serve" subpoenas without the cooperation or
concurrence of either the U.S. Attorney or the clerk of the court. While there are
commentators who suggest that such a power exists in theory, in fact such an
event is unheard of, as the court was certainly aware. 22 2
(2) The second pillar of the "majority" opinion in Klubock is its extended
discussion of the rule-making powers of district courtS22 3 and the policy reasons
that are said to justify the exercise of the rule-making power to ameliorate the
concerns aroused by attorney subpoenas.224 Here the majority becomes visibly
schizophrenic. It cannot decide whether the source of the district court's power to
adopt PF 15 is the "broad rule-making powers" district courts possess "by
reason of the inherent nature of the judicial process, ex-statute, ' ' 225 or the very
specific and limited power granted by Federal Rule of CriminalProcedure 57 to

222. The traditional view of the grand jury is as a body with broad investigative powers to be exercised
"independently of either the prosecuting attorney or judge." Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960);
GRAND JURY PROJECT, INC. OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, REPRESENTATION OF WITNESSES BEFORE FEDERAL

(3d ed. 1995) § 2.2(b), at 2-5; see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1973)
(discussing the wide latitude of grand jury investigations); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919)
(same). It is generally recognized, however, that prosecutors direct most aspects of the grand jury process,
including the issuance of grand jury subpoenas. See Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (And
Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 315 (1995) (arguing that prosecutors direct grand jury
investigations, including subpoena process); GRAND JURY PROJECT, supra, § 2.2(b), at 2-6 (stating that common
practice permits U.S. Attorneys or investigators to control subpoena process); In re Melvin, 546 F.2d at 5
(stating that a U.S. Attorney's powers in connection with the grand jury include the power to select the witnesses
to be subpoenaed). It has been suggested that the grand jury has some independent power to issue subpoenas
GRAND JURIES

without the concurrence of the prosecutor. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 702 (1986)

(stating that even where a prosecutor has independent right to subpoena witnesses, the grand jury remains free to
insist that additional witnesses be subpoenaed); ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN

&

LEONARD ORLAND, CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE 326 (1974) (stating that if a prosecutor should refuse to issue subpoenas, the grand jury can have the
court order him to do so); Leipold, supra, at 305 (stating that although a prosecutor normally decides what
evidence will be submitted to the grand jury, jurors have the authority to subpoena additional witnesses and
documents); William J. Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174, 178 (1973)
(contending that grand jurors possess independent power to subpoena witnesses, but this power is rarely, if ever,
invoked). However, courts have acknowledged that this power is more theoretical than real, and that in practice
it is prosecutors who control the issuance of subpoenas. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield 1), 486 F.2d
85, 90 (3d Cir. 1973) (stating that "although grand jury subpoenas are occasionally discussed as if they were the
instrumentalities of the grand jury, they are in fact almost universally instrumentalities of [prosecutors]");
United States v. Martino, 825 F.2d 754, 761 (3d Cir. 1987) (same); Campbell, supra, at 177 (stating that in
practice the prosecutor controls the grand jury, including deciding what witnesses the grand jury will subpoena);
GRAND JURY PROJECT, supra, § 2.2(b), at 2-6 (stating that courts defer to realities of modem grand jury practice
by finding no abuse of the subpoena power when the decision to issue subpoenas was neither made nor approved
by the grand jury); BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 7, § 6:10, at 60 (contending that although in the federal system
a prosecutor has no independent subpoena power, the prosecutor does control what evidence to subpoena, and
need not secure the prior authorization of the grand jury before he can issue a subpoena); United States v. Kleen
Laundry & Cleaners, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 519, 522-23 (1974) (observing that "[tihough the grand jury may
request evidence, the function of issuing process to obtain it belongs to ...the prosecutor," and that "Rule 17 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure... lends statutory authority to the prosecutor's role."). Furthermore,
federal case law provides no evidence of federal grand juries issuing subpoenas independently of the prosecutor.
223. 832 F.2d at 652-53.
224. Id. at 652-55, 667.
225. Id. at 652.
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make local rules.22 6 The indecision is understandable because either choice is a
poor one for the outcome the majority espouses.
On the one hand, the district court quite plainly incorporated PF 15 in its
"Local Rules," 227 and the source of the power to make such rules is FederalRule
of CriminalProcedure 57. On the other hand, if the problem the rule addresses is
as complex and fundamental to the proper functioning of the adversary system as
the court's discussion of the justifications for the rule suggests, the rule can hardly
be characterized as "procedural rather than substantive. ' ' 228 And as Judge
Campbell notes in dissent, it plainly runs afoul of the injunction of the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that Rule22957 is meant
merely to leave leeway for local practices as to "matters of detail."
At the end of the day, a careful reading of the Klubock opinions provides little
solace for proponents of Model Rule 3.8(f). The majority opinion is markedly
deficient, both in its attempt to explain away obvious conflicts between the
concept of pre-issuance judicial screening of subpoenas and current federal law,
and in its effort to shoehorn a sea-change in privilege law and grand jury practice
into the cubby-hole of a local rule.
(C) Whitehouse v. DistrictCourt: Klubock Redux
Nonetheless, it is clear that the First Circuit has never entertained this
disparaging view of its earlier work. In April 1995, a panel of the First Circuit
decided Whitehouse v. DistrictCourt,230 holding that the District Court of Rhode
226. In the panel opinion, the majority declines to specify whether the source of the district court's authority
"derives as a result of statutory delegation or inherent judicial authority." Id. at 652-53. The en banc majority
opinion decided that the district court's action was an "exercise of both the inherent and statutory authority of
the courts to control ethical and procedural matters in their forum." Id. at 667 (emphasis added). In neither
opinion did the prevailing judges specify which among several possible statutes they were actually relying on.
227. Id. at 658.
228. Id. at 652.
229. Id. at 659-60 (quoting FED.R. CRIM. P. 57, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules (b)(2)). The dissents
in Klubock repay attention. The dissent of then-Judge, now-Justice Breyer focuses on the question of whether
PF 15 fell "outside the district court's rulemaking power." 832 E2d at 671. It concludes that it did. 832 F.2d at
675.
Among other points, the dissent by Chief Judge Campbell decries one of the most striking features of PF 15,
the fact that it requires a prosecutor to obtain judicial approval before subpoenaing a lawyer, but provides no
suggestion of what standards the judge should apply in deciding whether approval should be granted. Id. at
668-69. Judge Campbell hints at one of the arguments made earlier in this paper - any rule that works a
modification of federal privilege law is, as he says, "arguably beyond even the Supreme Court's rule-making
power." Id. at 670 n.5; see also supra notes 154-65 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intervention
in the Supreme Court's formulation of the Federal Rules of Evidence). Finally, Judge Campbell observes that
the majority's reference (in its catalogue of possible sources of power for the adoption of PF 15) to the power of
federal courts to regulate the behavior of attorneys appearing before them is no solution to the problem.
Klubock, 832 F.2d at 669-70. Calling a rule an ethical rule does not make it so, says Judge Campbell, and he
expresses his opinion that PF 15 "is not really about discipline," but is instead about substantially modifying
grand jury practice. Id.
230. 53 E3d 1349 (1st Cir. 1995).
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Island had the power to adopt a modified version of Model Rule 3.8(f) as a
component of its local rules.23 1
The Whitehouse opinion is a fascinating study. On first reading it appears to be
a ringing affirmation of a federal district court's power to regulate by ethical rules
the conduct of prosecutors working with grand juries. On closer examination, the
First Circuit has written a sheep in wolf's clothing, and an unconvincing sheep at
that. An understanding of Whitehouse begins with a careful examination of its
procedural history.
The ethical rule at issue was first adopted in 1988 by the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, and in 1989 by the U.S. District Court of Rhode Island.23 2 The text of the
Rhode Island rule itself contains only the requirement that a prosecutor obtain
"prior judicial approval" for a subpoena to a lawyer for evidence about a
client. 233 As with PF 15 in Massachusetts, there are no standards in the text of the
rule by which the judge is to determine whether approval should be granted.
Unlike PF 15, however, the Rhode Island version of Rule 3.8(f) (R.I Rule 3.8(f))
was adopted with a comment. The comment says approval should be granted or
denied "after an opportunity for an adversarial proceeding..." 2 3 4 The comment
goes on to say that "prior judicial approval should be withheld" unless five
conditions are met.235
(1) Whitehouse: District Court Opinion
After unsuccessfully petitioning both the Rhode Island Supreme Court and the
U.S. District Court for Rhode Island for an exemption from the rule, the Justice
Department sought injunctive relief in federal court.2 36 The district court that
heard the Justice Department's challenge invalidated R.L Rule 3.8(f) on the dual
grounds that it exceeded a federal district court's local rulemaking power if
applied to grand jury subpoenas,23 7 and that enforcement of the state rule against
federal prosecutors would violate the Supremacy Clause.2 38
Supporters of the rule sought to rely on Klubock's differentiation between rules
aimed at grand jury action and those allegedly dealing "solely with prosecutorial
231. Id. at 1366.
232. Almond v. District Court, 852 F. Supp. 78, 81 (D.R.I. 1994), affd in part, rev'd in part, 53 F.3d 1349
(1st Cir. 1995). The Rhode Island rule is apparently based on recommendations from an ABA committee whose
report ultimately led to the adoption by the ABA in 1990 of Model Rule 3.8(f). Id. at 80.
233. R.I. SuP. CT. ART. V R. 3.8(f) (1994).
234. Almond, 852 F. Supp. at 81.
235. id. (emphasis added). The conditions are: (1) no privilege applies; (2) "the evidence sought is essential
to successful completion of the investigation or prosecution"; (3) "the subpoena lists the information sought
with particularity"; (4) the purpose of the subpoena is not to harass the attorney or the client; and (5) the
prosecutor has exhausted other sources for the information. Id.
236. Id. at 81-82.
237. Id. at 83. The Justice Department did not challenge the application of R.I. Rule 3.8(f) to trial subpoenas.
Id.
238. Id. at 86.
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conduct in the prosecutor's capacity as a member of the bar.", 2 3 9 The district
court's response is worth quoting:
Two reasons compel me to reject this argument. First, while Rule 3.8(f)
undoubtedly implicates "latent" ethical concerns, labelling it an ethical rule
cannot obscure the fact it requires the creation of, and prosecutorial compliance
with, a novel form of grand jury procedure. Second, and more importantly,
Klubock's rationale is no longer good law. Although it was a plausible
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent at the time the case was decided, the
Supreme Court has since conclusively rejected the notion that an otherwise
impermissible rule of grand jury procedure becomes permissible if it is
enforced against the prosecutor instead of the grand jury itself.240
(2) Whitehouse: The First Circuit Opinion
The First Circuit's rejoinder to the district court's apparently irrefutable
argument, and its effort to circumnavigate the seemingly insurmountable obstacle
posed by the Williams decision, can only be termed unconvincing. The court
revived, again without citation of authority, its assertion in Klubock that grand
jurors have a power, "acting independently," to subpoena witnesses to the grand
jury through some unspecified procedure which involves neither Rule 17 nor the
prosecutor. 24 ' Therefore, reasoned the court, since a grand jury could issue and
serve a subpoena without action by the prosecutor, placing limitations on the
prosecutor's ability to issue subpoenas on behalf of the grand jury does not limit
the grand jury.24 2 While it might once have been possible to indulge the fiction
that regulation of the prosecutor is not regulation of the grand jury for and with
whom he acts, that option was foreclosed when the Supreme Court wrote in
Williams: "We reject the attempt to convert24 a3 nonexistent duty of the grand jury
itself into an obligation of the prosecutor."
The Whitehouse court next asserted that R.I. Rule 3.8(f) is not an alteration of
grand jury procedure and does not affect the grand jury's broad investigative
powers because it "makes no change in substantive law. '' 244 The court claimed
that the rule "merely authorizes district courts to reject a prosecutor's attorneysubpoena application for the traditional reasons justifying the quashing of a
subpoena - that is, the subpoena request would be denied if the evidence sought
is protected by a constitutional, common-law, or statutory privilege, or the court
determines that compliance with the subpoena would be 'unreasonable or
239. Id. at 87 (quoting United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 658 (1stCir. 1987)).
240. Id. at 87 (citing United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36,52 (1992)).
241. Whitehouse v. District Court, 53 F.3d 1349, 1357 (1st Cir. 1995). The court quotes verbatim the passage
from Klubock discussed supra at notes 298-303 and accompanying text. Id.
242. Id. at 1357-58.
243. Williams, 504 U.S. at 53.
244. Whitehouse, 53 E3d at 1357.
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oppressive.' ,,245 It then reasoned that because the rule "does not keep any
evidence from reaching the grand jury which would not potentially have been
kept from it anyway," the rule "merely changes the timing with respect to
motions to quash....
This is the key passage in Whitehouse. The court's claim that the rule does not
expand the "traditional reasons" for quashing a subpoena can mean only one of
two things: either the court believes that none of the conditions for approval listed
in the comment to R.L Rule 3.8(f) would constitute non-traditional reasons for
denial, or the court is saying that the comment should be given no effect. Since
each one of the five conditions in the comment would constitute a hitherto
unrecognized restriction on grand jury subpoena power, the court can only be
suggesting that the comment's guidelines exceed the limits of federal law and are
invalid and inoperative.
In fact, the court concedes, albeit obliquely, that this is indeed its view. In a
footnote to its assertion that R.L Rule 3.8(f) only authorizes traditional grounds
for quashing a subpoena, the court writes:
To the extent that the Comment to Local Rule 3.8(f) ...suggests a broader
basis for rejecting a subpoena application, we point out that the Comment
cannot substantively change the text of the Rule.... Moreover,federal district
courts cannot effect substantive changes in the law through local rulemaking.

We presume that district court judges2 4will
apply Local Rule 3.8(f) consistently
7
with both its text and applicable law.
This concession has far-reaching implications. It means that Whitehouse is not
authority for the proposition that the 1990 Model Rule 3.8(f) can co-exist with
federal grand jury law. The heart of the 1990 ABA rule is its requirement that a
judge make three of the findings required by the Rhode Island version of 3.8(f):
absence of privilege, essentiality to the investigation and exhaustion of alternative sources for the information. All three are incontrovertibly new restrictions on
grand jury power.
Footnote 12 alters understanding of the rest of the Whitehouse opinion. It
means that the First Circuit is willing to defend a requirement of pre-issuance
review of subpoenas on only two grounds: the existence of a privilege or
determination that compliance with the subpoena would be "unreasonable or
oppressive" under Rule 17.248 In sum, the court upheld the rule by eviscerating it.
Moreover, the court's effort to salvage even this much of R.1 Rule 3.8(f) was
unavailing.
The court was also unable to provide a convincing rejoinder to the govern-

245.
246.
247.
248.

Id.
Id. at 1357-58.
Id. at 1358 n.12 (emphasis added).
Id.at 1357.
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ment's argument that the adversarial hearing called for by the comment to R.L
Rule 3.8(f) has the potential to violate the traditional secrecy of grand jury
investigations.2 49 In response, the court once again disavowed the comment 25 ° and opined that "[n]othing in the text of the Rule prohibits the filing
of attorney-subpoena applications to the court under seal or in camera. Nor
does the 25Rule
prohibit the court from holding an ex parte, in camera
1
hearing.',

R.L Rule 3.8(f) may be read to permit ex parte applications by the prosecutor,
thus avoiding a secrecy violation. However, if the issue under consideration at the
ex parte hearing is the existence of a privilege, the prosecution as the only party
present is inescapably, and as noted above, impermissibly, put in the position of
proving the non-existence of a privilege.25 2 Moreover, while shifting the burden
of proof of the existence of a privilege may well be within the power of federal
courts acting in their capacity as common lawjudges, Congress and the Supreme
that federal privilege law is not within the rulemaking
Court have made it plain2 53
powers of federal courts.
The Whitehouse court is also unable to explain away R.L Rule 3.8(f)'s conflict
2 54
with Rule 17 of the FederalRules of CriminalProcedure.
The court reiterates
the same arguments it made in Klubock without any reference to the Supreme
Court's subsequent decision in United States v. R. Enterprises25 5 that Rule 17
review of a grand jury subpoena on grounds of oppression or burdensomeness
can only occur "on motion" of the witness, which by definition can only occur

after service of the subpoena. 256 Moreover, the Court also held in R. Enterprises
that at a hearing on the issue of oppression and burdensomeness, the court may
not impose an initial burden on the government to prove the subpoena is not
249. Id. at 1358.
250. Id. at 1358 n.14.
251. Id. at 1358.
252. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (noting that the defendant bears the burden of proof and
citing relevant authority).
253. See supra notes 159-65 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' exercise of its authority in this
area).
Moreover, if a district court judge attempting to apply R.I. Rule 3.8(0 does hold an adversarial hearing, the
supposed advantages flowing from pre-service review of attorney subpoenas evaporate. The Whitehouse court
goes to great length to explain how mere service of the subpoena causes adverse consequences for the
attorney-client relationship. Whitehouse, 53 F.3d at 1358. These include "driving a chilling wedge between the
attorney/witness and his client" and opening "a second front" on which the defense attorney must expend time
and resources. Id. But in order for the attorney/witness to know about the adversarial hearing, he would have to
be "served" with something, call it a "Notice of Intention to Serve Subpoena," which, in order for the attorney
to participate meaningfully in the hearing, would have to have as an attachment the subpoena itself. No
principled distinction can be drawn between the consequences to the attorney-client relationship of an attorney's
receipt of the notice of hearing and the subpoena itself.
254. Whitehouse, 53 F.3d at 1362-64.
255. 498 U.S. 292 (1991); see also discussion supra at notes 176-84 and accompanying text (discussing R.
Enterprises).
256. 498 U.S. at 301.
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257
oppressive or burdensome; the burden rests on the witness to show that it is.
Pre-service judicial approval of subpoenas cannot be squared with this holding.

5. The Prospects for Model Rule 3.8(f) in the Federal Courts
The future of Model Rule 3.8(f) is murky. As the preceding discussion
demonstrates, the rule in its 1990 form will not survive the scrutiny of federal
courts. One suspects that a close reading of the Whitehouse case may have been a
motivating factor in the August 9, 1995 vote by the ABA House of Delegates to
delete the requirement of pre-issuance judicial review. If the nine states that
currently have Model Rule 3.8(f) in their ethics codes, and the federal district
courts in the First Circuit and elsewhere, follow suit, many of the most
objectionable features of the rule should at the least be muted. Nonetheless, even
in amended form, the rule harbors considerable potential for future conflict.
For example, elimination of pre-issuance judicial review would seem to
eliminate the reversal of the burden of proof as to the existence of privileges
inherent in the 1990 version of Model Rule 3.8(f). In fact, this result is not so
clear. Under the 1990 version of the rule, a prosecutor was expressly obliged to
go to the court pre-service and prove in an adversary hearing his reasonable belief
in the absence of a privilege. Under the new rule, the very same issue may now be
raised by creative defense counsel in the setting of a post-service, pre-compliance
motion to quash. The argument will be that the subpoena should be quashed
because the prosecutor will be alleged to have violated the ethical rule by issuing
a subpoena without a reasonable belief regarding the absence of privilege.
Because the rule speaks in terms of the prosecutor's subjective belief, the focus of
the inquiry on the hearing on such a motion could become what the prosecutor
had reason to believe, as opposed to what the attorney/witness could prove about
his right to invoke a privilege.
Such a result would be most likely in federal district courts that have adopted
as a local rule some form of Model Rule 3.8(f) along with the ethics rules of the
state in which they sit. In such a district, the argument at the hearing on the
motion to quash would be that the Assistant U.S. Attorney violated the court's
own rule by unreasonably concluding that no privilege existed, that there was no
alternative source for the information or that the evidence was essential to the
case. Even if no federal court were disposed to make the new Model Rule 3.8(f)
the basis for relief on a motion to quash, the "reasonableness" of the prosecutor's
judgment on the existence of privilege, availability of alternate sources and
necessity of the information would remain open to second-guessing by bar
committees. Consequently, the bar is still claiming the right to discipline
prosecutors for issuing subpoenas that are legal and appropriate under federal
law.
257. Id.
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Finally, the amended version of Model Rule 3.8(f) does not limit the scope of
the information covered by the original rule. It still reaches any information
"about a past or present client," regardless of source or subject matter or the
existence of any privilege. By imposing requirements of "essentiality" and
exhaustion of alternate sources on a prosecutor seeking information, the rule will
forestall the issuance of some subpoenas and prevent disclosure of some
information never previously protected. Accordingly, whether enforced by federal judges in pre-issuance hearings or by bar grievance committees and state
supreme courts after service of the subpoena, the rule will remain an effort to
expand the traditional sphere of protection afforded the attorney-client relationship and to limit the power of grand juries.
C. MODEL RULE

4.2:

CONTACT WITH REPRESENTED PERSONS

The ethical rule at the center of the most heated current debate between the
Justice Department and the organized bar concerns contacts with persons
represented by counsel. 8 Discussion of this rule has been reserved for last
because the problems it raises are somewhat more subtle than those presented by
the exculpatory evidence and attorney subpoena rules, and because many of the
seeming conundrums and obscurities in the "no contact" rule debate are solved,
or at least illuminated, by an understanding of the disputes over the other two
rules.
1. History, Rationale and Scope of the "No Contact" Rule
The prohibition against communicating with represented parties without the
consent of their counsel has roots in English common law. Although one court
asserts it is a rule that has been followed "from time immemorial by the

Anglo-American bar,", 259 the current no contact rule seems to have its origin in
Hoffman's 1836 treatise, 260 and there is considerable evidence that until this

258. See Jerry E. Norton, Ethics and the Attorney General, 74 JUDICATURE 203, 207 (1991) ("Attorney
General Thornburgh has quite deliberately drawn the battle line."); Nancy J. Moore, Intra-Professional Warfare
Between Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys: A Plea for An End to the Current Hostilities, 53 U. PITT. L. REV.

515, 515 (1992) (discussing "the ongoing 'war' between the U.S. Department of Justice and the ABA over the
ethical conduct of prosecutors in their relationships with criminal defense attorneys").
259. United States v. Jamil, 546 F. Supp. 646, 651 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), order rev'd, 707 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1983).
There are some early nineteenth century English cases stating the principle. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 2 Adm. &
Eccl. 620, 622, 11 Eng. Rep. 239, 240 (1835).
260. DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY (2d ed. 1846); see also Jamil, 546 F Supp. at 651
(referring to Hoffman's Resolution XLIII); John Leubsdorf, Communicating with Another Lawyer's Client: The
Lawyer's Veto and the Client's Interests, 127 U. PA. L. REV.683, 684 (1979) (indicating that no contact rule can
be traced to Hoffman's treatise). Hoffman's Resolution XLIII provided that "I will never enter into any
conversation with my opponent's client relative to his claim or defense except with the consent and in the
presence of his counsel." HoFFMAN, supra, at 771.
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century the "rule" was regarded more as a professional courtesy than a binding
imperative. 26 '
A critical and unique component of the modem no contact rule is that it
reserves control over communications with a represented party to that party's
lawyer, rather than the party himself. In the United States, the idea that an
attorney has absolute control over communications with his client was not
generally accepted until passage of the ABA's Canons of Ethics in 1908.262 The
rule set forth in the 1908 Canons was continued without significant change or
discussion in 1970, when the ABA adopted its Model Code of Professional
the rule on contact with
Responsibility.263 Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A) contained
2
9. 6
Canon
old
the
superseded
and
persons,
represented
Model Rule 4.2, adopted by the ABA in 1983, carried forward without
substantial change the no contact rule embodied in DR 7-104(A). 265 Model Rule
4.2, as adopted in 1983, stated:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the

261. One authority of the time wrote:
Let your love of harmony lead you to recommend your clients to make greater concessions, for the
sake of tranquility, than rigid justice could require; and even dare to sacrifice punctilio to concord,
when you believe an interview with the adverse party will be more conducive to the extinction of
animosity, the settlement of a dispute, and the renewal of good-will, than any negotiation with his
legal adviser.
Leubsdorf, supra note 260, at 684 (quoting A.C. & W.H. BUCKLAND, LETTERS TO AN ATTORNEY'S CLERK,
CONTAINING DIRECTIONS FOR His STUDIES AND GENERAL CONDUCr 226 (1824)).
Many treatises after Hoffman's disregarded the "no contact" principle entirely. See Leubsdorf, supra note
260, at 685 (citing G. SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (2d ed. 1860); S. WARREN, THE MORAL,
SOCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL DuNEs OF ATTORNEYS AND SOLICrrORS (1870)). State codes of ethics often limited the
applicability of the rule to settlement negotiations. See id. at 685 (citing Committee on Code of Professional
Ethics, Report, 31 A.B.A. RP. 676, 706 (1907)). Only one state code of ethics allowed the bypassed lawyer to
veto the communication. Id. The remaining codes found it sufficient to require advance notice to the lawyer that
opposing counsel proposed to communicate with his client. Id.
262. Id. Canon 9 provided: "A lawyer should not in any way communicate ... with a party represented by
counsel; much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal only
" CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 9 (1908) [hereinafter 1908 CANONS].
with his counsel ..

263. Leubsdorf, supra note 260, at 685. See MODEL CODE DR 7-104(A) (1970) (prohibiting a lawyer from
communicating directly with a represented party without consent of the party's counsel).
264. DR 7-104(A) reads as follows:
Communicating with One ofAdverse Interest
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a
party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the
lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so.
MODEL CODE DR 7-104(A) (1970).
265. MODEL RULES ANN. commentary at 5,423; see also Martin S. Murphy, The "No-Contact"Ruleand the
Sixth Amendment. A Dilemmafor the Ethical Prosecutor,38 BOSTON B. J. 8, 23 (1994) (discussing history of
Model Rule 4.2). Some version of the no-contact rule is currently in effect in all fifty states. United States v.
Lopez, 989 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir.), opinion amended and superseded,4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993).
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representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another
lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is
lawyer in the matter, unless2 the
66
authorized by law to do so.

The ABA's 1983 annotations to Model Rule 4.2 explain that the rationale of the
rule is to "prevent lawyers from taking advantage of uncounselled lay persons
and to preserve the integrity of the lawyer-client relationship, ' 267 and to ensure
that lay persons do not "make decisions of major legal importance without
advice of counsel." 268 Despite the relative antiquity of the no contact rule as a
component of codes of legal ethics, prior to 1960 no court and only one
unpublished ethics opinion had ever suggested that the rule governed prosecutors.2 69 It was not until the 1960s that any court even raised the question of
whether the anti-contact rule might apply in criminal cases.2 7 0
Nonetheless, and notwithstanding a spirited rearguard action by some legal
scholars and courts who contend that the no contact rule was designed for civil
litigation and was neither intended for, nor is it appropriate to, the investigatory
activities of law enforcement officials,2 7' the federal courts now routinely intone

266. MODEL RULES Rule 4.2 (1991).
267. MODEL RULES ANN. commentary at 424.
268. Id. For a list of other explanations for the rule, see Leubsdorf, supra note 260, at 686-87.
269. In Jamil, Judge Weinstein says there were two ethics opinions before 1960 applying Canon 9 to
prosecutors. United States v. Jamil, 546 F. Supp. 646, 652 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), order rev'd, 707 F.2d 638 (2d Cir.
1983) One of those he cites has nothing to do with Canon 9. 546 F. Supp. at 652; ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 150 (1936). The other does. 546 F. Supp. at 652; ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics and Grievances, Decision 249, reported in HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHics 296 app. A

(1953) ("Where three persons are accused of related thefts, the prosecutor may not, in proceedings against one
of them, interview another of them represented by counsel, except with the [consent of the] latter's lawyer.")
See generally Moore, supra note 258, at 520-21 (discussing dearth of authorities that suggest the "no
contact" rule applies to prosecutors). See also Grievance Comm. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 647 (2d Cir. 1995)
(reviewing the history of application of DR 7-104 to prosecutors).
270. Among the four cases from the 1960s of which I am aware that touch on the question, three allude to it
only obliquely and reach no definitive conclusion. See Lee v. United States, 322 F.2d 770, 777 (5th Cir. 1963)
(presuming that legal ethics prohibit a government attorney's attempt to communicate with a represented
defendant without counsel's consent); Ricks v. United States, 334 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (describing as
"consistent with Canon 9" the government's practice of not allowing any communication between police or
prosecutors and a represented defendant except with counsel's consent); Mathies v. United States, 374 F.2d 312
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (noting that the U.S. Attorney has, in some cases, implemented a policy of notifying counsel for
the criminal defendant of any interrogation sessions). In none of these three cases was the ethical rule either
urged by the defendant or relied on by the court as a basis for decision. For discussion of the fourth case, United
States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), see infra notes
316-23 and accompanying text.
271. See L. RAY PATTERSON & THOMAS B. METZLOFF, LEGAL ETHics: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILrry 709 (3d ed. 1989) (indicating "almost surely drafters of the Rule did not contemplate its
application to prosecutors"); Bruce A. Green, A Prosecutor'sCommunications with Defendants: What Are the
Limits?, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 283 (1988) (concluding that the application of DR 7-104(A)(1) to criminal cases was
"clearly beyond the contemplation" of the rule's drafters); H. Richard Uviller, Evidencefrom the Mind of the
Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1137,
1176-83 (1987) (stating the consideration of implications indicates that the rule should not be applied in
criminal cases)); Note, ProsecutorialInvestigations and DR 7-104(A)(1), 89 COLUM. L. REV. 940, 946 (1989)
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that the rule applies to prosecutors. 272
Given this apparent consensus, the no contact rule would seem a curious issue
to provoke the current battle royal between federal prosecutors and the organized
bar. To understand the level of hostility, one must begin by examining the
substantial discontinuity between the no contact rule as it has been interpreted in
civil settings and the array of investigative procedures that police and prosecutors
have historically employed in criminal cases and which the courts have found
legally appropriate.
2. The No Contact Rule and Criminal Investigation
a. Government Contacts with Individual Suspects
The 1983 text of Model Rule 4.2 (and the text of DR 7-104(A)(1)), by referring
to contact with a "party," seemed to imply a litigation context and appeared to
limit the rule's application to situations arising after the initiation of formal
adversary proceedings. The ABA and state ethics authorities have nonetheless
interpreted the rule far more broadly. The 1983 comment to Model Rule 4.2 says
that the "rule covers any person, whether or not a party to a formal proceeding,
who is represented by counsel concerning the matter in question. ' ' 273 Professor
Wolfram, in his ethics treatise observes, "The lawyerism party sometimes refers
only to parties in litigation but evidently is here intended to refer broadly to any
'person' represented by a lawyer in a matter., 274 On July 28, 1995, the American
(asserting that DR 7-104(A)(1) on its face is aimed primarily at attorney conduct in the civil setting and should
not apply to the criminal context).
272. See infra notes 324-69 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the no-contact rule in
criminal cases).
273. MODEL RULES ANN. commentary at 423.
274. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics § 11.6.2, at 611 n.33 (1986). Examples of contacts the
rule has been said to prohibit include:
(a) Contacts with parties whose interests are not apparently adverse to those of lawyer's existing
client. Id. § 11.6.2 at 611. See, e.g., Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Hollstein, 274 N.W.2d 508, 517 (Neb.
1979) (analyzing friendship and social contact); In re Sedor, 245 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Wisc. 1976)
(concerning recent former client);
(b) An interview of a potential defendant by an attorney for a potential plaintiff, if the potential
defendant has retained counsel. ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 908 (1966);
ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 670 (1963);
(c) Letter by claimant's counsel to represented insured prior to institution of suit advising insured that
suit will be filed and extending offer to settle. ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, Informal Op.
1034 (1968); see also ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1373
(1976) (mailing of pre-indictment plea offer by prosecutor to defense lawyer and client improper);
(d) Once a claim against a municipality has been "put in the hands of an attorney for attention" it is
improper for police officers, clients of the municipal attorney, to obtain written statements from the
represented claimant. ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 95 (1933);
(e) Attorney for a personal injury defendant may not make a settlement offer directly to an injured
party who has retained an attorney although no suit has been instituted. N.Y.C. Bar Assoc. Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Op. 302 (1934);
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Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics issued Formal Opinion 95-396, in
which the Committee declared that Rule 4.2 applies in both civil and criminal
cases "to communications not only with formal 'parties' but also with any person
known to be represented with respect to the matter to be discussed. ' 275 Less than
two weeks later, on Aug. 9, 1995, the ABA House of Delegates eliminated any
doubt about the organization's intention to apply the "no contact" principle
it voted to
before the onset of formal litigation in civil and criminal cases when' 276
amend Model Rule 4.2 by substituting the term "person" for "party."
If this broad view of the anti-contact prohibition were applied to criminal
investigation, it would require dramatic revisions of current practice. Still more
to the present point, it would significantly alter the constitutional balance
between the rights of the individual and the needs of society which has been
laboriously crafted by the Supreme Court over the past three decades in cases
involving police contact with criminal suspects.
i. The Work of the Supreme Court
A detailed account of the Supreme Court's tortuous journey from Massiah277 to
Escobedo278 to the landmark of Miranda,279 and through the host of adjustments,
(f) An attorney may not interview, for fact-finding purposes, an opposing party represented by
counsel in connection with a demand for money damages although suit had not been filed. N.Y.C. Bar
Assoc. Comm. of Professional Ethics, Op. 101 (1928).
See also ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 58 (1931) (implying that an
attorney representing a person seeking a divorce should not contact the other marital partner directly, even
before a divorce action is filed, if the partner is represented by counsel).
275. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995) [hereinafter
Opinion 95-396]. The Committee expressly included among those "persons" covered by the rule "targets of
criminal investigations .... and witnesses who have hired counsel in the matter." Id.
276. ABA Leaders, supra note 71. In issuing Formal Opinion 95-396, the Ethics Committee wrote that it,
"recognizes that.., the word 'party' is ambiguous," but, undeterred by the ambiguity, it went on to find that,
"If the rule is to serve its intended purpose, it should have broad coverage, protecting not only parties to a
negotiation and parties to formal adjudicative proceedings, but any person who has retained counsel in a matter
and whose interests are potentially distinct from those of the client on whose behalf the communicating lawyer
is acting." Opinion 95-396, supra note 275. Committee member Ralph G. Elliott, dissenting from the opinion,
observed that, "despite the best efforts at textual archeology, the Committee can find no basis whatsoever in
legislative history for its conclusion; the conslusion it reaches violates basic and universally-applied canons of
statutory construction that govern the interpretation of these Rules ....
"Id. at 309. After an extended dissection
of the Committee's flawed analysis, Mr. Elliott concluded, "If my colleagues want Model Rule 4.2 to protect
Iany person,' their remedy... is to proselytize the members of the House [of Delegates] to change the words as
the Committee has proposed them." Id.
Either because the House of Delegates found Mr. Elliott's dissent persuasive, or just to be on the safe side,
they did change the wording of Model Rule 4.2 from "party" to "person." The official explanation for the move
by the House of Delegates made clear the ABA's intention to apply Rule 4.2 before the onset of litigation in
criminal cases. ABA Leaders, supra note 71. The reasons for the Aug. 9, 1995 change and its implications will
be discussed further infra notes 411-12 and accompanying text.
277. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
278. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
279. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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reinterpretations and refinements that have followed is beyond the scope of this
Article, 280 but the contours of the result are plain enough. The Fifth Amendment
prohibition against self-incrimination 28 ' precludes judicial compulsion of testimony 282 and any evidentiary use of a defendant's refusal to speak. 283 Before the
institution of formal charges, there are essentially no restraints on the government's choice of non-coercive methods designed to gather evidence through
overt or covert contacts with a suspect, so long as the suspect is not subject to the
potentially coercive influence of interrogation in government custody.2 84 Moreover, the Fifth Amendment also allows custodial interrogation, albeit only if
preceded by an admonition of rights and a valid waiver of those rights.2 85
Among the rights a defendant in custody enjoys, but can waive, is the right to
consult with a lawyer before and during questioning. 286 Still, the right to counsel
in the custodial setting rests only partially, if at all, on the Sixth Amendment.
Rather, it is a right ancillary to the Fifth Amendment conferred to ensure that the
suspect's right against compelled self-incrimination is protected.2 87 The right to
counsel under the Sixth Amendment by itself does not attach until the initiation of
formal adversarial judicial proceedings, "whether by way of formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment.' 288 Unlike the
Miranda right to counsel ancillary to custodial interrogation, once the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel has attached, law enforcement officials may not use
280. See generally Uviller, supra note 271, at 1155-76 (providing a detailed, and critical, account of the
Supreme Court's work).
281. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.").
282. The Fifth Amendment privilege is limited to "evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature."
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
283. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,613-14 (1965).
284. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) (stating that the coercion against which Miranda protects
occurs only though the interaction of the elements of custody and interrogation).
285. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,475 (1966); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,421 (1986); Colorado
v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169-70 (1986).
286. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 478-79. Once a suspect has asserted his Miranda right to counsel,
interrogation must cease until counsel is provided or the suspect subsequently waives the right. Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
287. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442.; Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 (1986). See, e.g., McNeil v.
Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175-77 (differentiating between the invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel and the invocation of counsel for later interrogation on an unrelated charge); United States v. Martinez,
972 F.2d 1100, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1992) (same).
288. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion). The Court has once or twice suggested
that the Sixth Amendment might be activated by events earlier in the investigative process. See, e.g., Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964) (suggesting that the right to counsel could be activated by a "focus" of
suspicion during police questioning); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1967) (holding that a
preindictment lineup was a "critical stage" of the prosecution and that such a stage triggered the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel). However, those suggestions have long since been disavowed. Escobedo's result
was explained in Fifth Amendment terms in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444 n.4 (1966). As for Wade, the
Court in Kirby held that it was limited to its facts. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972); see also Moran,
475 U.S. at 432 (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not activated merely because an event
"may have important consequences at trial").
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incriminating statements "deliberately elicited" from the accused without the
presence or waiver of counsel 2 9 even if the statements are made in a noncustodial setting or to persons unknown by the defendant to be acting for the
290

government.
The practical consequence of this legal structure is clear, and was clearly the
objective of its judicial architects. Before a criminal case is hardened into a
formal adversary proceeding by the occurrence of an event like an indictment or
the filing of an information, the government can try to get evidence from the
mouth and mind of the defendant surreptitiously without his consent or face-toface with it. Because of the practical reality, which the Court clearly understands,
that a suspect is unlikely to utter so much as a syllable once he is actually
counselled by a competent attorney, 29 ' the retention or appointment of counsel at
the onset of formal proceedings serves to slam the door on any further potentially

incriminating direct admissions to the police.
The establishment of this particular boundary between the periods during
which the government, practically speaking, can and cannot obtain evidence
from the mind of the defendant has been the subject of criticism, 292 as has the
employment of the right to counsel as the mechanism for achieving the demarcathe Court has assigned this role of boundary
tion,29 3 but there is no disputing that
294
marker to the Sixth Amendment.
289. Whether police can interrogate at the time of arrest of a defendant who has previously been indicted
seems to be a gray area. Since the indictment signals the onset of formal adversarial proceedings, one might
think no statement could thereafter be "deliberately elicited," thus ruling out police questioning even with
Miranda warnings and a valid waiver. In practice, during the window between the arrest and the first court
appearance, both the police and the courts appear to have treated the situation like any precharging custodial
interrogation. But see United States v. Foley, 735 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1984) (criticizing the U.S. Attorney
practice of interviewing unrepresented persons post-arrest, but pre-arraignment), cert. denied sub nom., Edler v.
United States, 469 U.S. 1161 (1985).
290. Moran, 475 U.S. at 431; Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977). See Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201,205-06 (1964) (holding that the Sixth Amendment was violated by government use of statements
made to a co-defendant acting as informant after defendant's indictment and release on bail).
291. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(observing that no lawyer "worth his salt" would do anything other than counsel his client to say nothing to
police); I ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 87 (1984)
(recommending that defense counsel advise clients at the initial interview to say nothing at all to police,
prosecutors, cellmates, co-defendants, lawyers for co-defendants or reporters under any circumstances).
292. See Uviller, supra note 271, at 1167 (calling the boundary "awkward, indeed indefensible"); J. GRANU,
POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A REBUTTAL TO MISCONCEIVED OBJECTIONS 13 (1987) (published by
the Center for Research in Crime and Justice of the New York University School of Law) ("[W]e lack good
reasons to reject either police interrogation as such or some of the tactics that help police interrogation to
succeed.").
293. See Uviller, supra note 271, at 1138 ("Some attention is accorded the theory that ethics reinforce the
Sixth Amendment proscription. None of the apologies survives close scrutiny, however, compelling the
conclusion that the Sixth Amendment provision has been misapplied as an artificial device of cloture on
government efforts to obtain cognitive evidence.").
294. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985) (Brennan, J.) (holding that the state violated the Sixth
Amendment when it arranged to record conversations between a defendant and an undercover codefendant
working for the state, after the defendant had already been charged with the crimes). Professor Uviller refers to
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ii. Mismatch: The No Contact Rule Meets Miranda
The no contact rule, as interpreted in the civil arena, cannot be harmonized
with the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence on criminal investigations.
(1) The rule would prohibit U.S. Attorney knowledge of or participation in
undercover operations involving direct verbal contact with any suspect known to
be represented by counsel. In civil practice, such proceedings are unethical.2 95
(2) No custodial interrogation would be permitted of any suspect known by the
prosecutor to be represented by counsel. Because Model Rule 4.2 and its
predecessors give the power of consent to communications with a client exclusively to the lawyer,2 96 a criminal defendant known to be represented could not
be asked to give a valid Miranda waiver
Moreover, these boons to criminal suspects would be awarded for reasons that
would be either irrelevant to or actually violative of principles of equal justice. In
the first place, since the right to government-financed counsel under either the
Fifth or Sixth Amendment cannot arise until one is either arrested or charged,2 97
no person of poor or even average means is at all likely to have a lawyer and to
have conveyed that fact to a prosecutor before being made the subject of
undercover recordings or being taken into custody. Consequently, only the rich
will enjoy the new immunity. 298 Moreover, even among the well-to-do, the
protection of the no contact rule would extend randomly to cases in which,
through fortuity or the foresight of defense counsel, the right prosecutor from the
right jurisdiction became aware of the representation.2 99
b. Government Investigations of Organizations
The other aspect of the no contact rule of particular significance in attempts to
Moulton as a "ringing affirmation" of the principle that "the counsel clause of the sixth amendment functions as
a restrictive device in the quest for reliable cognitive evidence of guilt." Uviller, supra note 271, at 1164.
295. See supranote 274 and accompanying text.
296. WOLFRAM, supra note 274, § 11.6.2, at 614; see also Waller v. Kotzen, 567 F. Supp. 424 (E.D. Pa. 1983),
appealdismissed,734 F.2d 9 (3d Cir. 1983); ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 362 (1992) (stating that a lawyer who makes an offer of settlement to the lawyer for the opposing party may
not inquire of the opposing party whether the party has received the offer, even if the offeror lawyer has reason
to believe the offeree lawyer has not conveyed the offer to his client); ABA Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1348 (1975) (holding that a lawyer may not transmit a settlement
offer to the opposing party, even if the lawyer has reason to believe that counsel for opposing party will not
convey the offer).
297. Miranda provides for a right to counsel paid for by the government during custodial interrogation of
indigent subjects. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,472-73 (1966). During the adjudication process following
the charging decision, those unable to pay are also entitled to appointed counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963).
298. Moreover, the subspecies of wealthy suspect most likely to have taken the precautions necessary to
invocate the rule are high-level drug traffickers, organized crime figures, white collar criminals and crooked
corporate executives.
299. For example, notifying the local district attorney of the fact of representation would have no effect on
the ethical obligations of the district attorney in the next county, or those of the U.S. Attorney.
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translate it to the criminal arena is the reach of the term "party" as applied to
corporations and other group entities. Once again, the bar has taken an expansive
view. The comment to Model Rule 4.2 says:
In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits communications by a lawyer
for one party concerning the matter in representation with persons having a
managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization, and with any other
person whose act or omission in connection with that matter may be imputed to
the organizationfor purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose statement
may constitute an admission on the part of the organization.300

The last clause of the comment is self-evidently open to a range of interpretations, from a narrow view, which would include only high corporate management,3 ° ' to the position that, since any statement by an employee might be
construed as an "admission" by the corporation under FederalRule of Evidence
801(d)(2), 3 °2 subjecting the corporation to civil or criminal liability, contact is
prohibited with all corporate employees.3 °3
In fact, the reach of the rule in the organizational context is uncertain and
unpredictable. 3° What does appear reasonably clear, however, is that the ABA's
300. MODEL RULES Rule 4.2 cmt. (emphasis added).
301. See, e.g., Fair Automotive Repair v. Car-X Serv. Sys., 471 N.E.2d 554, 560-61 (I11.App. Ct. 1984)
(applying the "control group" test); N.Y.C. Bar Assoc. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 613 (1942) ("only
managing employees represent the corporation for the purpose of examination of the corporation before trial").
302. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) states in pertinent part:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay.A statement is not hearsay if(2) Admission by a party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the
party's own statement in either an individual or a representative capacity or... (C) a statement
by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a
statement by the party's agent or servant concerning the matter within the scope of the agency or
employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator
of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
Any one or more of conditions (A), (C), (D) or (E) might apply in an investigation of corporate crime.
303. See, e.g., Public Serv. Elec. & Gas v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs., Ltd., 745 F. Supp. 1037,
1039-42 (D.N.J. 1990) (indicating that it is logical to prohibit ex parte communications with former employees
"except for formal discovery because they 'may' make statements which can be imputed"). For an "intermediate" position that might in practice approach an absolute prohibition on interviews of any employee worth
talking to, see Niesig v. Team 1,559 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1990) (applying the rule to corporate employees whose acts
or omissions in the matter at issue are binding on the corporation or imputed to it for liabilitypurposes, or who
are implementing advice of corporate counsel); State v. CIBA-GEIGY, 589 A.2d 180 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991) (adopting Niesig rationale; the corporate criminal defendant is entitled to an orderbarringthe statefrom
interrogating any of its employees whose acts or omissions the state seeks to impute to the corporatedefendant).
304. See, e.g., MODEL RULES ANN. commentary at 426-27 (stringing together an array of conflicting tests
cited by various authorities with no attempt whatever to distinguish between them or identify the correct, or
even preferred, approach).
The subject has spawned a wealth of commentary. See, e.g., Jerome N. Krulewitch, Comment, Ex Parte
Communications with CorporateParties: The Scope of the Limitations on Attorney Communications with One
of Adverse Interest, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 1274, 1305 (1988) (proposing that the best solution to resolve the
corporate party ambiguity of DR 7-104(A)(1) is a "managing speaking agent" or "alter ego" test); Samuel R.
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interpretation of the rule has grown more expansive in the wake of the Supreme
Court's 1981 decision in Upjohn Co. v. United States30 5 concerning the scope of
the attorney-client privilege in the corporate setting. In the Upjohn case, the
Court rejected the so-called "control group" test for determining which corporate
employees were clients, 3 "6 and extended the potential applicability of the
who, by virtue of their employment, have knowledge
privilege to "all employees
307
of relevant facts."
As Professor Stahl has described, before Upjohn, the traditional view taken by
the bar was that the no contact prohibition generally extended only to persons
who, by virtue of their position in, or relationship to, the corporation, could be
considered its "alter ego.", 30 8 After Upjohn, and in part in response to it, various
state bars and the ABA itself reevaluated the traditional position. 30 9 This
reevaluation was reflected most starkly in the modification of the comment to
Model Rule 4.2 between its draft version 1981 and the final version adopted in
1983. The draft version comment adopted an alter ego approach, but as can be
readily seen from the excerpt quoted above, the final comment had shifted
dramatically to a broader focus. 3 t0 The ABA's expanded interpretation of the
reach of Model Rule 4.2 was reconfirmed in the ABA Ethics Committee's Formal
Opinion 95-396, where the Committee opined that, "The Comment to Rule 4.2
... makes plain that the term represented party refers not only to those with
who may legally bind the organization
managerial responsibilities but to anyone
31 1
,
question.
in
matter
the
to
respect
with
Two things can, therefore, be said about attempts to apply Model Rule 4.2 to
criminal investigations of crime involving or related to organizations. First,
Model Rule 4.2 would represent a significant practical impediment to such
investigations. Because, unlike most individuals, virtually all corporations are
continuously represented by counsel, if local ethics authorities take a broad view
of the rule's reach, the rule could forestall interviews with virtually any employee
Miller & Angelo J. Calfo, Ex ParteContact with Employees and FormerEmployees of a CorporateAdversary:
Is it Ethical?42 Bus. LAW. 1053 (1987) (arguing that current employees should not be contacted without prior
consent of opposing counsel); Louis A. Stahl, Ex ParteInterviews with Enterprise Employees: A Post-Upjohn
Analysis, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1181 (1987) (discussing ex parte interviews with enterprise employees after
Upjohn); Annotation, Right of Attorney to Conduct Ex ParteInterviews with CorporateParty's Nonmanage-

ment Employees, 50 A.L.R.4th 652 (1985) (analyzing cases regarding whether an attorney has the right to
conduct ex parte interviews with nonmanagerial employees of an opposing corporate party).
305. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
306. Id. at 391-92.
307. Stahl, supra note 304, at 1194.
308. Id. at 1183-91.
309. Id. at 1199-1218.
310. "This rule prohibits communication concerning the matter in representation by a lawyer for one party
with managing agents of a party that is a corporation or organization." MODEL RuLEs Rule 4.2 cmt. (Proposed
Final Draft, May 1981). See, Stahl, supra note 304, at 1218-25 (commenting on the broader focus of the final
comment to Model Rule 4.2)
311. Opinion 95-396, supra note 275.
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who knows anything of value to the investigation.3 1 2 Even in jurisdictions where
the scope of the rule is narrower, it is inherently unpredictable, making any
investigation of corporate wrongdoing at best an enterprise fraught with peril for
the prosecutor's license and livelihood.
Second, while application of Model Rule 4.2 to criminal investigations of
corporate misconduct does not directly upset the balance of constitutional
interests created by the federal courts in the same way that its application to
individual suspects so plainly does, such a use of the rule has a perverse result at
odds with any reasonable interpretation of the Supreme Court's intentions. In
Upjohn, those who opposed expansion of the attorney-client privilege in the case
of corporations argued that such an expansion would "entail severe burdens on
discovery and create a broad 'zone of silence' over corporate affairs.", 31 3 The
Court rejected this contention, saying:
Application of the attorney-client privilege to communications such as those
involved here, however, puts the adversary in no worse position than if the
communications had never taken place. The privilege only protects disclosure
of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by
those who communicated with the attorney.3 14
The Court's reasoning was limited to the types of information protected by the
attorney-client privilege, communications between attorney and client. By employing the Upjohn definition of "client" in the no contact rule setting, the bar
seeks through Model Rule 4.2 to impose precisely the "zone of silence" the Court
said it did not intend to create. Thus, by operation of Model Rule 4.2, corporate
suspects join wealthy individuals in the special class that is largely exempt from
normal pre-indictment criminal investigative procedures.
3. The No Contact Rule in Federal Criminal Cases: Response of the Federal
Courts
In light of the obvious gap between the bar's interpretation of the no contact
rule in civil settings and the constitutional and policy choices made by the
Supreme Court in criminal cases, the perceptive reader may recall and wonder at
the assertion made above that the federal courts routinely hold the rule applicable
to prosecutors.31 5 The answer to this apparent conundrum is that, regardless of
312. For a discussion of the sorts of difficulties that could arise, see In re Investigation of FMC Corp., 430 E
Supp. 1108 (S.D. W.Va. 1977) (discussing a situation where a corporation under grand jury investigation sought
injunctive relief prohibiting government personnel from interviewing any of its employees without corporate
counsel in attendance; the request was denied in light of guidelines for such interviews adopted by the
government).
313. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981).
314. Id. (emphasis added).
315. See supra note 272 and accompanying text (asserting that federal courts routinely state that the rule
applies to prosecutors).
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what they say, the rule the courts are applying has only a distant relationship in
scope and rationale to the no contact rule that obtains in civil matters. In fact, at
the very outset of the criminal procedure revolution, the federal courts considered
and discarded the ethical prohibition on contact with represented persons as a
limitation on government investigative tactics before the lodging of formal
charges.
a. Prologue: 1962 to 1987
The story begins in 1962, when the Second Circuit decided United States v.
Massiah,3 16 apparently the first reported case in which the no contact rule was
urged in federal court as a bar to the admissibility of a defendant's statement.
There, in circumstances made famous by the Supreme Court's later decision in
the matter, the defendant argued that his post-indictment statements to a codefendant cooperating with the police should be suppressed because at the time
3 17
of the statements he had retained an attorney and the government knew it.
Massiah claimed that this conduct violated his constitutional rights 3 ' 8 and the
1908 Canons.31 9 The Second Circuit rejected both arguments and sustained
Massiah's conviction. 320
The Supreme Court reversed.3 2' In doing so, however, it made no mention of
the ethics issue, relying exclusively on the Sixth Amendment.3 22 Justice White's
dissent picked up the no contact rule argument, but only to discount it. 323 After
Massiah, the anti-contact prohibition disappeared as a material factor in the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence on defendant statements. With one exception,324
316. 307 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
317. Massiah, 307 F.2d at 65-66.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 66.
320. Id. at 66-67. The Second Circuit expressed doubt that the no contact rule applied to criminal cases, and
opined that, even if it did, the facts of this case did not offend the rule. Id.
321. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
322. Id. at 205-06.
323. Justice White wrote:
This case cannot be analogized to the American Bar Association's rule forbidding an attorney to talk
to the opposing party litigant outside the presence of his counsel. Aside from the fact that the
Association's canons are not of constitutional dimensions, the specific canon argued is inapposite
because it deals with the conduct of lawyers and not with the conduct of investigators. Lawyers are
forbidden to interview the opposing party because of the supposed imbalance of legal skill and
acumen between the lawyer and the party litigant; the reason for the rule does not apply to
non-lawyers and certainly not to Colson, Massiah's codefendant.
Id. at 210-11.
324. The sole reference to the no contact rule in a majority opinion appears to be an enigmatic footnote by
Justice Burger in United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 275 n.14 (1980). After holding that placement of a
jailhouse informant in the same cellblock as the defendant with instructions to be alert for statements from
federal prisoners offended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Burger added footnote 14: "Although it does
not bear on the constitutional question in this case, we note that Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) of the Code of

HeinOnline -- 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 732 1995-1996

1996]

MISUSE OF "ETHICAL RULES"

the only significant references to the rule in the more than three decades since
Massiah appear in a series of three dissents by Justice Stevens.3 25
Stevens repeatedly expressed the view that the ethical standard in Model Code
DR 7-104(A)(1) and Model Rule 4.2 applies in criminal cases. His position,
oft-repeated though it was, was neither very clear nor entirely consistent. At times
he seemed to resurrect and endorse the inventive, if idiosyncratic, theory of one
of his own dissents on the Seventh Circuit, in which he opined that an interview
of the defendant in the absence of counsel would have violated DR 7-104(A)(1)
in the civil context and violated the "procedural regularity" required by the Due
Process Clause in the criminal context.32 6 Later, he seemed to have abandoned all
restraint and asserted that "the same ethical rules apply" in criminal and civil cases.327
Whatever the precise contours of Justice Stevens' view, he never managed to
attract a majority that shared it. Indeed, in Moran v. Burbine the Court rejected
both Stevens' position on the application of the no contact rule in particular and
the more general notion that either the ABA or state legal ethics regulators could
define federal constitutional law. In that case, the Court indicated an unwillingness to extend Model Rule 4.2-type notions to pre-charging investigation by
refusing to suppress a confession despite the failure of Rhode Island police to tell
the suspect under interrogation that his sister had hired a lawyer for him.328
Responding both to Justice Stevens' dissent and to the amicus briefs filed by the
ABA, the National Association of Defense Lawyers and the National Legal Aid
and Defender Association,32 9 the Court wrote:
We recognize.., that our interpretation of the Federal Constitution, if given the
dissent's expansive gloss, is at odds with the policy recommendations embodied in the American Bar Association Standards of Criminal Justice. Notwithstanding the dissent's protestations, however, our interpretive duties go well
beyond deferring to the numerical preponderance of lower court decisions or to
of even so esteemed a body as the
the subconstitutional recommendations
330
American Bar Association.

Professional Responsibility provides [quoting the rule]." Id. What this was intended to signify is anybody's
guess. The only subsequent reference to it in the Court's cases appears in Justice Burger's dissent in Moulton,
where he contends that the Henry footnote was intended to limit the reach of Sixth Amendment protection in that
case to situations where "the State deliberately circumvented counsel with regard to the 'subject of
representation.' "Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 187 (1985).
325. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,434 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285,
301 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 355 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
326. United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344, 1354-55 (7th Cir.) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 873 (1972). Justice Stevens cites his Springeropinion in his dissent in Moranv. Burbine.475 U.S. 412,464
n.53 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
327. Patterson, 487 U.S. at 301 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Harvey, 494 U.S. at 365-66 n.12 (Stevens, I.,
dissenting).
328. Moran,475 U.S. at 420.
329. Id. at415.
330. Id. at 427-28 (citation omitted and emphasis added). The Court continued:
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Despite the Supreme Court's hostility to the no contact rule as a limitation on
criminal investigations before the filing of charges, criminal defendants have
continued to invoke the rule in arguments to the lower federal courts. Roughly a
decade after Massiah, the D.C. Circuit addressed such an argument in United
States v. Lemonakis.33 ' During the government's investigation of a series of
burglaries, but before any indictment, suspects Lemonakis and Enten retained
counsel, who made their representation known to the authorities.332 The govern
ment nonetheless recorded incriminating conversations between the defendants
and a cooperating accomplice.33 3 The defendants argued that these recordings
violated their Sixth Amendment rights, a contention the court immediately
not attach before the
discounted by noting that the right to counsel does 334
"initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceeding[s]."
The defendants also argued for suppression of the tapes on the ground that the
Assistant U.S. Attorneys who authorized the undercover recordings violated
ABA Canon 7 (formerly Canon 9) and DR 7-104. 335 The court disagreed. It
began by distinguishing two of its own earlier cases that might have been read to
support the defendants' argument 336 on the ground that in each case the alleged
prosecutorial misconduct had a "constitutional dimension, in terms of Fifth and
Sixth Amendment guarantees relating to the right to counsel, which does not, as
we have concluded, inhere in the instant case.", 3 3 7 The inescapable implication of
this pronouncement is that the no contact ethical rule as applied to a prosecutor is
to be read in pari materia with the constitutional right to counsel.3 38
Since Lemonakis, every other circuit that has addressed the question (with the

Nothing we say today disables the States from adopting different requirements for the conduct of its
[sic] employees and officials as a matter of state law. We hold only that the Court of Appeals erred in
construing the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution to require the exclusion of respondent's
three confessions.
Id.
331. 485 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974).
332. United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941,954 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974).
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 954-55.
336. Id. at 955 n.1. The cases were Ricks v. United States, 334 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1964), and Mathies v.
United States, 374 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
337. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d at 955 n.21.
338. The only D.C. Circuit case on this issue since Lemonakis is United States v. Sutton. 801 F.2d 1346 (D.C.
Cir. 1986). In Sutton, the court rejected a motion to suppress tape recordings made of the defendant during the
pre-indictment investigative phase of the case, holding that neither the Sixth Amendment nor DR 7-104
provided grounds for relief. 801 F.2d at 1366. The court cited Lemonakis, and then observed: "Rule 7-104 was
never meant to apply to situations such as this one, but was meant to ensure that lawyers not prey on persons
known to be represented by counsel." Id.
The court's remark is interesting for two reasons: first, there are certainly elements in the ABA eager to take
issue with the court's view on original intent. See, e.g., ABA House of Delegates, Report No. 301, approved Feb.
12-13, 1990 (stressing that the requirements of DR 7-104(A)(1) are applicable to prosecutors). Second, the court
is palpably incorrect insofar as the conduct under review would certainly be viewed as improper if engaged in
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exception of the Second Circuit) has defined the no contact rule as an ethical
obligation triggered only by the attachment of Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.3 39

b. United States v. Hammad and the Thornburgh Memorandum
The continuing evolution of the Second Circuit's views merits some analysis,
by disputants in a civil controversy. The comment is only coherent if it is taken to mean that DR 7-104 was
"never meant to apply" to criminal cases, or at least to the investigative phase of criminal cases.
339. Fourth Circuit: United States v. Chavez, 902 F.2d 259, 265-67 (4th Cir. 1990) (expressing concern
about an agent's post-indictment conversations with a represented defendant, and stressing the effect of such
communications on the "trust and confidence" essential to the attorney-client relationship guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment).
Fifth Circuit: United States v. Heinz, 983 F.2d 609, 613 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting claim by dissent that
anti-contact obligation applies pre-indictment and noting "the great weight of authority to the contrary").
Seventh Circuit: United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344, 1354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972).
Eighth Circuit: United States v. Fitterer, 710 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852 (1983).
The defendant was recorded speaking to an accomplice after he had retained counsel in connection with an
upcoming grand jury appearance. The defendant claimed that the prosecutor had violated Minnesota Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility DR 7-104. The court found: (1) the defendant had no Sixth Amendment right to
counsel because adversarial judicial proceedings had not begun; (2) the defendant had no Fifth Amendment
right to counsel because he was not in custody; and (3) that "[w]e do not believe that DR 7-104(A)(1) of the
Code of Professional Responsibility was intended to stymie undercover investigations when the subject retains
counsel." id. at 1333; accordUnited States v. Dobbs, 711 F2d 84, 86 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that government
investigatory agencies are not required to refrain from contact with a suspect because he or she had previously
retained counsel).
Ninth Circuit:United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 920, cert. denied,
454 U.S. 828 (1981) ("non-custodial environment, prior to Kenny's charge, arrest, or indictment" does not
"implicate the sorts of ethical problems addressed by the Code"); United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir.
1993) (same); United States v. Powe, 9 F3d 68, 69 (1993) (same).
The Ninth Circuit once suggested in a footnote that the no contact rule might apply pre-indictment to a
situation of custodial interrogation, the circumstance that triggers the Miranda right to counsel ancillary to the
Fifth Amendment, but the suggestion was dictum and the court has never revisited the idea. United States v.
Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1460 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993). In support of this suggestion, the court cited three cases in which it
said other courts have held that "in custodial situations, the ethical rule prohibits prosecutors from interviewing
defendants in the absence of and without the consent of their counsel." Id. A close reading of the cases cited
renders this interpretation of them doubtful.
In United States v. Thomas, the interrogation occurred after the defendant had been arrested, served with a
criminal complaint, had counsel appointed and appeared at a preliminary hearing, in short, after adversarial
judicial proceedings had begun. 474 F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973).
In United States v. Killian, the timing of the questioning is less clear, but the court says it occurred "[w]hile
[the defendant was] in custody awaiting trial and after obtaining the services of an attorney ... " 639 F.2d 206,
208 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Cox v. Wynck, 451 U.S. 1021 (1981). This, too, sounds as though the
interrogation occurred after commencement of the adversarial process.
In United States v. Durham, an FBI agent interviewed the defendant on six occasions. 475 F.2d 208 (7th Cir.
1973). The first was arranged by defense counsel; four of the last five, though they occurred without the
knowledge of defense counsel, occurred after defendant had been arrested and had appeared with counsel at a
preliminary hearing. Id. at 209-10. Defendants have a right to counsel at a preliminary hearing. Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). Only one of the six interviews occurred prior to the preliminary hearing, but the
court did not appear to recognize the distinction. Durham, 475 F.2d at 210-11.
Tenth Circuit: United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 855 (1990) ("We
hold that DR 7-104(A)(l)'s proscriptions do not attach during the investigative process before the initiation of
criminal proceedings.").
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particularly because it was a case from that court, United States v. Hammad, 4 °
that was the catalyst for the present feud between the bar and the Department of
Justice.
In 1982, twenty years after its Massiah opinion, the Second Circuit decided
United States v. Vasquez,34 t in which it held that an undercover tape recording of
an unindicted suspect, who had previously retained counsel in connection with a
violated neither the Sixth Amendment nor DR
appearance,
grand jury 34
2
7-104(A)(1).
The following year, the Second Circuit was confronted in United States3 4v.4
Jami134 3 with a forceful exposition of the most expansive view of DR 7-104.
The district judge's position was that the ethical rule should prohibit the
government from using the pre-indictment undercover tapes at issue, or any
evidence obtained from direct or indirect communications with a person under
suspicion of committing a crime, once the government became aware that the
person had a lawyer.345 He rejected the position that there need be any congruence between the ethical rule and the Sixth Amendment,346 and explicitly urged
the Second Circuit to reconsider Vasquez.34 7
On appeal, the Second Circuit served up a remarkably anemic response. It
reversed the suppression of the evidence on the narrow ground that, because the
prosecutor had been unaware of the undercover taping, there could have been no
340. 846 F2d 854, opinion withdrawn and revised, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871
(1990).
341. 675 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1982).
342. Id. at 17. The court held that acceptance of defendant's argument on the ethics rule "would simply
enable criminal suspects, by retaining counsel, to hamper the government's conduct of legitimate investigations.
Even assuming this provision of the Code to be applicable to a criminal investigation, which is doubtful, it was
not intended to lead to such a result." Id. (emphasis added).
343. 707 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1983).
344. United States v. Jamil, 546 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), order rev'd, 707 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1983).
Defendant was the represented target of a grand jury investigation into the unauthorized export of military
equipment. Jamil, 546 F. Supp. at 649. Two-and-one-half years before the indictment was finally returned, but
after the defendant had retained counsel, customs agents tape recorded conversations between the defendant and
an informant. United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d at 645. The Assistant U.S. Attorney was aware the defendant had
counsel, but unaware of the taping. Jamil, 546 F. Supp. at 651. The defendant moved to suppress the tapes on
Sixth Amendment grounds and on the basis that the taping had violated DR 7-104(A)(1). Id.
Judge Weinstein found no Sixth Amendment violation. Id. But then he held: (1) the no contact rule applies to
prosecutors, id.at 652-53; (2) a criminal client is a "represented party" within the meaning of the rule as soon as
"the client is being investigated as a possible defendant in a potential criminal proceeding," id. at 653; (3) any
direct or indirect communication between the prosecutor or any representative of the prosecutor "occurring
after the government became aware that [the defendant] was represented by counsel would constitute a violation
of DR 7-104(A)(1)," id. at 654; and (4) even though the Assistant U.S. Attorney had no advance knowledge of
the taping in this case, his use of the tape at trial would constitute an ethical violation and should not be
permitted, id. at 655.
345. Judge Weinstein did not actually base his suppression of the tapes on the alleged ethical violation,
recognizing that he could not do so in light of Vazquez. Id. at 660. Instead he excluded them on what might best
be termed an expansive application of FederalRule of Evidence 403. Id. at 661.
346. Id. at 655-58.
347. Id. at 660.
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violation of the disciplinary rule.3 48 It left open the possibility that "Jamil may
have been entitled to the protection afforded by DR 7-104(A)(1) at the time the
recording was made ....

i. Stimulus: United States v. Hammad
The district court judge in United States v. Hammad350 saw the opening left by
Jamil and plunged through it. Hammad involved three represented suspects being
investigated by federal agents and the U.S. Attorney's Office for Medicaid
fraud. 35 1 During the investigation, but before indictment, the government taped
conversations between several suspects, including Taiseer Hammad and an
informant, Wallace Goldstein.35 2
The district court recognized that pre-indictment undercover meetings with a
suspect implicated neither the Fifth nor Sixth Amendment.35 3 The court also
admitted that it had been unable to find a case holding that a statement obtained in
the "investigative, that is, pre-arrest, preindictment stage" of a prosecution had
been garnered unethically.354 But apparently on the ground that the anti-contact
rule "attempts to effectuate many of the same values embodied in the Sixth
Amendment,, 35 5 the district court held that the Assistant U.S. Attorney had
violated DR 7-104(A)(1) and that the undercover tapes should be suppressed on
that basis.356

The government appealed.3 57 In the original and revised opinions that followed, the Second Circuit succeeded principally in sowing confusion. On its first
pass, the court rejected the government's argument that the no contact rule was
inapplicable prior to the attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.35 8
The court refused, however, to define the circumstances that would trigger the
rule.35 9 It then accepted the district court's determination that the rule should
apply precisely as it would in a civil case, that is, "to instances in which a suspect
has retained counsel specifically for representation in conjunction with the
348. Jamil, 707 F.2d at 646.
349. Id. (emphasis added)
350. 678 F. Supp. 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
351. United States v. Hammad, 678 F. Supp. 397, 398-99 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), reversedin part, 846 F.2d 854 (2d
Cir.), revised, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990). The Assistant U.S. Attorney
disputed the claim that he was aware of Hammad's representation by counsel, but the district court found that he
either did know, or had been made aware of facts sufficient to give rise to a duty to inquire further. Hammad, 678
F. Supp. at 399.
352. Id. at 398-99.
353. Hammad, 858 F.2d at 836; Hammad, 678 F. Supp. at 405.
354. 678 F. Supp. at 405.
355. Id. at401.
356. Id.
357. Hammad, 846 F.2d at 857.
358. Id. at 858-59.
359. Id. at 860.
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criminal matter in which he is held suspect, and the government has knowledge
of that fact."' 360 The circuit court upheld the district court's ruling that the ethical
rule had been violated, but reversed its imposition of the sanction of suppression
of evidence. 36 t
Several months after its original opinion, the Second Circuit changed its
mind.36 2 The panel left untouched its statements about the coverage of the no
contact rule not being limited by the Sixth Amendment.36 3 However, the court
withdrew its endorsement of the district court's holding on the ambit of the
ethical rule, avowedly out of solicitude for the government's concern that
applying DR 7-104(A)(1) would prohibit undercover operations. 36 Instead, the
court ruled that "the use of informants by government prosecutors in a preindictment, non-custodial situation ...will generally fall within the 'authorized by
law' exception to DR 7-104(A)(1) and therefore will not be subject to sanctions." ' 365 The court concluded by declining to create a "bright line rule," or
indeed to give any guidance whatever, for the application of the no contact rule to
preindictment situations. It simply declared that "[t]his delineation is best
accomplished by case-by-case adjudication, ' 366 and retired from the field.
As it later proved, the Hammad decision had no notable effect on federal law,
even within the Second Circuit. As the Second Circuit itself recently observed in
Grievance Committee v. Simels,3 6 7 "since Hammad, neither this Court nor any
reported district court decision considering an alleged violation of DR 7-104(A)(1)
has found that the Rule had been violated." 3 68 The court made this observation in
the course of an opinion so vocally skeptical about the propriety of applying the
rule broadly to either prosecutors or criminal defense counsel that it amounts to a
de facto reversal of Hammad. The court wrote:
We believe that the [Grievance] Committee's interpretation [of the rule] may
well result in broad and unwarranted changes in traditional law enforcement
and defense practices and procedures. If such substantialmodifications are to
be made, they should occur only after careful considerationby the representative branches of the federal government. The concededpower offederal district

360. Id. at 859 (quoting Hammad, 678 F. Supp. at 401). The Second Circuit viewed this formula as a
"sensible limitation" on the reach of the rule. Id. This is an utterly baffling assertion since the quoted language is
not a limitation but a restatement of the rule itself.
361. Id. at 859-60, 861-62.
362. The original opinion was issued on May 12, 1988. 846 F.2d at 854. The opinion was then revised on
Sept. 23, 1988, and then amended on Nov. 29, 1988. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 834 (1988).
363. 858 F.2d at 839.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 840.
366. Id.
367. 48 F.3d 640, 649 (2d Cir. 1995). In Simels, the court rejected application of DR 7-104 to a defense
attorney who interviewed a represented co-defendant with the knowledge that the co-defendant had counsel. Id.
at 642-43, 651.
368. Id. at 649.
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courts to supervise the conduct of attorneys should
not by used as a means to
369
substantially alterfederal criminallaw practice.
ii. Response: The Thornburgh Memorandum
Paradoxically, for a case whose resolution was as confused, illogical and,
frankly, toothless as Hammad became in its ultimate form, the opinion churned
up a maelstrom that is still whirling. On June 8, 1989, roughly six months after
the Second Circuit finished fiddling with Hammad, then-Attorney General
Richard Thornburgh issued a memorandum to all Department of Justice litigators. 3 70 The memorandum was framed as a direct response to Hammad and to
continuing efforts by the defense bar "to press its position that DR 7-104 does in
fact limit the universe of appropriate federal investigative techniques." 37 1 Viewed
objectively, the vast majority of the Thornburgh Memorandum is unsurprising
and unobjectionable. For example, its position on the no contact rule was nothing
more than a restatement of the position the Justice Department had been asserting
in court, with uninterrupted success until Hammad, since Massiah first went
before the Second Circuit in 1962 - that it is legal and appropriate for
government lawyers and agents "to gather evidence by communicating with any
person who has not been made the subject of formal federal criminal adversarial
proceedings ... regardless of whether the person is known to be represented by
37 2
counsel."
Had the memorandum stopped there, it would probably have remained an
obscure internal communique. What made the document famous was its overt
proclamation of two assertions that, while the first is plainly true and the second
is arguable, might best have remained unsaid. The first of these declarations was
that "although the states have the authority to regulate the ethical conduct of
attorneys admitted to practice before their courts, that authority permits regulation of federal attorneys only if the regulation does not conflict with the federal
law or with the attorney's federal responsibilities., 373 The memorandum went on
to say that "the Supremacy Clause forbids the states from regulating [Justice
Department] attorneys' conduct in a manner inconsistent with their federal
374
responsibilities, as determined by federal law and the Attorney General."
Despite the furor this claim has provoked, it stands, as will be seen, on a firm
footing.
369. Id. at 644 (emphasis added).
370. Richard Thornburgh, Memorandum to All Justice Department Litigators re Communications with
Persons Represented by Counsel (unpublished office memorandum, June 8, 1989) [hereinafter Thornburgh
Memorandum], reproducedin In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 489-93 (D.N.M. 1992).
371. Id. at 490. The memorandum refers to Hammad as "the high water mark of the bar's litigative effort."
Id.
372. Id. at 492.
373. Id. at 490 (citation omitted).
374. Id. at 492.
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The aspect of the Thornburgh Memorandum that has provoked the most
violent denunciation is its implicit claim that any contact with a represented
person by a Justice Department lawyer or his agent, regardless of circumstances,
is ethical because "authorized by law." 3 75 This assertion seems at least problematic, particularly in a case such as Hammad, where the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York had adopted DR 7-104(A)(1) as a local rule,376 and
the problem was thus not a conflict between a state ethics authority and federal
law, but a disagreement between the federal executive and judicial branches over
the proper interpretation of federal law. Much more easily defensible is the
implication of the very same passage of the memorandum that the Attorney
General has the power to set standards
for Justice Department lawyers by
377
regulation that will preempt state law.
Irrespective of the legal correctness of the Thornburgh Memorandum, one is
disposed to wonder at the political acumen of declaring so boldly for federal
supremacy and choosing Hammad and the no contact rule as casus beli.378 In the
limited context of the no contact rule itself, the memorandum has forced the
lower federal courts to confront a contradiction they have been discreetly
avoiding for decades, to the advantage, on balance, of federal prosecutors. That
contradiction, as we have seen, is that Model Rule 4.2 and its predecessors, as
interpreted by the organized bar and many states, cannot be reconciled with the
federal constitutional and procedural law of criminal investigations. The courts'
solution has been to say that the no contact ethics rule applies to federal
prosecutors, while in fact crafting a very different rule that is both triggered by
attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and narrowly tailored to
protect Sixth Amendment interests. The result has been preservation of the
Supreme Court's careful balancing of public interest and suspects' rights without
the uncomfortable necessity of declaring a venerable ethical rule void as to one
class of lawyers.
Before the Thornburgh Memorandum, disputes over particular ethical rules exculpatory evidence in the grand jury, attorney subpoenas and no contact usually stayed focused on whether the rule in question violated federal law. The
Thornburgh Memorandum shifted the center of gravity of the debate from the

375. The memorandum says:
In the near future, the Department will codify language in the Standards of Conduct, 28 C.ER., Part
45, that will make the Department's position clear to the bench and bar. We intend to make clear that
the "authorized by law" exemption in DR 7-104 applies to all communications with represented
individuals by Departmentattorneys or by others acting at theirdirection.

Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
376. United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 837 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990).
377. In re Doe, 801 E Supp. at 493 (citing Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 370).
378. The choice to unfurl the battle flag seems particularly unnecessary in light of the post-Hammad
jurisprudence of the Second Circuit. See supra notes 367-69 and accompanying text (discussing the Second
Circuit's treatment of Hammad in subsequent case law).
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distortion of criminal procedure through the misuse of ethical rules to the
"arrogance" of federal lawyers seeming to declare themselves exempt from
ethical control. 3 7 9 By publishing a declaration that could be twisted by opponents
into the sneer that "we're the feds and we don't need no stinking ethics," the
Justice Department raised judicial eyebrows (and hackles), made litigation of no
contact cases more difficult and gift-wrapped a rhetorical meat axe that the
defense bar has been wielding with relish in and out of court ever since.
iii. Shock Waves: The Aftermath of the Thornburgh Memorandum
The reaction to the Thornburgh Memorandum among the organized bar was
predictable. The popular and legal press was filled with howls of indignation.3 8 °
At its next mid-year meeting, in February 1990, the ABA House of Delegates
passed a resolution condemning the memorandum as "a unilateral assumption of
authority to render self-interested interpretations of ethical standards, [and] an
unwarranted and unfounded use of executive power to create unequal classes of
both litigants and lawyers. 38 1 It may be no coincidence that Model Rule 3.8(f)
on attorney subpoenas was ratified by the House of Delegates at the same
session.3 82 The reaction among academic commentators to the memorandum has
been generally negative.3 83

More significantly from a practical point of view, some members of the federal
bench plainly took umbrage at what must have appeared as a challenge, not only
to state authorities, but to the supervisory power of federal judges. The baneful
379. See In re Doe, 801 F Supp. 478, 486 (D. N.M. 1992) (saying that the Thornburgh Memorandum
"displays an arrogant disregard for and irresponsibly undermines ethics in the legal profession"); ABA Adds
Two Model Rules on Subpoenas, PracticeSales, [6 Current Reports] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
27 (1990) (noting an ABA delegate's view that Department of Justice position represents "sheer arrogance").
380. See, e.g., Tom Watson, AG Decrees Prosecutors May Bypass Counsel; Move Is Assault on Ethics
Codes, Defense Bar Claims, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 25, 1989, at I ("In a move likened by one lawyer to a
'declaration of war on the defense bar,' Attorney General Richard Thornburgh has decreed that federal
prosecutors are not bound by a time-honored canon of legal ethics governing contact with counsel in criminal
investigation."); William Glaberson, Thornburgh Policy Leads to a Sharp Ethics Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
1991, at B4 ("That memorandum has reverberated through the world of criminal law like a shot across the
bow."). See also Special Committee of the Conference of Chief Justices, Comment on Proposed Regulation
Governing Contacts by Department of Justice Attorneys with Represented Persons, 28 C.F.R., Part 77, Mar. 31,
1994, at 13 (noting that "[t]he Supremacy Clause cannot be used to justify preempting a state ethics rule by
means of a regulation adopted by the Department") (available from National Center for State Courts).
381. Am. Bar Ass'n Report to the House of Delegates (Feb. 12, 1990), quoted in In re Doe, 801 F Supp. at
487.
382. MODEL RULEs ANN. commentary at 408.

383. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors,53 U. Prrr. L. REV.393,446-48 (1992) (discussing the
negative reaction); Neals-Erik W. Delker, Ethics and the FederalProsecutor:The Continuing Conflict Over the
Application of Model Rule 4.2 to FederalAttorneys, Am.U. L. REV. 855, 865-66, 871, 911 (1995) (same). But
see F. Dennis Saylor, IV & J. Douglas Wilson, Puttinga Square Peg in a Round Hole: The Application of Model
Rule 4.2 to FederalProsecutors,53 U. Prrr. L. REV.459, 485-87 (1992) (describing the policy as a "reasonable
accommodation of the legitimate needs of the prosecutor, the rights of the criminal defendant and the purposes
of the ethical rule").
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384
effect of the Thornburgh Memorandum can be seen in United States v. Lopez.
While the Ninth Circuit ultimately confirmed its earlier restriction of the no
contact rule to the period after the activation of the Sixth Amendment, 385 the path
to that result was perilous. The Lopez case arose out of a situation in which, after
seeking and obtaining approval from a magistrate to do so, an Assistant U.S.
Attorney met with an indicted defendant, Jose Lopez, in the absence of his
retained counsel to discuss a plea bargain.3 86 The ensuing plea negotiations
ultimately collapsed; the defendant's attorney found out about them and withdrew. 387 Lopez' newly retained counsel immediately moved for dismissal of the
indictment due to an alleged infringement on Lopez' Sixth Amendment right to
counsel and violation of the no contact rule of the California Bar, which had been
incorporated into the local rules of the federal district court.3 88
In the district court proceedings on the motion to dismiss, the government's
primary line of defense was that the Thornburgh Memorandum exempted
Department of Justice attorneys from compliance with the no contact rule
adopted by the district court, even in a post-indictment situation where the right
to counsel had attached. 389 This approach was not well received.
The district judge wrote a sizzling opinion, 39 in which she found that neither
the Thornburgh Memorandum nor general principles of separation of powers
exempted federal government lawyers from the operation of the court's local
ethical rule.391 She further found that the Assistant U.S. Attorney had violated the
ethical rule, despite having cleared his meeting with Lopez with a magistrate, on
the ground that the Assistant U.S. Attorney "effectively misled" the magistrate

384. 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993).
385. See, e.g., United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 920, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 828 (1981) (upholding the no contact rule once the defendant hired an attorney).
386. United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993). The facts of the Lopez case were convoluted
and remained in dispute even after the court of appeals decision, but the salient points were these:
Two defendants were indicted for drug crimes in the Northern District of California. Id. at 1456. Sometime
thereafter, one of the defendants, Jose Lopez, approached his co-defendant's attorney, Twitty, about the
possibility of negotiating a plea agreement with the government without the presence or knowledge of his own
lawyer, Tarlow. Id. at 1456-57. The reasons for Lopez' desire to cut out Tarlow were later the subject of much
dispute, but Twitty contacted the Assistant U.S. Attorney and requested a meeting between the Assistant U.S.
Attorney, Twitty, Twitty's client and Lopez, in order to discuss a plea in Tarlow's absence. Id. at 1457.
Recognizing the obvious difficulties of such a meeting, the Assistant U.S. Attorney contacted the district
court, which referred the matter to a magistrate. Id. The magistrate conducted two in camera interviews of
Lopez to determine whether Lopez wanted to meet with the government without his attorney and whether he
understood his rights and the dangers of self-representation. Id. After both interviews, the magistrate concluded
that Lopez should be allowed to meet with the government. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. at1458.
390. United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991), order vacated, 989 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir.),
opinion amended and superseded, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993).
391. Id. at 1450-54.
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about Lopez' motives for seeking the meeting without his attorney. 392 The court
concluded by ordering the indictment against Lopez dismissed.3 93

On appeal of the district court's ruling to the Ninth Circuit, the government
discarded its reliance on the Thornburgh Memorandum, 394 arguing instead that
the ethical rule "was not intended to apply to prosecutors pursuing criminal
395

either before or after indictment.396 The court made short
work of this contention, referring to it as "puzzling, ' 397 and holding that rule
39
investigations,,

does indeed apply "beginning at the latest upon the moment of indictment.The court's reasoning, however, is most instructive. It wrote:
The prosecutor's ethical duty to refrain from contacting represented defendants
entifies 13991 upon indictment for the same reasons that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel attaches.... In addition to focusing "the subject of the
representation," indictment gives rise to a defendant's "right to rely upon
counsel as a 'medium' between him and the State." Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S.
159, 176 (1985). Thus, the Sixth Amendment guarantee would be rendered
fustian if one of its "critical components," a lawyer-client " 'relationship
characterized by trust and confidence,' "could be circumvented by the prosecutor under the guise of pursuing the criminal investigation. 4°

Just as it had in Kenny,4 ° ' the Ninth Circuit in Lopez justified and defined the
limits of the anti-contact "ethical" rule by reference to Sixth Amendment
principles.40 2
iv. The DOJ Regulation on Contact with Represented Persons
In part because it became clear that federal courts were not disposed to accept a
392. Id. at 1452.
393. Id. at 1464.
394. Lopez, 4 F.3d at 1458.
395. Id. at 1459.
396. Id. at 1459, 1460.
397. Id. at 1460.
398. Id. at 1461.
399. The word "entify" is defined as, "To make into an entity, attribute objective existence to." 5 THE
OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 298 (2d ed. 1989). Assuming that the court employed the word advisedly, its use
implies that the prosecutorial obligation of no contact with represented persons lacks "objective existence"
pre-indictment.
400. Lopez, 4 F.3d at 1460-61 (quoting United States v. Chavez, 902 F.2d 259, 266 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 21 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring))).
401. United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828 (1981).
402. The court nonetheless overruled the district court in two respects: First, while the appeals court initially
refused to overturn the district court's finding of ethical misconduct by the prosecutor, United States v. Lopez,
989 F.2d 1032, 1041 (9th Cir.), opinion amended and superseded, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993), upon further
consideration it issued an amended opinion concluding that the facts were unclear and remanding for further
proceedings on the issue of whether there had been an ethical violation, 4 F.3d at 1462. Second, the court held
that, even if an ethical violation had been committed, dismissal of the indictment was an inappropriate remedy.
Id. at 1464.
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prosecutorial exemption from an ethical rule purely on the basis of an internal
memorandum from the Attorney General,4 °3 particularly once the judges had
acted to incorporate the rule in their own local rules, the Justice Department
promulgated a regulation governing contacts between government lawyers and
persons represented by counsel.
The regulation, which became effective on August 4, 19 9 4 ,404 establishes a
broad prohibition against contacts with a "represented party" after such a party
has been arrested or charged in a federal criminal case,40" subject to six fairly
narrow exceptions.40 6 The general prohibition on contact, taken together with its
exceptions, does two basic things. First, it incorporates a fair approximation of
existing federal case law concerning the point at which the anti-contact prohibition is activated. 40 7 Second, it defines and legitimates a narrow post-activation
403. See, e.g., In re Gorence, 810 F Supp. 1234, 1236 (D.N.M. 1992) (holding that because an assistant U.S.
Attorney did not have colorable federal defense to New Mexico's no contact rule, disciplinary proceedings
against him could not be removed to federal court); In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478,485-86 (D.N.M. 1992) (holding
that there was no evidence of any federal law showing a clear and manifest purpose to preempt the application
of state ethical codes to an Assistant U.S. Attorney).
404. In November 1992, Attorney General William Barr proposed the regulation. Communications With
Represented Persons, 57 Fed. Reg. 54,737 (1992). On Jan. 22, 1993, the Clinton Administration withdrew the
proposed regulation. Daniel Wise, 'Thornburgh Memo' Rules Killed: Clinton Staff Retracts Regulations on
Agents' Contact with Suspects, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 1, 1993, at 1. The following year, on July 26, 1993, the
Department of Justice reissued the same regulation for an additional period of comment. Communications With
Represented Persons, 58 Fed. Reg. 39,976 (1993); see also 'ThornburghMemo'Resurfaces, Justice Seeks More
Comments, 62 U.S.L.W. 5 d18 2077 (Aug. 10, 1993). During the comment period, members of the ABA
Litigation Section held a meeting with Attorney General Reno to oppose reissuance of the proposed rule. See
Compromise Sought with Defense Lawyers on Limits to InvestigativePower, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Oct.
15, 1993, at *4, available in LEXIS, Exec. Library, Drexec File. Following the comment period, the regulation
was revised and reissued. 59 Fed. Reg. 10,086 (1994). It became effective on Aug. 4, 1994, 59 Fed. Reg. at
39,910 (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 77).
405. 28 C.F.R. § 77.3(a)(3) (1994).
406. The exceptions are:
(a) Communications to determine whether the person is in fact represented. Id. § 77.6(a);
(b) Communications in the course of discovery, grand jury testimony or the service of judicial
process such as subpoenas. Id. § 77.6(b);
(c) Communications initiated by the represented party after a hearing before a federal judge or
magistrate who has determined that the party has voluntarily waived counsel or obtained substitute
counsel. Id. § 77.6(c);
(d) Communications at the time of arrest after an advisement of rights and a waiver. Id. § 77.6(d);
(e) Communications in the course of investigating additional, different or ongoing crimes separate
from those for which the defendant has been arrested or charged. Id. § 77.6(e); and
(f) Communications believed in good faith to be necessary to protect against threats to life or
personal safety. Id. § 77.6(f).
407. I say "fair approximation" because several peculiarities in the structure and wording of the regulation
create anomalies that could have the effect of blurring the distinction that federal courts have so far maintained
between contacts before and after attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. By defining a
"represented party" as one who has counsel and has been "arrested or charged in a federal criminal case," id.
§ 77.3(a)(3), the regulation suggests that the anti-contact ethical prohibition is activated by the attachment of the
Miranda right to counsel ancillary to the Fifth Amendment. Despite occasional hints that the rule might apply in
precharging custodial situations, no federal court has ever actually made such a finding. See, e.g., discussion of
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exception to the rule for contacts initiated by the suspect with the knowledge and
approval of a judge.
The regulation also defines the scope of the Justice Department's no contact
prohibition as to employees of organizations that qualify as "represented parties." The regulation includes within the general ban on pre-charging contact
only "controlling individuals;" this category is limited to current high-level
employees known by the government to be participating as decision makers in
the determination of the organization's legal position in the case or matter under
investigation.4 °8 In effect, the regulation returns the no contact rule on organizaill-conceived 1983
tional employees to its traditional scope prior to the ABA's
409
modifications in the wake of Upjohn Co. v. United States.

Beyond the particulars of the no contact ban, 28 C.F.R. § 77.11 is notable for its
chosen enforcement mechanism. It states that responsibility for investigation and
punishment of infractions rests exclusively with the Attorney General and the
Justice Department itself. The adequacy of this approach will be considered
below.
v. Counterstrike: The ABA Interprets and Amends Model Rule 4.2
The response of the ABA to the DOJ "no contact" regulation followed within a
year. Formal Opinion 95-396 of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility (issued on July 28, 1995), and the vote of the ABA House of
Delegates two weeks later (on Aug. 9, 1995) to amend Model Rule 4.2 by striking
the word "party" and inserting the word "person," were undeniably direct
reactions to the regulation. The more striking of the two ABA documents is the
Ethics Committee opinion. The opinion acknowledged the weight of federal case
law "suggesting" that "the Rule... does not come into play until Sixth AmendUnited States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1460 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993), supra note 339. On the other hand, the exception
in the regulation, 28 C.FR. § 77.6(d), which allows interrogation of a "represented party" at the time of arrest
after warnings and waiver, seems to restore the status quo and leave the Fifth Amendment/Sixth Amendment
dichotomy undisturbed. 28 C.F.R. § 77.6(d).
On close examination, however, there are two situations in which the regulation appears to change existing
law. First, assume an unindicted represented suspect who is arrested, refuses to speak, and advises his
interrogators of the fact of representation, and is then released for lack of sufficient evidence. Under existing
federal law, since formal adversary proceedings had not commenced, the suspect would be fair game for
undercover or overt contacts in the period following his release but before any subsequent filing of formal
charges. By defining "represented party" as one who has been arrested, the regulation appears to bar such
contacts. Second, if the same arrestee had already been indicted and had obtained counsel prior to the arrest, the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel would certainly have attached and, assuming the prosecutor were aware of
the representation, even custodial interrogation without consent of counsel would appear to be forbidden. Yet
the regulation appears to permit such an interrogation.
Whether these anomalies are oversights to be corrected with subsequent amendments or represent considered
choices by the drafters remains to be seen.
408. 28C.ER. § 77.10.
409. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). The comment that originally accompanied Model Rule 4.2 limited its coverage to
"managing agents" of the corporation or organization. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
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4 10
ment rights attach," but blithely concluded that such opinions "are not sound."
The Committee grudgingly acknowledged that the existing body of federal
decisional law restricting the reach of Model Rule 4.2 must be adhered to, but
offered an interpretation of that body of law which, to be candid, is distorted
almost beyond recognition. The Committee wrote:

[T]he Committee recognizes that there is a body of decisional law that in effect
concludes that the public interest in investigating crime may outweigh the
interests served by the Rule in the criminal context, at least where the contacts
are made with represented persons who have been neither arrested nor formally
charged, and the contacts are made by undercover agents or informants and not
by the government lawyers themselves (orby agents acting so closely under the
lawyers' direction as to be their alter egos). Accordingly, the Committee
believes that so long as this body of precedent remains good law, it is
appropriate to treat contacts that are recognized as proper by such decisional

authority as being "authorized by law" within the meaning of that exception
stated in the Rule.4 11
As has been discussed above, there is virtually no support in prevailing federal
case law for the proposition that federal prosecutors may not direct pre-charging
undercover activities involving agent or informant contact with a represented
suspect. Indeed, the "altar ego" language in the Committee's parenthetical would
swallow the rule enunciated by the federal courts. The Committee's interpretation
would forbid a federal prosecutor to contact an uncharged, represented suspect
himself, or to direct an agent to do so on his behalf. The only contacts that would
remain unaffected by this "exception" would be agent-suspect contacts of which
the prosecutor was unaware, and contacts of that type have always been beyond
the ambit of a rule which is, after all, about attorney conduct.4 12 In short the

410. Opinion 95-396, supra note 275. The Committee's arguments against the "unsoundness" of the federal
court's reading of Model Rule 4.2 are principally: (1) That prosecutors could "manipulate grand jury
proceedings to avoid [the Rule's] encumberance," and (2) that "applying the Rule to prohibit only postindictment communications would render the rule of little use in the criminal context." Id. The Committee
simply declines to address the self-evident policy rationale behind the courts' choice of attachment of the Sixth
Amendment as a demarcation line for activation of the Rule -- that the intervention of lawyers early in the
investigative stage of criminal cases would be effective in shutting off or reducing the flow of useful, reliable
information about the commission of crimes, and the courts are unwilling to countenance that result. See supra
notes 291-94 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence on this issue).
411. Opinion 95-396, supra note 275 (emphasis added). The highlighted language is plainly contrary to the
law of every federal circuit to have considered the question, with the possible exception of the Second Circuit.
See supra note 339 (discussing cases holding that the "no contact" rule does not apply before the initiation of
formal adversary proceedings, and making no distinction regarding the identity of the person making or
authorizing the contact); see also supranotes 340-69 and accompanying text (discussing the work of the Second
Circuit). Particularly in light of the decision in Grievance Committee v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640 (2d Cir. 1995),
discussed supra notes 367-69 and accompanying text, there would appear to be little support for the Ethics
Committee's position in any federal circuit.
412. In light of language in Section IX of the Opinion 95-396, even complete ignorance of the activities of
one's agents would not necessarily be enough to protect a federal prosecutor from a grievance under Model Rule
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Ethics Committee opinion, despite its cautious draftsmanship, concedes authority
over the regulation of federal prosecutors to neither the Justice Department nor
the federal courts. Read carefully, it is neither a concession nor a compromise. It
is instead a manifesto for further conflict.
4. The Debate over the No Contact Regulation: An Argument about History
and Power
Though vastly different in both substance and tone from the Thornburgh
Memorandum, the Justice Department's no contact regulation has also inspired
intense criticism from the bar.4 13 Reasonable observers can differ over whether
the substance of the regulation is a fair compromise between prosecution and
defense interests.4 14 Resolving the merits of that debate is not my objective here.
However, certain components of the roaring feud over whether the Justice
regulations that supersede state ethics
Department has the power to promulgate
4 15
rules do illuminate the present topic.
The basic argument of those who deny the Justice Department's authority
under the Supremacy Clause to promulgate the no contact regulation and preempt
state law is that both Congress and the federal courts have, in effect, delegated to
the states the power to control the membership in, and regulate the conduct of, the
legal profession, including that portion of the profession that practices in the
federal courts. Since, the argument continues, the Supreme Court persists in its
reliance on state bars to regulate the conduct of federal lawyers, and since
Congress has not expressly indicated an intention to permit the Justice Department to preempt this "traditional" state function, there can be no preemption by
regulation.45 6 While this contention is in itself a marked distortion of federal

4.2. According to the Committee, a prosecutor (or other lawyer) who had supervisory authority over an
investigator "would be ethically responsible for [contacts with represented persons] made by the investigator if
Opinion 95-396, supra note 275 (emphasis added).
she had not made reasonable efforts to prevent them ....
413. See, e.g., Samuel Dash, Justice Department Contacts With Represented Persons: An Alarming

Assertion of Power, 78 JUDICATURE 137 (1994) (finding the Justice Department's justification for the rule
lacking); Alafair S.R. Burke, Reconciling Professional Ethics and ProsecutorialPower: The No-contact Rule
Debate, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1635, 1668-69 (1994) (describing flaws in the Justice Department's rationale).
414. See Burke, supra note 413, at 1665-67 (offering critical commentary). But see Developments in the
Law-Lawyers'Responsibilitiesand Lawyers'Responses, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1547, 1595 ("Substantively, [the

DOJ regulation] provides a balanced approach to ex parte communications, nicely accommodating competing
interests...").
415. This Article does not attempt to determine conclusively the question of whether Justice Department
regulations can supersede ethical rules properly adopted by federal courts as local rules under FederalRule of
Criminal Procedure57 or otherwise.

416. See Dash, supra note 413, at 138-39 (arguing that the attorney general has no power to preempt state
and federal court ethics rules under the Supremacy Clause because the power is not expressly granted by
Congress); Conference of Chief Justices, Comment on Proposed Regulation Governing Contacts by Department of Justice Attorneys with Represented Persons, 28 C.F.R. Part 77, Mar. 31, 1994, at 12-16 (available from
National Center for State Courts) [hereinafter Chief Justices' Comment].
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preemption doctrine, because there is a well-established doctrine of administrative preemption,41 7 the argument implicitly concedes, as it must, one critical
point: if either Congress or the Supreme Court chooses to invalidate all or any
portion of state ethics rules as applied to practice in the federal courts, it may do
so under the Supremacy Clause.
Moreover, the fundamental assertion of the Justice Department's critics that
the regulation of lawyers is "the exclusive province of the states, ' ' 418 with its
implied corollary that Congress and the federal courts have not hitherto preempted state law in this area, is historical fiction. Federal courts have repeatedly
417. The Supreme Court has held unequivocally that "[flederal regulations have no less preemptive effect
than federal statutes." Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc. v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); accordCity
of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1988) (stating "the statutorily authorized regulations of an agency
will pre-empt any state or local law that conflicts with such regulations of an agency or frustrates the purposes
thereof") A number of critics have claimed that "[t]o preempt state law, Congress must do so expressly." Dash,
supra note 413, at 138; Chief Justices' Comment, supra note 416, at 13. This statement is correct, but
misleading because it applies only to acts of Congress itself, which have preemptive effect. An administrative
agency does not require express congressional authorization to displace state law. City of New York, 486 U.S. at
64 (stating that "where state law is claimed to be pre-empted by federal regulation, a 'narrow focus on
Congress' intent to supersede state law [is] misdirected,' for '[a] pre-emptive regulation's force does not depend
on express congressional authorization to displace state law.' " (quoting De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 154)
(alterations in original).
When a federal agency seeks to preempt state law by regulation, the relevant inquiry is whether the agency
that promulgated the regulations intended to displace state law and whether it acted within the scope of its
delegated authority. See City of New York, 486 U.S. at 63-64 (holding that a federal agency may preempt state
regulation); De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153-54; Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699-700 (1984)
(discussing the limitations of the court's inquiry into regulations, promulgated by an administrator, that are
intended to preempt state law); United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961) (discussing the importance of
legislative history in preemption situations). In the present case, the Department of Justice no contact regulation
expressly states its intention to preempt conflicting state law. 28 C.F.R. § 77.12. Congress has authorized the
Attorney General to direct Department of Justice attorneys in the enforcement of federal criminal law. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 516, 519 (1993). Congress also authorized the Attorney General to promulgate regulations governing the
Department and the "conduct of its employees." 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1977). See generally Burke, supra note 413, at
1652-53 (discussing the attorney general's authority to promulgate regulations defining government attorneys'
authority to communicate with represented parties directly).
The ABA's official position on the preemption issue as it relates to the DOJ "no-contact" regulation is
painfully obscure. In Opinion 95-396, the Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility addresses the
question of when conduct contrary to Model Rule 4.2 is "authorized by law." The Committee discusses the case
of Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979), at great length. In Brown, federal regulations were invalidated
because they were in conflict with a federal statute, and because they failed to comply with the federal
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq (1976). Brown, 441 U.S. at 316. The Ethics Committee,
without so much as a mention of the Supremacy Clause, then concludes that Brown should produce the "same
result ... if the other law involved were rules of professional conduct adopted by state courts - or, for that
matter federal courts." Opinion 95-396, supra note 275. Having gone this far, however, the Committee adds a
footnote stating that, "we express no view as to whether the Department of Justice regulations have sufficient
statutory authorization to meet [the Brown] test." Id.
418. Chief Justices' Comment, supra note 416, at 12. See also Dash, supra note 413, at 138 (stating the
presumption against the preemption of state law in areas regulated by the states); Opinion 95 - 396, supra note
275 ("Moreover, regulation of lawyers, including Justice Department lawyers, has traditionally and quite
properly been left to the states. Indeed, in the authors' view, there could never be a delegation to the Justice
Department or other law enforcement agency to set its own ethics rules unilaterally.") (emphasis added)
(Lawrence J. Fox and Kim Taylor-Thompson dissenting).
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intervened to nullify state bar regulations at odds with the federal constitution,
statutes and regulations. To highlight but a few examples:
(1) The Supreme Court has ruled that state bars do not have unfettered control
even over their own membership. State bar rules and practices regarding
admission to practice will be struck down if violative of the federal Constitution.4 t 9

(2) Federal power to override state determinations about membership in the
legal profession is not limited to state actions that violate the federal Constitution.
State decisions in derogation of federal statutes and regulations must also
yield.42 °

(3) Likewise, federal control over state bars' regulation of their members is not
restricted to the determination of who shall become an attorney in the first
instance. The Supreme Court has repeatedly invalidated state ethical rules
governing legal practice that conflicted with federal law.
(a) In NAACP v. Button,4 2 1 the Supreme Court struck down a transparent
attempt by the Virginia Bar to employ legal ethics rules to prop up racial
segregation. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found that the activities of
the NAACP in organizing African-American citizens to combat state-sponsored

419. In Schware v. Board of BarExaminers, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), and Konigsberg v. State Bar,353 U.S. 252
(1957), the Court found that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment place
limits on the ability of states to exclude a person from the practice of law or any other occupation. Schware, 353
U.S. at 238-39. The Court went on to hold that New Mexico and California had impermissibly excluded the
petitioners from the practice of law for their admitted or suspected political beliefs.Id.at 247; Konigsberg, 353
U.S. at 273. See also Law Students Civil Rights Research Counsel v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 162-63 (1971)
(holding that there is no constitutional invalidity in Rule 9406 of the New York Civil Practiceand Law Rules).
Likewise, the Court has repeatedly struck down bar rules that imposed residency requirements for bar
membership or imposed more onerous conditions on out-of-state residents seeking admission to the bar. See
Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 278 (1985) (holding New Hampshire Supreme
Court's refusal to swear in a Vermont resident who passed the bar examination violated the privileges and
immunities clause of the U.S. Constitution); Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 70 (1988)
(invalidating a Virginia rule that let Virginia residents licensed out-of-state waive into Virginia bar, but required
non-Virginia residents to take the bar exam, as a violation of privileges and immunities clause of the U.S.
Constitution); Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1989) (invalidating Virgin Islands one-year
residency requirement).
420. See, e.g., Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 404 (1963) (holding that, just as a state could not exclude
persons from the bar for reasons that violated federal law, neither could it require a non-attorney authorized by
federal regulation to practice before the U.S. Patent Office either to become an attorney and join the bar or
discontinue his patent practice). At the behest of the Florida Bar, the Florida Supreme Court had enjoined Sperry
from engaging in his patent practice because, in its view, his activities constituted the "unauthorized practice of
law." Id. at 382. The Court said:
A State may not enforce licensing requirements which, though valid in the absence of federal
regulation, give "the State's licensing board a virtual power of review over the federal determination"
that a person or agency is qualified and entitled to perform certain functions, or which impose upon
the performance of activity sanctioned by federal license additional conditions not contemplated by
Congress.
Id. at 385 (quoting Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187, 190 (1956)).
421. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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segregationist policies constituted "solicitation of legal business" in violation of
state law and the 1908 Canons.422 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the state's interpretation of the 1908 Canons offended the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.42 3
(b) The Supreme Court has twice rejected efforts by state bar associations to
enjoin labor unions from facilitating their members' access to competent and
sympathetic counsel. In Brotherhoodof RailroadTrainmen v. VirginiaBar424 and
United Mine Workers v. Illinois BarAssociation,42 5 the Court held that the efforts
by the bar to halt the union plans on the ground that they constituted improper
427
violated the
solicitation of legal business 426 or the unauthorized practice of law
42 8
association.
and
speech
of
rights
constitutional
union members'
(c) In Bates v. State Bar ofArizona,42 9 the Court invalidated the ban on lawyer
advertising contained in the Arizona Supreme Court's ethics rules, holding that
the ban violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 3 °
(d) In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,4 3 ' a minimum fee schedule maintained
by a county bar association was held to be price-fixing in violation of the
Sherman Act. 432
All of the foregoing cases involve federal invalidation of state bar rules
regulating the licensure and conduct of lawyers practicing in state courts. In such
situations the Court starts from the premise that states have a "compelling
interest" in the regulation of their bars, and intervenes only when it is clear that
the bar rule offends supervening federal law. 4 3 3 By contrast, the Court has
repeatedly emphasized that federal courts exercise independent and sovereign
control over the admission and conduct of lawyers practicing before them.4 34

422. NAACPv. Harrison, 116 S.E.2d 55, 72 (Va. 1960).
423. Button, 371 U.S. at 428-29. See also In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 417-18, 439 (1978) (finding South
Carolina's attempt to discipline for improper "solicitation" of a client an ACLU attorney who offered the
organization's legal services to women who had been sterilized as a condition of receiving Medicare, a violation
of First and Fourteenth Amendments).
424. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
425. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
426. Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 2.
427. Id.; Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 218.
428. Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 5-6; Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 225.
429. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
430. Id. at 381-82, 384.
431. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
432. Id. at 789-91.
433. See, e.g., Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 792; Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252,273 (1957).
434. See Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 48 (1917) (stating that the power of removal is reserved to the
federal court itself); Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 282 (1957) (holding that state disbarment did not, of
itself, mandate removal from the Court's rolls because "disbarment by federal courts does not automatically
flow from disbarment by state court"). Each case concerns a petition to remove an attorney from the bar of the
U.S. Supreme Court on the ground that he had been disbarred by the state in which he was licensed. Both cases
held that a state disbarment has only evidentiary weight in a federal disbarment proceeding. Theard, 354 U.S. at
282; Selling, 243 U.S. at 50-51. Indeed, in Theard, the Supreme Court reversed the federal court's order of
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Federal courts may choose to make state bar membership a precondition of
federal practice, and they may elect to adopt state rules of lawyer conduct, in
whole or in part, as their own, but the power to regulate the practice of federal law
is inherent in the federal courts and not derivative from any state body. 435 As the
Supreme Court said in In re Snyder,4 36 in the course of reversing sanctions levied
by the Eighth Circuit against an attorney for conduct alleged to be "unbecoming
a member of the bar of the court ' 4 3 7 and violative of the North Dakota Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility:
The state code of professional responsibility does not by its own terms apply to
sanctions in the federal courts. Federalcourts admit and suspend attorneys as
an exercise4of
their inherent power; the standards imposed are a matter of
38

federal law.

The federal government's undisputed power to set the rules of conduct that
govern attorneys who practice in the federal courts is, if anything, enhanced when
the particular lawyers at issue are employed by the federal government to
investigate and enforce the criminal law of the United States.4 39 Indeed, as the
discussion so far has demonstrated, federal courts have shown no reluctance to
invalidate, modify or ignore ethical rules originating in state codes of conduct
when such rules have restricted federal prosecutors in ways that violate federal
law and procedure.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Williams"0 forbade adoption by a
federal court of a requirement that federal prosecutors present exculpatory
evidence to grand juries. Although Williams voided a "local rule" adopted by the
Tenth Circuit, there can be no doubt that the Williams decision forecloses the
application of Model Rule 3.3(d), or any analogue, to federal prosecutors by state
ethics authorities. 44 '
disbarment because it was premised exclusively on the state action. Theard, 354 U.S. at 282-83; see also In re
Isserman, 345 U.S. 286, 288 (1953) (holding that the court will usually follow a state court's disbarment, but
that such a result is not automatic).
435. See Theard, 354 U.S. at 281 ("The two judicial systems of courts, the state judicatures and the federal
judiciary, have autonomous control over the conduct of their officers, among whom, in the present context,
lawyers are included.").
436. 472 U.S. 634 (1985).
437. Id. at 645.
438. Id. at 645 n.6 (emphasis added). See also Kitchen v. Aristech Chem., 769 F. Supp. 254, 258 (S.D. Ohio
1991) ("The ethical standards by which federal courts measure an attorney's professional conduct are standards
defined by federal law."); Polycast Technology v. Uniroyal, 129 F.R.D. 621,624 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Federal law
governs the conduct of attorneys in the federal courts.").
439. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972) ("[Flair and effective law enforcement aimed
at providing security for the person and property of the individual is a fundamental function of government");
United States v. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972) ("It has been said that '[t]he most basic function of any
government is to provide for the security of the individual and of his property.' "(quoting Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 539 (1966) (White, J., dissenting))).
440. 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
441. See supra notes 33-41, and accompanying text (discussing the Williams case).
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As for Model Rule 3.8(f),.every federal circuit but the First Circuit has rejected
efforts to require pre-issuance judicial approval of attorney subpoenas. 442 The
First Circuit, in the Whitehouse44 3 case, considered a rule adopted by the federal
district court, not a state ethical rule, and, as we have seen, was able to uphold
even a federal rule only by labelling the bulk of its substantive provisions as
non-binding commentary. 44
Finally, in the contact-with-represented-persons dispute, while federal courts
say the ethical rule governs federal prosecutors, they do so only by quietly
transmuting the bar's no contact rule into a truncated version compatible with
federal law.445
In sum, the claim that there is some policy of the federal judiciary that Justice
Department lawyers must submit to the disciplinary rules of the states in which
44 6
they are licensed irrespective of the content of those rules is wholly unsupportable.
The last arrow in the quiver of advocates of state bar hegemony over federal
government lawyers is the undoubted fact that in the Department of Justice
Appropriation Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1980, Congress provided that
Justice Department lawyers must be licensed in at least one state. 4 7 This simple
proviso has been inflated into an unequivocal statement of congressional intent
that government lawyers were henceforth to be bound by any and all ethical rules
in effect in the state of their licensure. 4 8 The statute will not bear so much
weight; to the extent Congress' intent in inserting the highlighted language can be
divined at all, its aims were certainly much more modest. As the Justice
Department itself commented at the time of the statute's initial passage, the act
"reflects a congressional decision to defer to the States, territories and the District
of Columbia the threshold judgment regarding a person's qualifications and
suitability to practice law."449 What the act quite plainly does not do is confer
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.

See supra note 184 and accompanying text (citing the controlling case in each circuit).
Whitehouse v. District Court, 53 F.3d 1349 (1st Cir. 1995).
See supra notes 241-57 and accompanying text (describing the circuit's opinion as unconvincing).
See supranote 339 and accompanying text.
For a particularly dogmatic exposition of this view, see Franklin D. Cleckley, Clearly Erroneous: The

FourthCircuit's Decisionto Uphold Removal of a State Bar DisciplinaryProceedingUnder the FederalOfficer

Removal Statute, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 577 (1990). Professor Cleckley attacks the decision in Kolibash v.
Committee on Legal Ethics, 872 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1989), which allowed removal to federal court of a West
Virginia Bar Association disciplinary proceeding against a U.S. Attorney. He claims that the Supreme Court's
deference to state interests in regulating the legal profession is so pronounced that a United States Attorney
brought before a state ethics tribunal may not raise any federal defense to the charges of misconduct. Cleckley,
supra, at 615-16, 624.
447. Pub. L. No. 96-132, 93 Stat. 1040, 104 (1979). The bill prohibits "the compensation of any person
hereafter employed as an attorney (except foreign counsel employed in special cases) unless such person shall
be duly licensed and authorized to practice as an attorney under the laws of a state, territory, or the District of
Columbia." The requirement has been reenacted by Congress and remains in effect. Pub. L. No. 102-395, 106
Stat. 1828, 1838, Sec. 102(a) (1992).
448. See Dash, supra note 413, at 139; Chief Justices' Comment, supra note 416, at 14-15.
449. Memorandum of the Department of Justice Re: Petition of the Board of Governors of the District of
Columbia Bar for Amendment of Rules Implementing Canon 9, at 5 (Sept. 11, 1979) (emphasis added).
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upon the states a continuing power to impose restrictions upon the official
conduct of government attorneys, even when such restrictions are contrary to
other provisions of federal law. For example, by inserting in an appropriations
bill one sentence about the professional qualifications required of federal prosecutors, Congress cannot reasonably be thought to have authorized state ethics
committees to change the fundamental character of federal grand juries, as Model
Rule 3.3(d) would do, or to limit the power of federal grand juries to compel the
production of evidence, as would Model Rule 3.8(f). Congress certainly cannot
have meant to delegate to state authorities a power it denied the Supreme Court
- the power to make rules such as Model Rule 3.8(f), which modify evidentiary
privileges in federal criminal cases. And Congress plainly did not intend to
abandon thirty years of constitutional case law by allowing state authorities to
place significant new restrictions, through a broad reading of Model Rule 4.2, on
the power of federal law enforcement officers to interview criminal suspects.
It should be clearly understood that I am not offering a definitive opinion on
whether the Justice Department may preempt state bar rules through the particular mechanism of a regulation. While I am disposed to think it can, the important
point is that the federal government in the aggregate cannot be legally bound
by the acts of state professional regulatory bodies. Nor has the federal government, either in the aggregate or through any one of its coordinate branches,
decided to delegate to the states unfettered power over the conduct of federal lawyers.
All this having been said, the critics of the Department of Justice no contact
regulation are correct in observing that the federal bench has placed heavy
reliance on state bar mechanisms. The bench has ceded them great responsibility
for determining, as an initial matter, who shall be admitted to federal practice and
for disciplining lawyers who misbehave in federal court. Moreover, it is plain that
the Supreme Court has not hitherto considered federal prosecutors exempt from
regulation by the bar.4 5 Similarly, it is not unreasonable to think that Congress
did anticipate that Justice Department lawyers would be regulated, at least in
some degree, by the states from which they are now required to obtain licensure.
Neither the federal judiciary nor Congress has defined the boundaries of
permissible and impermissible state regulation of federal government lawyers.
The balance of this Article will be devoted to defining those boundaries and
exploring their implications for the enterprise of ethical regulation of all lawyers.
1I.

CONSIDERING MODEL RULES

3.3(d), 3.8(0

AND

4.2:

TOWARD A DEFINITION

OF LEGITIMATE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

While, as we have seen, the rules discussed above are contrary to existing
450. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976) ("[A] prosecutor stands perhaps unique among
officials whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline
by an association of his peers.").
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federal law, my principal concern here is not with whether the rules would be
sensible as substantive modifications of the legal system, but with the question of
whether they are appropriate as ethical standards. I believe that these three rules
represent a new, troubling and ultimately illegitimate use of the process of
professional self-regulation for lawyers. In my view, these rules are an abuse of
the ethics regulation process, even if viewed only from within the confines of the
bar. An even more profound difficulty with. these rules flows from the fact that
their enforcement would markedly change the parameters of basic constitutional
rights, principally the right to counsel, and would alter the character of a
fundamental institution of the criminal justice system, the grand jury. Therefore,
if enforced, these rules would be, both in effect and by design, rules of positive
law.
I suggest that these rules are illegitimate as rules of ethics, and even more
illegitimate as rules of positive law. Let me begin by considering them purely as
rules of ethics.
A. THE ILLEGITIMACY OF MODEL RULES

3.3(d), 3.8(f)

AND

4.2

AS RULES OF ETHICS

Before considering Model Rules 3.3(d), 3.8(f) and 4.2 in particular, it is
necessary to explore the traditional understanding of what constitutes a legitimate
rule of ethics for lawyers. Consequently, a brief foray into the history of ethical
regulation of American lawyers is required.45 1
1. The Development of Ethical Regulation of Lawyers in America
a. Judicial Control over American Lawyers
From the founding of the Republic, American judges, like their English
cousins, 452 have held the power to control the admission to practice and
451. For more complete treatments of this subject, see WOLFRAM, supra note 274, §§ 2.6.2-2.6.6, at 53-67;
Mary M. Devlin, Historical Overview: The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the United
States, 7 GEo. J.LEGAL ETHics 911 (1994).
452. Beginning no later than the Statute of Westminster in 1275, English lawyers, both barristers and
solicitors, were subject to the summary jurisdiction of the courts in which they practiced for professional
misconduct. Devlin, supra note 451, at 912; ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES

98-100 (1953). From an early date, the control imposed by the courts upon barristers was supplemented by the
scrutiny of one's legal peers in the Inns of Court. Devlin, supra note 451, at 911-12. The privilege of admission
to practice as a barrister was technically the province of the judges, but was in practice controlled by the Inns of
Court. See POUND, supra, at 99-100 (contending that the discipline of barristers was also handled almost
exclusively by the Inns). Judge (later Justice) Cardozo, writing for the Court of Appeals of New York in People
v. Culkin, agreed that the primary responsibility for barrister discipline rested with the Inns, but that the courts'
"supervisory power was ever in reserve," and that the judges "were not diffident or chary in announcing their
pleasure or displeasure." 162 N.E. 487, 490 (N.Y. 1928). In contrast with barristers, the solicitor was not a
member of an Inn, but was licensed and regulated by the courts and Parliament. POUND, supra, at100; Culkin,
162 N.E. at 490.
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subsequent conduct of lawyers.45 3 State judges have commonly relied on an
asserted inherent power to control the admission to and conduct of practice in the
454
courts,
but state legislatures in the post-Revolutionary period often made
express grants of authority to the courts to regulate lawyers.4 5 5 Federal courts
also assert an inherent power to regulate their own bars,4 56 but since their creation
they have enjoyed statutory authorization to regulate the admission and discipline
of lawyers appearing before them.457
Historically, American judges exercising their regulatory authority over lawyers have been concerned primarily with the fitness of persons to become and
remain members of the bar.458 From the earliest days, American courts assumed
or were delegated authority to determine fitness for admission to practice in the
first instance. 459 As an entry qualification, "fitness" has customarily included
both competence and moral character.460 Likewise, the focus of judicial inquiry
453. See, e.g., Ex Parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824) ("The power [to strike attorneys from the
rolls] is ... incidental to all courts .. "); Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 273 (1883) ("[A] court has power to
exercise a summary jurisdiction over its attorneys."). See also WOLFRAM, supra note 274, § 2.2.1 at 22-23.
454. WOLFRAM, supranote 274, § 2.2.2, at 24-28.
455. See generally 2 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION INAMERICA 224-80
(1965) (discussing the authority of late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century courts to regulate
attorney conduct); see, e.g., An Act Regulating the Admission of Attornies, Act of 1785, MASS. GEN. L. ch. 23,
§§ 1, 2 (1823), quoted in CHROUST, supra,at 229; Act Regulating the Admission of Attornies, 1821 Me. Laws
396-97, quoted in CHROUST, supra, at 234; An Act Adopting the Common Law of England, 1808 Vt. Laws 60
(providing "[tihat the supreme and county courts shall have power to admit attornies in said courts"), quoted in
CHROUST, supra, at 236; 1822 R.I. Pub. Laws 109 (authorizing the Supreme Judicial Court "to make and
establish ... rules for the admission of attorneys to practice in said court"), quoted in CHROUST, supra, at 240;
An Act for the Appointment and Regulating Attornies, 1784 Conn. Pub. Acts 10- 11 (authorizing county courts
to appoint "attornies... to plead at the Bar"), quoted in CHROUST, supra, at 24); New York State Constitution of
1777, art. 27, § 2, 1802 N.Y. Laws 14 (stating that attorneys were to be appointed, licensed and regulated by the
judges of the courts in which they practiced), quoted in CHROUST, supra, at 245.
456. See Exparte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824) (holding that the power to suspend an attorney is
"necessary for the preservation of decorum, and for the respectability of the profession"); Exparte Garland, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378-79 (1867) (stating that admission or exclusion of an attorney from a court is the
"exercise of judicial power" not a "mere ministerial power"); In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985) (noting
that "[c]ourts have long recognized inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers").
457. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1654).
458. This Article does not discuss the power ofjudges to impose sanctions less than disbarment through their
contempt power for the behavior of lawyers actually appearing in court or acting for clients in matters under the
jurisdiction of the court. See generally Louis S. Raveson, Advocacy and Contempt: ConstitutionalLimits on the
Judicial Contempt Power, 65 WASH. L. REV. 477 (1990) (arguing that there should be a constitutionally based
limit on the court's contempt power so that it is only used to punish the actual obstruction of justice).
459. See supra notes 454-55 and accompanying text (noting that state judges often relied on an asserted
inherent power, but state legislatures often expressly granted power to the courts to regulate attorneys).
460. Requirements of competence and character were imposed very early by the states. See, e.g., An Act
Regulating the Admission of Attornies, Act of 1785, MASS. GEN. L. ch. 23, § 1(1823) (requiring that a person
admitted to be an attorney be professionally qualified and proficient and "a person of good moral character"),
quoted in CHROUST, supranote 455, at 229; Act Regulating the Admission of Attornies, 1821 Me. Laws 396-97)
(requiring an attorney to be of good moral character and to have "devoted seven years at least to the acquisition
of scientific and legal attainments"), quoted in CHROUST, supra note 455, at 234; An Act Adopting the Common
Law of England, 1808 Vt. Laws 60 (requiring as a prerequisite for admission examination by the judges and
"attornies of the bar" for knowledge of the law and good character); 1837 R.I. Pub. Laws 25 (requiring a
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in the discipline of attorneys already admitted to practice has been on whether the
conduct under scrutiny evidences a want of character or capability establishing
unfitness for membership in the profession. 46 '
classical education and two years of legal study with a practitioner, or three years of such study, and a
recommendation "by the bar as having a good moral character"), quoted in CHROUST, supra note 455, at
240-41; 4 Day 119 (Conn. 1809) (citing a rule of Superior Court barring admission to practice before it until the
applicant "shall have practiced two years in the Court of Common Pleas... and unless he sustain a good moral
character, and shall be found qualified for practice, on a public examination of his knowledge of the law"),
quoted in CHROUST, supra note 455, at 242; Minutes of the Supreme Court of Judicatureof the State of
New-York, 1775-1781, at 177, Court of Appeals Hall, Albany, New York (requiring that attorneys admitted to
practice before the court must have served as clerks to a member of the court's bar for three years, be found on
examination to be of "Sufficient Ability and competent Learning to practice as an Attorney of this Court and
produce a certificate of his Moral Character"), quoted in CHROUST, supra note 455, at 245. See generally 2
CHROUST, supra note 455, at 224-80 (discussing legislative and judicial attempts to control the legal profession).
In the modern era, the Supreme Court wrote of state bar admission requirements in Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners,that:
A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral characterorproficiency in its
law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection with
the applicant'sfitness or capacity to practice law.
353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957) (emphasis added); see also Dent v. West Virginia, a case involving state regulation of
doctors in which the Court said that the power of states to regulate professions includes the power to "prescribe
all such regulations as in its judgment will secure ... them against the consequences of ignorance and
incapacity, as well as of deception and fraud." 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889).
Similarly, the requirements for membership in the bar of the U.S. Supreme Court are three years of
membership in the bar of the highest court of any state and "good private and professional character." SUP. CT.
R. 2. See In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286, 287-88 n.3 (1953), judgment set aside, 348 U.S. 1 (1954). Each
requirement is directed at both character and competence. Bar membership presumably carries at least minimal
guarantees of professional knowledge, as well as the assurance that some investigation of character has been
performed as a prerequisite for admission. The term "good private character" obviously implies some moral
component, while "good professional character" suggests both moral integrity and at least minimal competence.
461. The classic statement is Lord Mansfield's in Ex ParteBrounsall:
[T]he question is, whether, after the conduct of this man, it is proper that he should continue a member
of profession which should stand free from all suspicion.... It is not by way of punishment; but the
Court on such cases exercise their discretion, whether a man whom they have formerly admitted, is a
proper person to be continued on the roll or not.
98 Eng. Rep. 1385 (1778), quoted with approval in Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 273 (1883); see also In re
Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 (1985) (holding that " 'conduct unbecoming a member of the bar' is conduct
contrary to professional standards that shows an unfitness to discharge continuing obligations to clients or the
courts, orconduct inimicalto the administrationofjustice" (emphasis added)).
State courts commonly hold that the purpose of attorney regulation and discipline is protection of the public
through the determination of the fitness of lawyers to practice. See, e.g., Elledge v. Alabama State Bar, 572 So.
2d 424, 425 (Ala. 1990) (holding that the purpose of inquiry is to determine whether attorney's resumption of
law practice will be detrimental to the integrity of the bar, the administration ofjustice or the public interest); In
re Preston, 616 P.2d 1, 5-6 (Alaska 1980) (stating that the purpose of discipline is not to punish, "but to inquire
into the fitness of the attorney to continue in that capacity to the end that the public, the courts and the legal
profession itself will be protected" (citation omitted)); In re Lutz, 592 P.2d 1362, 1366 (Idaho 1979) (noting that
discipline should exact justice, purge the legal profession of unworthy and unscrupulous lawyers and protect the
public from those who are unfit to practice law); In re Smith, 572 N.E.2d 1280, 1286 (Ind. 1991) (explaining
that discipline is not meant to punish but to determine fitness of an officer of the court and to protect the public
from unfit legal practitioners); Committee on Professional Ethics v. Behnke, 486 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Iowa 1992)
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b. Bar Associations in America
Pre-Civil War America contained no institution analogous to the English Inns
of Court.4 6 2 There were many reasons for this void, but one powerful factor was
the persistence of the Jacksonian idea that law was a public profession whose
463
practitioners exercised unique influence over the institutions of government.
Accordingly, thought Jacksonian democrats, access to this most public of
professions should be as open as possible. Consequently, discipline of erring
attorneys remained a monopoly of the judiciary that was neither supplemented
464
nor supplanted by any formal peer review.
The bar association, the vehicle for legal self-regulation, and thus, from the
radical democratic perspective, for the emergence of legal elitism, did not begin
its rise until the early years of the twentieth century. In 1878, the ABA, the first
national organization of lawyers, was founded in Saratoga Springs, N.Y. 4 6 5 Over

(same); Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Dineen, 557 A.2d 610, 614 (Me. 1989) (citing Maine Bar Rule 2(a):
"[The] purpose of [a] disciplinary proceeding 'is not punishment but protection of the public and the courts
from attorneys who by their conduct have demonstrated that they are unable, or likely to be unable, to discharge
properly their professional duties' "); In re Trombly, 247 N.W.2d 873, 875 (Mich. 1976) (stating that the
disciplinary powers of the courts exist so that the administration of justice may be protected by weeding out
untrustworthy practitioners); In re Cochrane, 549 P.2d 328, 329 (Nev. 1976) (reasoning that discipline is meant
to protect the public from persons unfit to serve as attorneys); In re Rowe, 604 N.E.2d 728, 730 (N.Y. 1992)
(holding that the focus of inquiry is on fitness to practice law); Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Weaver, 322 N.E.2d 665,
667 (Ohio 1975) (same); In re Gortmaker, 782 P.2d 421, 424 (Or. 1989) (explaining that discipline should
protect the public and the justice system "from lawyers who have not discharged, will not discharge, or are
unlikely to properly discharge their professional duties"); In re Hopewell, 507 N.W.2d 911, 916 (S.D. 1993)
(arguing that discipline not designed to punish but rather to remove from the profession those unfit to be
entrusted with the office of attorney); In re Berk, 602 A.2d 946, 950 (Vt. 1991) (same).
Other stated purposes for the judicial discipline of attorneys include protecting public confidence in the legal
system, upholding the reputation of the legal system and deterrence of future misconduct. Devlin, supra note
451, at 934-35 n.209, 935-36 n.210, 937-38 n.212.
462. Devlin, supra note 451, at 917-18. "Until 1870, there were only the barest beginnings of any effective
organizations for lawyers in the United States. Lawyers were scattered widely over dozens of States and
hundreds of cities and towns, with no centralizing body such as the Inns of Court of the Law Society, exercising
any sort of control or leadership, and with little or no standards of legal education or of admission to the bar."
ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, LAW AND LAWYERS IN THE UNITED STATES 20 (1965).
463. Those legal organizations that existed in the young United States grew out of eating clubs or other social
gatherings. WOLFRAM, supranote 274, § 2.3, at 34. "Bar associations fell into decline and ceased to exist during
the early part of the nineteenth century." Id. This devolution has been attributed to the leveling influence of
Jacksonian democracy and its resistance to professional castes perceived as elitist. GRISWOLD, supranote 462, at
15-20 (discussing the "deprofessionalizing" of the American legal profession in the 1840s due to "overzealous
democratization" in the Jacksonian era); RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 4-5 (1989); 2 CHROUST, supra
note 455, at 156.
464. Some informal enforcement of group norms must certainly have occurred. See, e.g., JAMES W. HURST,
THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 285-87 (1950) (noting that until 1925, most of the bar
associations were informal social or political organizations); John A. Matzko, "The Best Men of the Bar": The
Founding of the American Bar Association, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIvIL WAR AMERICA
77 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984). Nonetheless, the nineteenth century American legal profession was far too
geographically dispersed and professionally unorganized for meaningful self-regulation.
465. GRISWOLD, supra note 462, at 23. For an account of the founding of the ABA, see EDSON R.
SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND ITS WORK (1953). The extremely influential and
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the ensuing decades, the ABA and the growing number of state and local bar
associations 466 undertook the task of "professionalizing" the business of law

practice.46 7 This effort took a number of forms, including raising and standardizing the requirements for admission to the practice of law 468 and efforts to assert
control over the discipline of attorneys.4 69
With respect to attorney discipline, two developments in the "professionalism" campaign of the organized bar are of special importance: the promulgation
by the ABA of codes of ethical conduct, beginning in 1908 with the Canons of
Legal Ethics,470 and the emergence of increasingly powerful bar organizations.
c. The Canons of Legal Ethics and the Rise of the Organized Bar
Examination of the original 1908 Canons reveals "thirty-two hortatory statements that insisted that a lawyer pursue the high road in every endeavor
mentioned." ' 47' Though amended from time to time until 1969, and eventually
numbering forty-seven,4 7 2 the essentially aspirational character of the 1908
Canons was never altered.4 73

It seems unlikely that the drafters of the 1908 Canons conceived of them as an
enforceable code of conduct.4 74 Nonetheless, because of another development in
the "professionalism" campaign of the bar, the Canons assumed that role.
pathbreaking Association of the Bar of the City of New York had been founded in 1869. Devlin, supra note 451,
at 918.
466. "By 1890 there were 20 state or territorial bar associations in the United States. By 1900 there were 40;
by 1916 there were 48; by 1925 all the states and territories could claim some sort of association." Hurst, supra
note 464 at 174.
467. See POUND, supra note 452, at 353 ("I have spoken of the rise of Bar Associations in the last three
decades of the nineteenth century, and the growth of Bar organization in the present century as a progress in
undoing the mischief wrought in the deprofessionalizing of the practice of law in America before and after the
Civil War. This undoing is a real achievement .... We are restoring the practice of law as a profession.")
468. See David R. Papke, The Legal Profession and Its Ethical Responsibilities:A History, in ETHICS AND
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 29, 40-41 (Michael Davis & Frederick A. Elliston eds., 1986) (pressuring state
legislatures to require two or three years of college, plus character and fitness examinations).
469. See POUND,supra note 452, at 271 (noting the ABA's work in codifying the 1908 Canons).
470. WOLFRAM, supra note 274, § 2.6.2, at 54. The text of the 1908 Canons as amended to 1969 is
reproduced in SELECTED STATUTES, RULES AND STANDARDS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 320-35 (1991).
471. WOLFRAM, supra note 274, § 2.6.2, at 54. "The 1908 Canons were not designed to break new ground.
They were largely copied from the 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama Bar Association." WOLFRAM, supra note
274, § 2.6.2, at 54. The Alabama Code, in its turn, drew heavily on still earlier sources, particularly GEORGE
SHARSWOOD, ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1854), republished in ABA Rep. 1 (1907)). WOLFRAM, supra note
274, § 2.6.2, at 54.
472. Canons 33 through 45 were added in 1928. Canon 46 was adopted in 1933, and Canon 47 in 1937.
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Address Before the ABA Regional Meeting (Oct. 22, 1964) (Atlanta, Ga.), in LEWIS F.
POWELL, JR., ETHICAL STANDARDS OF THE BAR 2 (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee
University).
473. WOLFRAM, supra note 274, § 2.6.2, at 54.
474. Professor Wolfram asserts that "[t]he Canons were probably not intended to have any direct legal effect,
but it is clear that the ABA leadership contemplated that they would be influential in lawyer discipline
proceedings in courts." Id. § 2.6.2, at 55.
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Roughly ten years after the promulgation of the Canons, the effort of bar
associations to attain greater control of the legal profession took the form of a
movement for an "integrated" bar in the states.4 75 An "integrated bar," now
more commonly called a "unified" bar, 4 7 6 is one in which membership in the
state bar association is mandatory and must be maintained in order to keep a
bar, the bar association assumes primary
license to practice law. 4 77 In a unified 478
attorneys.
of
discipline
the
over
control
By the 1950s, twenty-five states had unified bars. 4 7 9 By the 1980s, the number
had risen to thirty-three. 4 80 Even in those states where bars were not formally
unified, by mid-century bar associations had assumed a role in the regulation of
law practice largely indistinguishable from that of unified bars, a role they
maintain to this day. 48 1 Professor Wolfram puts it this way:
[C]ourts serve as the largely passive sounding boards and official approvers or
disapprovers of [ethics] initiatives that are taken by lawyers operating through
bar associations ....[Bar associations'] power can be much the same regardless of the particular form or official status of the bar association. Formal and,

475. In 1918, the American Judicature Society published a Model Act for the "integration" of state bars.
Devlin, supra note 451, at 920. In 1921, North Dakota became the first such bar. Id.; WOLFRAM, supra note 274,
§ 2.3, at 36 n.7; GRISWOLD, supra note 463, at 28-29.
476. WOLFRAM, supra note 274, § 2.3, at 36 n.9.
477. Id. § 2.3, at 36 n.7; GRISWOLD, supra note 463, at 28.
478. WOLFRAM, supra note 274, § 2.3, at 36-37; GRISWOLD, supranote 463, at 28. State courts often view the
state bar association as an administrative arm of the court. See, e.g., Sams v. Olah, 169 S.E.2d 790, 795-96 (Ga.
1969) (indicating that state law establishes the state bar as an "administrative arm of the Court" (citation
omitted)), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 914 (1970). In states with unified bars, the state bar association is delegated by
statute or rule of court the authority to adopt rules of attorney conduct, subject to the approval of the state
supreme court. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-3-43(a)(3) (1975) (granting the power "[slubject to the approval of the
); TExAs CODE
supreme court, to formulate rules governing the conduct of all persons admitted to practice ....
ANN. §§ 81.024 et seq. (West 1996) (describing the process by which the state supreme court adopts rules
governing attorney conduct). Unified bar associations also administer the rules by investigating complaints and
imposing penalties through bar ethics committees. Severe sanctions such as suspension and disbarment require
the imprimatur of the state supreme court.
479. Devlin, supra note 451, at 920. 480. WOLFRAM, supra note 274, § 2.3, at 37.
481. In states without unified bars, the highest court customarily develops ethical rules either through its own
work or that of a committee it creates whose results are reviewed and approved, modified or rejected by the
court. While the bar association may not be included in this process by statute or rule, in practice it generally
dominates the work of rulemaking. For example, in New -York the Code of Professional Responsibility was
written by the New York Bar Association and incorporated into the Judicial Codes of the several appellate
divisions after review. Greene v. Grievance Comm. for Ninth Judicial Dist., 429 N.E.2d 390, 393 (N.Y. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035 (1982). The incorporation occurred pursuant to statute. Id. Moreover, in states with
non-unified bars, the courts customarily delegate the enforcement of professional misconduct rules to the
voluntary bar associations, reserving to themselves powers of review and control over the ultimate sanctions of
suspension from practice and disbarment. See, e.g., ORIE L. PHILLIPS & PHILBRICK MCCOY, CONDUCT OF JUDGES
AND LAWYERS: A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, DISCIPLINE AND DISBARMENT 95 (1952) (reporting a study
comparing results of the attorney discipline process in California, which integrated its bar in 1927, with that of
Illinois, whose Supreme Court had vested disciplinary investigations in the voluntary Illinois State and Chicago
Bar Associations).
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to an extent, functional differences do exist between [unified and non-unified
bars]. At the end of the day, however, bar associations exercise pervasive
influence over bar admission and discipline, whatever the form of their
organization. 482

As bar associations gained increasing control over the lawyer disciplinary
process from the 1920s forward, they were obliged to settle on some standards to
apply in their new enterprise of self-regulation. The ABA's 1908 Canons rapidly
became the accepted expression of the profession's ethical norms, 4 8 3 and continthey were supplanted by the ABA
ued to occupy that position until 1969, when
48 4
Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.

Many commentators expressed dismay over the shortcomings of the 1908
Canons as a system of ethical regulations.48 5 Among critics of the 1908 Canons
there was a sense of surprise that these "generalizations designed for an earlier
era" 486 should have been so rapidly and universally accepted as the ethical rules
of the profession, and that their hegemony should have persisted for so long.
In fact, given the historical milieu in which the 1908 Canons arose and held
sway, their content and tenacity is entirely unsurprising. Recall that as the
renascent bar associations of the early twentieth century gained de facto control
over the process of regulating lawyers, the role they were assuming was that
historically claimed by judges - determining who was fit to become and remain
a member of the profession. While administration of both the admission and
exclusion processes was increasingly dominated by the bar, both unified and
482. WOLFRAM, supra note 274, § 2.3, at 33-34. One particularly germane recent manifestation of the
now-engrained tendency of courts to defer to bar associations in matters of ethics is contained in the response of
the Conference of Chief Justices to the Justice Department "no contact" regulation. After recounting the ABA's
opposition to the Thornburgh Memorandum and its position on the proper interpretation of DR 7-104(A)(1) and
Model Rule 4.2, the Chief Justices wrote: "The ABA's conclusions regarding DR 7-104(A)(1) and Rule 4.2 must
be considered authoritative in light of the ABA's role in formulating those rules. " Chief Justices' Comment,
supra note 416, at 5-6 (emphasis added).
483. By 1910, the Canons had been adopted in twenty-three states. Devlin, supranote 451, at 918. Professor
Wolfram writes that, "As bar associations became more active in enforcing professional standards through
disbarment and suspension procedures of courts, the Canons came to be widely regarded as 'wholesome
standards of professional action' or as 'guidelines' which lawyers could ignore only at their peril." WOLFRAM,
supra note 274, § 2.6.2, at 55 (citations omitted).
484. Id. § 2.6.3, at 56.
485. Some observers complained that the Canons were too general, in that they consisted principally of
high-toned moralisms that provided little specific guidance to practitioners contemplating future action. The
Canons have been called "pontifical pap," ARTHuR G. HAYS, CITY LAWYER 32 (1942); "glittering generalities,"
James E. Starrs, ProfessionalResponsibility: Three Basic Propositions,5 Am.CRIM. L.Q. 17, 20 (1966-67); and
"vaporous platitudes," Professional Ethics: Lies & Lawyers, TIME, May 13, 1966, at 81 (quoting Anthony
Amsterdam).
486. Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REv. 1, 10 (1934). Critics often noted that
the Canons were outdated because "lt]hey speak of a kind of law practice that was carried on almost entirely in
the courtroom." WOLFRAM, supra note 274, § 2.6.2, at 54. See also Powell, supra note 472. Commenting on the
need for reevaluating the 1908 Canons,Justice Powell, then the incoming president of the ABA, observed: "In
1908 the typical lawyer was a general practitioner, usually alone, who divided his time between the courts and a
family type of office practice." Id. at 4.
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voluntary bar associations ultimately held their warrant for performing the task of
487
In the area of discipline, judges could deal with
self-regulation from the courts.
specific instances of misconduct before them through the contempt power. The
portion of the bench's regulatory authority that it largely delegated to the bar dealt
with determination of overall fitness for admission to and continued membership
in the profession. Under these circumstances the generality of the 1908 Canons
was quite natural because they functioned not as a detailed guide to daily
practice, but as an expression of the general norms to which a lawyer should
488
conform on pain of exclusion from the profession.
d. "Reform": The Model Code and the
Emergence of Enforcement Bureaucracies
As the 1960s arrived, continuing complaints about the existing attorney
regulatory system led to two complementary reform efforts: revision of the 1908
Canons and an overhaul of the bar's disciplinary enforcement mechanisms. In
1964, ABA president, and later Justice of the Supreme Court, Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
appointed an ABA committee to study the 1908 Canons and propose revisions to
them.4 89 In his many public statements, Powell's consistent theme was that the
combination of a set of ethical rules, sound in principle but antiquated in form,
discipline was failing to
with inadequate mechanisms for enforcement of attorney
49 0
purge the ranks of the unethical and incompetent.

487. See Hazard, supra note 5, at 1250-51 (discussing the effect of the interaction of the bench and bar in
transforming professional norms into enforceable rules).
488. Likewise, even though in the decades following the adoption of the Canons the daily business of the
legal profession became more centered on the counselling function, the types of misconduct of immediate
concern to judges continued to be those surrounding litigation. Hence, the Canons, with their emphasis on trial
work, persisted in part because they were a better fit to the needs of the courts than they were to the bar at large.
489. WoLFRAM, supra note 274, § 2.6.3, at 56; see generally John F. Sutton, Jr., Introduction to Symposium The American Bar Association Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, 48 TEx. L. REv. 255 (1970).
490. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 472. Powell declared:
It is not suggested that all or even a substantial number of the Canons are obsolete. There is, of course,
no thought of starting out to rewrite de novo the ethical standards of the legal profession. The broad
principles, as reflected eloquently in the Canons, are immutable. No doubt a major portion of the
present Canons will be found adequate. The greater need may be for additional Canons rather than
widespread revision of existing ones.
Closely related to the contents of the Canons is their enforcement. There is growing disatisfaction
[sic] among lawyers with the adequacy of the discipline maintained by our profession.
Id. at 6.
On several occasions Powell cited as an example of the failure of the attorney regulatory system the very low
number of disbarments it produced. See, e.g., id. at 7 (citing E. Blythe Stason, Disbarments and Disciplinary
Action, 49 A.B.A. J. 270 (March 1963)); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Areas of Emphasis for 1964/65, at 5-6, Address
Before the ABA House of Delegates (Aug. 14, 1964) (New York, N.Y.) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Archives, Washington & Lee University) [hereinafter Areas of Emphasis]; see also Lewis F. Powell, Jr., The
President's Annual Address: The State of the Legal Profession, at 5-6, Address to the ABA House of Delegates
(Aug. 9, 1965) (New York, N.Y.) (on file with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University)
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In 1969, the ABA adopted the Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.4 9'
The Model Code contains three levels of norms: first, "Canons," which are short
statements of general principle; second, "Ethical Considerations," which are
commentaries "couched in the profession's traditional ethical rhetoric;, 4 92 and
third, "Disciplinary Rules," which function as statutes imposing reasonably
specific minimum standards of conduct.4 9 3 The principal innovation of the Model
Code was not its fundamental content, which remained strikingly similar to that
of the 1908 Canons,49 4 but the inclusion of the "DRs," the standards of minimum
conduct. The disciplinary rules are the component of the Model Code responsive
to the call by Lewis Powell and others for specific rules enforceable by
disciplinary bodies.
By 1972, all but three states had taken steps to adopt the
49 5
Model Code.
In the early 1970s, bar associations and courts across the country not only
abandoned the 1908 Canons for the Model Code, but undertook sweeping
modifications of the mechanisms for enforcing lawyer discipline.4 9 6 Informal

handling of grievance complaints and utilization of volunteers from the bar as
investigators and prosecutors were abandoned in favor of the professionalization
of disciplinary enforcement through the creation of formal disciplinary agencies.49 7 The combination of the widespread adoption of the Model Code and the
proliferation of disciplinary bureaucracies 498 resulted in an increasing "legalization" of attorney discipline.

(expressing concern about the possibility "that grievance committees and courts tend to be unduly lenient in
grievance cases").
491. WOLFRAM, supra note 274, § 2.6.3, at 56.
492. Hazard, supra note 5, at 1251.
493. According to the preamble of the Code, the Disciplinary Rules state "the minimum level of conduct
below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action." MODEL CODE pmbl., preliminary
statement.
494. "The preoccupations of the old Canons still lie heavy in the new Code, and they are the preoccupations
of a profession composed overwhelmingly of individual practitioners serving individual clients." Charles
Frankel, Book Review, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 874, 886 (1976).
495. REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO SECURE ADOPTION OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, in

97 AM. BAR ASS'N, ANNUAL REPORT 268 (1972) (reporting adoption of the Model Code in forty states and

substantial progress towards adoption in seven more).
496. One catalyst for these changes was the "Clark Report" of the ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of
Disciplinary Enforcement, named after its chairman, former Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark. SPECIAL COMM.
ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN

DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 5-6 (1970) [hereinafter PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS]. The report found a

"scandalous situation" in which "[d]isciplinary action [was] practically nonexistent in many jurisdictions;
practices and procedures [were] antiquated; [and] many disciplinary agencies ha[d] little power to take effective
steps against malefactors." Id. at I. For a general account of the reform effort, see Devlin, supra note 451, at
921-30.
497. PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS at 5, 9. "The major thrust of the Clark Report was its recognition of
the need to professionalize lawyer disciplinary agencies." Devlin, supra note 451, at 926.
498. By 1975, 24 jurisdictions employed lawyers in their disciplinary agencies. Michael C. Doff, Disbarment in the UnitedStates: Who Shall Do the Noisome Work? 12 COLUM. J.L. & SOc. PROBS. 1, 14 (1975).
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e. Still More "Reform": The Model Rules
Despite its rapid and nearly universal acceptance by the states, the Model Code
came under immediate attack.4 99 By 1977, leaders of the ABA were already
calling for a complete overhaul. 5 00 After laboring for six years, the Kutak
Commission 50 1 produced the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which were
adopted on August 2, 1983.5°2 The Model Rules are overtly statutory in form.
They consist of fifty-four rules, accompanied by commentary.50 3 Not all of the
rules are prohibitions; some describe conduct that lawyers may undertake in the
exercise of discretion. Nonetheless, all the rules are plainly relevant to attorney
disciplinary proceedings.50 4 It can be argued that the core principles embodied in
the 1908 Canons are reflected, largely unchanged, in the Model Rules.5 °5
Nonetheless, even if one accepts this premise, because of their form the Model
Rules represent a significant acceleration of the process of legalizing ethics
50 6
regulation begun in the Model Code.
All in all, the progression of the last twenty-five years has been to an increasing
499. WOLFRAM, supra note 274, § 2.6.4, at 60.
500. William B. Spann, Jr., The Legal Profession Needs a New Code of Ethics, A.B.A. BAR LEADER 2
(Nov./Dec. 1977); Sanford D. Levy, Time to Review the Code, 62 A.B.A. J. 225 (1976).
501. WOLFRAM, supra note 274, § 2.6.4, at 61. The official title of the committee was the Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards. MODEL RULES ANN. commentary at 4.
502. MODEL RULES ANN. commentary at 5. At this writing, the Model Rules have been adopted in some form
in thirty-seven jurisdictions: Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin and Wyoming. Of these thirty-seven, only Alaska has adopted the Model Rules and accompanying
commentary verbatim. See ALASKA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1993) (mirroring Model Rules). The
remaining thirty-six jurisdictions use the Model Rules only with alterations. For example, six states, Illinois,
Louisiana, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey and Washington, adopted the Model Rules without the comments.
This omission can have significant practical effects. As but one salient instance, exclusion of the comment to
Model Rule 3.8 (which says that Model Rule 3.3 applies to grand juries, see supra note 6 and accompanying
text) has the effect of eliminating the requirement of presentation of exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. Ten
jurisdictions, Georgia, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont and
Virginia, still use the Model Code. Three jurisdictions, including most prominently California, have created
their own codes of legal ethics. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CAL.; ME. BAR RULES,
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; N.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. Puerto Rico is the last holdout

for the Canons.4 L.P.R.A. App. IX (1993).
503. The commentary "explains and illustrates the meaning of and purpose of the Rule." MODEL RULES
ANN. scope.

504. See generally MODEL RULES ANN. pmbl., scope (defining the nature of lawyers' responsibilities
generally and the role of the Model Rules in ensuring that responsibilities are met). See also WOLFRAM, supra
note 274, § 2.6.4, at 63 (describing types of rules).
505. The reporter for the Kutak Commission, Professor Geoffrey Hazard, has made this case. Hazard, supra
note 5, at 1249.
506. Id. at 1249, 1251. Professor Hazard writes:
In retrospect, it is clear that the crucial step in the "legalization" process occurred in the change from
the 1908 Canons to the 1970 Code, rather than from the Code to the 1983 Rules. It was the Code that
first embraced legally binding norms in the form of the Disciplinary Rules, albeit also retaining (in the
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codification of black letter rules administered by disciplinary bureaucracies.
Violation of the rules became less and less a falling away from the standards of a
fraternal association, to be dealt with fairly informally by other members, and
of the law. 50 7
more and more like being accused of and tried for a violation
Indeed, it is the transformation of ethics regulation of lawyers into a system so
"law-like" that initially suggests the need for an inquiry about its legitimacy. If
ethics regulation means rules of minimally acceptable conduct enforceable by
punitive, coercive sanctions, a regime functionally indistinguishable from the
positive law of the state, it behooves us to examine the source of the system's
claim on lawyers' obedience.
It is no answer to say simply that ethics rules are legitimated by the approval of
a state supreme court. In the first place, if, as I believe, Professor Wolfram is right
in concluding that the ethics regulation process is dominated by the bars, with the
state courts acting as "largely passive" partners,5 °8 then the question even for
purely state practitioners becomes not merely whether a court has blessed
bar-created rules, but whether the rule-making and rule-enforcing processes of
the bars are themselves legitimate. And when the issue is the reach of state ethics
rules in federal practice, the imprimatur of a state court carries no necessary
weight at all.
2. Regulation of Prosecutors and the Legitimacy of Ethics Rules
a. The Legitimating Characteristics of Traditional Ethics Rules
Traditional rules of legal ethics, including the vast majority of the Model
Rules, have shared two characteristics.
i. Subject matter
The first characteristic shared by ethical rules as traditionally understood is a
common subject matter. Such rules concern topics at the core of professional
self-definition. These topics include:
50 9
(1) Rules of moral conduct and right action in the ordinary sense;
Ethical Considerations) the fraternal voice of the Canons. The Code's Disciplinary Rules formed the
baseline of the 1983 Rules; indeed, many of the DR's were carried over intact into the Rules.
Id.
507. See, e.g., Murray L. Schwartz, The Deathand Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 953,
953-54 (noting shift from "articulating professional standards, suffused with ideas of morality and ethics, and
enforced if at all by informal sanctions and peer pressure, to enacting comprehensive and explicit legislation
attended by formally imposed sanctions for breach") (citation omitted).
508. See supra note 482 and accompanying text (quoting relevant language from Wolfram's Modem Legal
Ethics and providing reference material supporting this proposition).
509. Such rules include:
(a) Do not steal from the client. Model Rule 1.15 "addresses the lawyer's ethical duty with regard to
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(2) Rules expressing the importance of loyalty to clients, and defining the
limits of such loyalty;51
(3) Rules that define the lawyer's role in the adversary system. Among these
are rules that address the dissonance between society's ethics and the lawyer's
obligation to represent loyally people who may not themselves be honest or
ethical. 51' Also among the rules defining the lawyer's role in the adversary
receiving, safeguarding, and distributing funds belonging to a client." MODEL RULES ANN. commentary at 251;
-(b) Do not overcharge the client. Model Rule 1.5(a) states: "A lawyer's fees shall be reasonable," and
goes on to list "factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee." MODEL RULES
Rule 1.5(a);
(c) Do not lie to the client or withhold information. MODEL RULES Rule 1.4 (requiring that a lawyer
keep his client informed, comply promptly with reasonable requests for information, and explain
things sufficiently that the client may make informed decisions);
(d) Do not lie to other people. MODEL RULES Rule 4.1 cmt. ("A lawyer is required to be truthful when
dealing with others on a client's behalf ....).
(e) Do not lie aboutjudges or public officials. MODEL RULES Rule 8.2 (prohibiting the making of false
statements about the integrity or qualifications of judges, legal officials or candidates for those
offices);
(f) Do not bribe the judge or the jury. MODEL RULES Rule 3.5 (prohibiting attempts to influence
judges, jurors and other officials "by means prohibited by law");
(g) As a prosecutor, do not charge people with crimes unless there is probable cause. MODEL RULES
Rule 3.8(a) (a prosecutor shall "refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not
supported by probable cause"); and
(h) Volunteer to do free legal work for the poor. MODEL RULES Rule 6.1 (regarding the responsibility
of lawyers to perform pro bono work).
510. Such rules include:
(a) Once again, do not steal from, lie to or overcharge the client. MODEL RULES Rules 1.15, 1.4,
1.5(a);
(b) Do not represent clients with conflicting interests. MODEL RULES Rules 1.7 (governing conflicts of
interest generally); 1.9 (governing conflicts of interest with former clients);
(c) Act as an intermediary between two clients only if that is in the best interests of both and both
consent. MODEL RULES Rule 2.2 (defining the duties of a lawyer who has clients with potentially
conflicting interests);
(d) Do not create temptations for yourself to betray a client by going into business with a client,
MODEL RULES Rule 1.8(a) (defining limits on business transactions with clients); making a will for a
client naming yourself as beneficiary, MODEL RULES Rule 1.8(c) (prohibiting making wills and other
instruments in which lawyer is named as beneficiary, except where lawyer is related to the donee); or
switching sides in a matter as you shuttle back and forth between public service and private practice,
MODEL RULES Rule 1.11 (concerning limits on successive government and private employment).
511. "Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients,
to the legal system, and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person while earning a satisfactory
living." MODEL RULES pmbl. Rules concerning this conflict include:
(a) Represent your client zealously, but do not make frivolous arguments or claims. MODEL RULES
Rule 3.1 (regarding meritorious claims and contentions);
(b) Do not disclose information relating to representation of a client without the client's consent
unless disclosure is necessary to prevent a future violent crime. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6 (stating the
general rule of confidentiality);
(c) Be honest with the court. Do not lie or knowingly present perjured testimony. MODEL RULES Rule
3.3 (governing candor toward the tribunal). The problem of client perjury is, of course, much more
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the system by doing things to which the
system are rules that prohibit subverting
5
12
opposing lawyer cannot respond1;
51 3
(4) Rules of minimal professional competence;
(5) What I call the "guild rules" - rules that can either be described as
promoting the identity and integrity of the legal profession or as protecting
lawyers' monopoly on legal business.5 t4
One can readily take issue with the particulars of this taxonomy. Some might
5 5
say that there should be more categories, others that there should be fewer.
Others might point to particular rules that do not fit readily in any of these
categories. The fundamental point remains, however, that rules of legal ethics
traditionally have been about defining what it means to be a lawyer and setting
standards of fitness for membership in the profession. Viewed in the affirmative,
as a description of desirable behavior, they describe the bar's vision of itself and
its role in society. Viewed as a list of prohibitions, almost all of the standards

subtle and contentious than implied by this summary of Model Rule 3.3. It has spawned endless
debate. See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Client Perjury:The Kutak Commission and the Association of
Trial Lawyers on Lawyers, Lying Clients, and the Adversary System, 1980 AM. BAR. FOUND.
RESEARCH J. 964. See also WOLFRAM, supra note 274, § 12.5.1, at 653 n.36 (listing numerous journal
articles on the subject). The point here is not the particulars of the rule, but the fact that its subject is
the central ethical dilemma of being a lawyer: Where do my obligations to my client stop and where
do my obligations to society begin?
(d) Try to expedite litigation, unless delay helps your client. MODEL RULES Rule 3.2 ("A lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client."); and
(e) Respect the rights of third parties, even though their interests must be subordinated to those of the
client. MODEL RULES Rule 4.4 (respect for rights of third persons).
512. Rules in this category include:
(a) Do not make ex parte contact with judges or jurors. MODEL RULES Rule 3.5(b) (prohibiting ex
parte communications with judges, jurors and other officials);
(b) Do not try the case in the press. MODEL RULES Rule 3.6 (governing trial publicity); and
(c) As a prosecutor, ensure that the accused is advised of his right to counsel and is afforded a
reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel. MODEL RULES Rule 3.8(b).
513. Rules in this category include:
(a) Be competent. MODEL RULES Rule 1.1;
(b) Be diligent. MODEL RULES Rule 1.3;
(c) Give proper supervision to your subordinates. MODEL RULES Rules 5.1 (supervision of lawyers);
MODEL RULES Rule 5.3 (supervision of non-lawyers); and
(d) Do not file pleadings without a basis in law. MODEL RULES Rule 3.1 (regarding meritorious claims
and contentions).
514. Rules in this category include:
(a) unauthorized practice of law rules. MODEL RULES Rule 5.5;
(b) the prohibition against partnerships with non-lawyers. MODEL RULES Rule 5.4;
(c) advertising and solicitation rules. MODEL RULES Rule 7.1-7.5.
515. For example, Professor Hazard argues that the "basic ethical rules of representation that the narrative
both presupposes and illustrates" have remained essentially unchanged for the past two centuries, and that they
"enforce three core values: loyalty, confidentiality, and candor to the court." Hazard, supranote 5, at 1246.
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proscribe behavior that, if knowingly or persistently engaged in, would merit
disqualifying the offender from the profession.
ii. Consensus
The second defining characteristic of traditional ethical standards is that, in
addition to addressing the subject of fitness for membership in the profession, the
rules have generally represented a consensus across the profession. By consensus
I do not mean absolute unanimity. There certainly has been disagreement, often
vigorous, about this or that rule, or part of a rule.5 16 It is nonetheless fair to say
that, historically, the principles animating the rules have been shared by the
overwhelming majority of attorneys. It was the existence of such a consensus that
allowed Lewis Powell to refer to the 1908 Canons as "an articulate expression of
the 'conscience of the profession in the 19th and early 20th Centuries,' ,517 and
to call for the 1908 Canons' reform in order to ensure that "they now conform to
the conscience of the bar in the mid-20th Century." 5 18 Moreover, traditionally the
consensus has run across all sectors of the profession: attorneys, judges, those in
big firms, those in small firms, government lawyers and private practitioners,
corporate counsel and tort litigators, prosecutors and defense attorneys. There is
no doubt that the cause of consensus has in the past been aided by the generality
of the rules. But even those few rules that addressed a particular practice area
represented agreement between those practicing on both sides in that area.5 19
b. Ethics Rules as a Narrative of the Bar
The combination of subject matter and consensus gave traditional ethical rules
moral force. Moreover, the subject - principles defining what it is to be a lawyer
- combined with the consensus about the principles, make it appropriate, as
Professors Hazard 520 and Koniak52 ' have previously argued, to think of traditional ethical standards as a "narrative" or "nomos" describing the normative
universe of lawyers.
516. See, e.g., Koniak, supra note 5, at 1441-47 (discussing the conflict within the ABA over the Kutak
Commission's draft of Model Rule 1.6 regarding client confidentiality).
517. Areas of Emphasis, supra note 490, (quoting HURST, supra note 464, at 329).
518. Id.
519. For example, Canon 5 concerns criminal practice. It says that defense attorneys may undertake the
defense even of those they believe to be guilty, and may assert "every defense that the law of the land permits."
1908 CANONS Canon 5.Of prosecutors it says that their "primary duty.., is not to convict, but to see that justice
is done," and it condemns any effort to hide facts or witnesses favorable to the defense. Id. General though these
statements may be, each side of the often-polarized criminal bar can agree that they fairly describe both its role
and that of its adversary. Indeed, I might be disposed to go further and say that to a reflective attorney of upright
character on either side of the criminal bar, Canon 5 says all that really needs to be said about professional
ethics.
520. Hazard, supra note 5, at 1242-46.
521. Koniak, supra note 5, at 1391.
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Because traditional ethical standards were a particularization of the shared
narrative of the legal profession, the rules had aspirational power. For the same
reason, those individuals found to have violated the shared vision were disposed
to accept discipline meted out for those violations. In this respect the idea of
ethical rules as a narrative of the profession is of more than descriptive
consequence. The legitimacy of the ethics regulation process has always rested,
and continues to rest, on the perception among lawyers that it is about adherence
to shared moral norms that define suitability for membership in the profession.
This perception of the nature of the system of legal ethics has proven
remarkably tenacious, even in the face of accelerating changes in the nature of the
actual system. As we have seen, the 1908 Canons persisted, often maligned but
unmolested, for six decades. In the ensuing fourteen years there were two
wholesale rewrites of the profession's standards. The second of these, the Model
Rules, took six years to complete and has to this day not achieved anything
approaching universal acceptance. 522 Despite the actual state of flux in legal
ethics rules, the perception that legal ethics rules are the embodiment of a shared
moral vision which defines fitness for membership in the profession endures and
is the source of much of the rhetorical ammunition being fired by bar associations
(and sometimes judges 523 ) when prosecutors and others resist the rules at issue in
this Article. The critics of prosecutorial resistance are shocked; shocked at the
notion that prosecutors have the "arrogance" to claim that they are not bound by
rules of ethics.52 4 And it would be a shocking claim, if these rules were legitimate
ethical rules.
c. The Illegitimacy of Model Rules 3.3(d), 3.8(f) and 4.2
In fact, the rules discussed here depart from traditional ethics rules in a number
of ways that render them illegitimate.
i. Subject matter
The rules on exculpatory evidence (Model Rule 3.3), attorney subpoenas
(Model Rule 3.8(f)) and contact with represented persons (Model Rule 4.2) are
not about fitness for membership in the profession. They are not about honesty.
522. See supra notes 501-08 (broadly describing the statutory nature of the Model Rules).
523. See, e.g., In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 480 (D.N.M. 1992) ("Today, in the context of a disciplinary
proceeding, the government threatens the integrity of our tripartite structure by arguing its lawyers, in the course
of enforcing the laws regulating public conduct, may disregard the laws regulating their own conduct.").
524. See, e.g., SUMMARY OF ACTION TAKEN BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, ABA MID-YEAR MEETING 8 (1990)
(opposing (1) exemption for Department of Justice lawyers from Model Rule 4.2 and (2) "any attempt by the
Department of Justice unilaterally to exempt its lawyers from the professional conduct rules that apply to all
lawyers under applicable rules of the jurisdictions in which they practice"); Norton, supra note 258, at 207
("There is something very disquieting in what appears to be the emerging notion that attorneys for the
government are to be held to a different and lower standard of ethics than are other members of the bar.").
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They are not about competence. They are not about maintaining the integrity of
the profession. They are not about the classic conflict between duty to client and
the dictates of ordinary morality. They are not even about seeking to protect the
integrity of the traditional adversary system.
One might argue that all three rules at issue here fall into this last category, but
close examination reveals that they do not. The exculpatory-evidence-to-grandjuries rule, far from protecting the traditional adversary system, tries by fiat to
make adversarial a component of the Anglo-American criminal justice system
which has for over 800 years not been so.
Extension of the no contact rule to non-custodial, pre-indictment settings does
the same thing. The treatment of the rule by the federal courts demonstrates the
point. The courts are willing to apply the rule to settings that tradition and the
developments in constitutional law from Massiah onward have made adversarial.
They are unwilling to allow a disciplinary rule to expand the adversary process
into portions of the investigative phase of criminal cases that it has never
heretofore reached.
The attorney subpoena rule is the most flagrant deviation of the three. 525 Model
Rule 3.8(f) does not even look like an ethical rule. It is unique and unprecedented
in requiring a judicial order before an attorney takes a particular step, and in
setting out a multi-part test for the court to apply in determining whether the order
should be issued. Far from protecting the traditional adversary system, the rule
radically alters one of the defining features of that system - the sphere of
confidentiality surrounding the attorney-client relation 526 - and, like the exculpatory evidence rule, injects adversary proceedings into the grand jury where
they have not historically belonged.5 27
These are not rules about legal ethics. They are about changing executive
policy, legislative enactments, and judicial decisions regarding criminal procedure.

525. One might argue that Model Rule 3.8(f) is about either loyalty or confidentiality, two of the "three core
values" (the other being candor to the court) that Professor Hazard says ethical rules enforce. Hazard, supra
note 5, at 1246. The difficulty is that, at least hitherto, ethics rules have generally confined themselves to
defining the duties of confidentiality and loyalty by considering the limits on one's relationship with one's own
client. A rule restricting prosecutors from issuing grand jury subpoenas to attorneys has no relationship to the
prosecutor's duty of loyalty or confidentiality to his client: the people of the state or nation by whom he is
employed.
526. See supra notes 166-72 and accompanying text (discussing alterations of attorney-client and work
product privileges implicit in Model Rule 3.8(f)).
527. See supra notes 173-90 and accompanying text (discussing modifications of grand jury practice that
would be mandated by Model Rule 3.8(f)).
Moreover, other rules concerned with protection of the adversary system tend to be directed at situations
where one lawyer does something that undermines the system because the other lawyer does not know about it
(destroying or failing to disclose evidence), or because there is no adequate response within the system if the
lawyer finds out (pre-trial publicity). An attorney subpoena guarantees open, violently contested adversarial
dispute.
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ii. Consensus
These rules do not represent consensus. Exactly the reverse. They are opposed
virtually unanimously by the sector of the bar on whom their penalties would fall
- prosecutors. Moreover, the structure of the ABA and the process by which the
organization adopts rules of professional conduct makes a mockery of any claim
that these rules represent a consensus among the regulated population.
As an example, in 1990, the membership of the ABA Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, which studies and recommends amendments to the Model Rules, contained not a single prosecutor. 528 At its August
1990 meeting, of the 463 members of the ABA House of Delegates, only two can
be identified as prosecutors: Attorney General Richard Thornburgh and one state
attorney general.5 29 Prosecutors are not outvoted in the ABA; they are, for all
intents and purposes, unrepresented.
The absence of consent, or even meaningful participation in the adoption
process by the very lawyers subject to these rules, is the fact that most clearly
delegitimates them as rules of professional self-regulation. As far as I am aware,
these rules are the only instance where one side of a practice area has captured the
rule-making process, made rules and in effect declared to the other side: "We
don't care what you think. We've got the votes. Do it our way or get disbarred."
The implications of this behavior for other practice areas, like labor law, personal
injury litigation or environmental law, where people have a tendency to choose
sides and stay there over a career, are obvious.
Still, one might argue that prosecutors are just sore losers. Majority rules, and
government lawyers should become more involved in the profession and send
more delegates to ABA conventions. But it is the fact that these are criminal
rules, whose sanctions would fall on agents of the government, that gives rise to
the strongest arguments for their illegitimacy.
B.

ETHICS RULES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW OF THE STATE

At the outset of this part of the discussion, it is useful to expand on the notion
of legal ethics rules as a self-defined narrative of the bar in order to contrast that
narrative with the law of the state governing lawyers.
528. The membership was: Helaine Barnett (Legal Aid Society of New York); Michael Franck (Executive
Director, State Bar of Michigan; formerly private practitioner, insurance defense); William F. Womble, Jr.
(private practitioner, commercial litigation); Ralph G. Elliot (private practitioner); Daniel T. Goyette (public
defender, Kentucky); Daniel Robert Coquillette (Professor of Law, Boston College; formerly private practitioner); David Isbell (private practitioner); William C. McLearn (private practitioner, commercial litigation); and
Philip S. Anderson (private practitioner). AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 1990/91 DIRECTORY 36.

529. These figures are derived from a comparison of the roster of the ABA House of Delegates, id. at 13, with
biographical data from Martindale-Hubbelland other standard legal biographical sources. It is possible that
more than two prosecutors were present. I am unable to identify the affiliations of 21 of the 463 delegates. What
is clear is that no meaningful number of prosecutors were delegates.
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1. Symbiosis: The Bar and the State
There has always been tension between the normative universe of the legal
profession and that of the legal system lawyers serve. After all, one of the most
romantic images in the bar's narrative is the lone lawyer standing between his
client and the power of the State.5 3 ° Yet there is constant creative interplay
between the law of the State and the law or narrative of bar. In thinking about that
interaction, one needs to remember several things.
First, there is more overlap than conflict. After all, lawyers who are members
of the bar administer the mechanisms of the State. Lawyers are judges, prosecutors, members of congress, Attorneys General and presidents. These people
received the same legal education, took the same "professional responsibility"
courses and were socialized in the same professional values as private practitioners. Consequently, the lawyer agents of the state have inevitably internalized
much of the bar's normative vision.
Second, even considered as a monolithic entity, the State recognizes that its
objectives - here administering a system of criminal justice consistent with
constitutional guarantees of due process - cannot be achieved without allowing
a sphere of autonomy for lawyers.
Third, the organized bar, at least until now, has always recognized the primacy
of the democratic constitutional order in making positive law governing conduct
of lawyers. Where obligations imposed by a bar rule conflicted with the law of
the State, the bar recognized the lawyer had to obey the State.5 3' Until now, the
bar has never claimed the right to punish members who were obeying law of the
state.
2. Consent of the Governed: Government Lawyers Cannot Be Subject to
Ethical Sanctions If They Are Defined Out of "The Bar"
Professor Susan Koniak has discussed the attorney-subpoena rule as an
example of an ethics rule that is integral to the narrative of the bar, but which is in
conflict with the law of State.532 Though she does not speak in precisely these
terms, implicit in her presentation is the claim that because the attorney subpoena

530. See, e.g., Professor Koniak's discussion of the 1735 trial of John Peter Zenger for seditious libel against
the colonial governor of New York. Koniak, supra note 5, at 1448-50 ("The central and recurring theme in the
profession's narratives portrays the lawyer as champion, defending the client's life and liberty against the
government ....).
531. See MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.6 cmt. (discussing the lawyer's duty to withdraw and the lawyer's
professional discretion to reveal information in order to prevent prospective conduct that is criminal, as defined
by state law, and likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm); MODEL CODE DR 4-101(C)(2)
(concerning the ability of a lawyer to reveal confidential client information when required by state law or court
order); see also supra note 110 and accompanying text (noting that the attorney-client could historically be
disrupted when a court ordered the attorney to disclose information).
532. Koniak, supra note 5, at 1398-1401.
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rule is a manifestation of the narrative of the bar, it is a legitimate feature of the
ethics law of the bar. Although the conception of ethics rules as a narrative of the
legal profession is a useful and powerful tool, a careful examination of the notion
of law as narrative demonstrates why the rules examined here are illegitimate
when they conflict with the law of the State.
In order for a narrative or "nomos" to arise and gain the status of "law,".there
must exist a community whose members recognize themselves as such and who
accept the story as their own. The limits of the narrative are defined by the limits
of consensus within the group about its content. By definition, if a significant
segment of the community does not accept a part of the narrative, only two
conclusions are possible: either the portion of the narrative that cannot command
consensus is not part of the "nomos," or the faction that does not accept the
disputed portion of the narrative is not really a part of the community that claims
the "nomos" as its law. Moreover, if the particular narrative under examination is
conceived of as embodying norms enforceable within the community, either
formally or informally, those norms that cannot command consensus cannot
legitimately be enforced against dissenters. Within the community, disputed
norms do not bear the legitimating imprimatur of the "nomos." Outside the
community, attempts may be made to impose the community's norms on others,
but the community can hardly argue that its own internal narrative creates "law"
in any form to which outsiders are bound to submit.
Seen in this light, the difficulties with a claim that the rules examined here are
legitimate expressions of the law of the bar become obvious. Prosecutors are
"members of the bar," as are federal judges and legislators. Yet these groups,
most prominently prosecutors (as the segment of the bar upon whom the rules'
sanctions fall), do not agree that the rules represent manifestations of the shared
vision of the profession. One can conceive of the attorney subpoena rule, the
exculpatory evidence rule and the no contact rule as threads of the bar's narrative
only by redefining the "bar" to exclude lawyers employed by the State as
legislators, judges and prosecutors. But if prosecutors are defined out of the
"bar," how can it be legitimate to impose career-ending consequences on them
for violating the internal vision and self-regulating rules of a group to which they
do not belong?
Either the rules at issue here are not part of the bar's narrative properly
understood, or their enforcement against prosecutors is illegitimate. As developed thus far, this argument would be equally applicable to ethics rules governing
any practice area. In short, the theory of law as narrative teaches the same lesson
as does the history of bar regulation - ethics rules are legitimate when they
express a consensus about issues that define membership in the profession.
3. The Bar Cannot Control the Law of the Nation through Ethical Rules
The rules I have been discussing present, however, an additional complication.
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These rules are an attempt to capture the legal disciplinary process for the express
purpose of controlling government policy through the imposition of sanctions
against those who work in government. This effort is contrary to the constitutional order that lawyers are sworn to uphold.
The rules discussed in this Article illustrate the problem starkly. Remember
that all of these rules are designed to expand the protections afforded criminal
suspects by altering fundamental aspects of the criminal justice system. The rules
seek to redefine how the grand jury works, when a criminal suspect is entitled to a
lawyer and what information that lawyer may hold as confidential and what he
must disclose. These are issues concerning the balance between society's interest
in the investigation and prosecution of crime, and the right of the individual to
defend himself against charges of criminal wrongdoing.
Of course, the mere fact that a bar rule affects the fate of criminal suspects by
regulating the way lawyers behave is no necessary barrier to ethical regulation. If
it were, the ethics rules could not prohibit defense lawyers from active cooperation in client perjury5 33 or prosecutors from concealing evidence.5 34 What
distinguishes the three rules at issue here is that they presume to supersede the
conscious choices of Congress and the federal courts about the proper balance
between the interests of society and those of the suspect.
Consider, for example, Model Rule 3.8(f), concerning attorney subpoenas. The
result of the application of Model Rule 3.8(f) is that the zone of protection for the
attorney-client relationship, whose boundaries the Supreme Court and other
lesser tribunals have painstakingly defined by balancing competing public
interests, is to be expanded. Carefully scrutinized, the justifications advanced for
this expansion reflect nothing more than a difference of opinion about how to
perform the utilitarian calculus that courts (and legislatures) have used to set the
boundaries. 535 The rule's proponents are not claiming a new rights-based theory
of privileges. They do not advance any novel claim of constitutional protection. 536 They really say nothing more than this: we think the attorney-client
533. See MODEL RULES ANN. Rule 1.16 cmt. (discussing a lawyer's mandatory withdrawal from representation where the client demands that the lawyer actively cooperate in client perjury).
534. MODEL RULES Rule 3.8(d) (concerning obligations of prosecutor to disclose exculpatory and mitigating
evidence).
535. See supra notes 126, 148 and accompanying text (discussing utilitarian justifications for the existence
and scope of privileges protecting the attorney-client relationship).
536. Some commentators certainly argue that subpoenas directed to attorneys can implicate Sixth Amendment concerns such as the right to choose one's counsel by creating a conflict between a subpoenaed attorney's
dual roles as advocate and witness, or the adequacy of the attorney's representation. See, e.g., Genego, supra
note 73, at 820-34; Stem & Hoffman, supra note 73, at 1804-07. Commentators have suggested that attorney
subpoenas raise Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process concerns. Genego, supra note 73, at 834-40. But
when such commentators call for an ethical rule on attorney subpoenas, they do so not because the Constitution
commands such a rule, but because the Constitution as currently interpreted by the courts provides, in the
commentators' view, insufficient protection for the attomey-client relationship. See Genego, supra note 73, at
833-34, 839-40, 856-57 (arguing that although the practice of directing subpoenas at attorneys is not
unconstitutional under current law, the practice is undesirable because of the significant additional costs to the
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relationship should receive more protection from prosecutorial intrusion than the
law now affords. We think so because we believe that relationship is more
important and more at risk than the courts are willing to acknowledge, and we
believe competing values such as the discovery of truth are either less implicated
by restrictions on attorney subpoenas or relatively less important than the courts
have thought.53 7

That the organized bar would weigh the attorney-client relationship differently
in the calculus of social values than do the organs of government is hardly a
surprise. After all, the historical difference in perspective on the issue is the cause
of the gap between the scope of the law of privilege and the bar's rules about
client confidentiality. What delegitimates Model Rule 3.8(f) is its implicit
assertion that the bar can ignore 400 years of Anglo-American law and substitute
its social calculus for that of the national government.
Likewise, both Model Rule 3.8(f) and 3.3(d) attempt to alter characteristics of
the federal grand jury that have remained constant for eight centuries, and which
received in this decade the blessing of the Supreme Court. Finally, the no contact
rule in the form espoused by the ABA is, in effect and by design, an end run
around thirty years of federal constitutional case law on the interrogation of
suspects.
The standard being advanced here, that ethical rules cannot impose greater
restrictions on federal government lawyers than do federal statutes and case law,
will seem to many unduly cramped. It runs contrary to the confident pronouncement of various participants in this debate, including the ABA itself, that the
constitution and federal statutory and decisional law merely set minimum
standards of conduct, but that ethics rules governing federal prosecutors as
members of a learned profession are free to set "higher" standards. 538 This

operation of the adversary system); Stem & Hoffman, supra note 73, at 1807 (noting that courts typically rely
upon their supervisory powers rather than any constitutional mandate in limiting the use of subpoenas directed
at attorneys).
537. The academic commentator who has most explicitly categorized Model Rule 3.8(f) as an expression of
the bar's ordering of values over the values of the government is Professor Koniak. See Koniak, supra note 5
(explicitly categorizing Model Rule 3.8(f) as an expression of the bar's ordering of values over the values of
government).
See also Genego, supra note 73, at 842-56 (analyzing the practice of subpoenaing attorneys using competing
normative "models" of criminal procedure). Professor Genego concludes that the practice, "as presently
constituted and utilized, [is] undesirable," and should be regulated through, among other measures, ethical
rules. Id. at 857, 863.
538. In its 1995 opinion on the scope of the "no-contact" rule, the ABA Ethics Committee stakes out this
position unambiguously. It wrote:
While the Fifth and Sixth Amendments provide protections to individuals in the context of a criminal
case, the Constitution establishes only the "minimal historic safeguards" that the defendants must
receive rather than the outer limits of those they may be afforded. Ethics rules, on the other hand, seek
to regulate the conduct of lawyers according to the standards of the profession quite apart from other
laws or rules that may also govern a lawyer's actions. Consequently, by delineating a lawyer's duties

HeinOnline -- 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 774 1995-1996

19961

MISUSE OF "ETHICAL RULES"

assertion rests on seductive, but demonstrably erroneous, images of the nature of
federal lawmaking and of legal ethics regulation.
The idea that ethical rules can set "higher" standards than the legally
prescribed minimum rests on the sub rosa assumption that there is a hierarchy of
values in the criminal justice system, a hierarchy in which fewer procedural
protections for criminal suspects is "bad," and therefore low on the scale, while
more procedural protections is "good," and therefore high on the scale. From this
perspective, the perspective of a criminal suspect and the lawyer whose duty it is
to defend him, it is easy to view the law as setting a minimum standard on a
vertical scale. Seen from this perspective, any rule that moves the standard "up"
the scale is self-evidently good.
Of course, this image is a simplistic distortion of what Congress and the
Supreme Court do. Constitutional, procedural and evidentiary lawmaking is not a
matter of choosing the minimally acceptable point on a vertical scale running
upwards from bad to good. The more accurate image is that of selecting, on a
horizontal scale, the point of balance that best accommodates inevitably conflicting interests of society and individual criminal suspects.
For example, the Supreme Court's Miranda decision and its progeny are all
efforts to balance the need of society to solve crimes with the right of individuals
to autonomy free of government coercion. Both solving crimes and individual
autonomy are "good." Neither value can be accommodated absolutely. Consequently, it is perfectly possible for people of intelligence and good will to
disagree heatedly about where the balance between these goods should be struck.
The point here, however, is that in our system of government, the Constitution
confers upon the Supreme Court of the United States the power to set the balance
point. When the bar creates a rule like Model Rule 4.2, which requires federal
prosecutors and their agents 539 to behave differently in an area where the Court
to maintain standards of ethical conduct, ethical rules like Rule 4.2 may offer protections beyond
those provided by the Constitution.
Opinion 95-396, supra note 275 (emphasis added).
539. One foreseeable objection to the argument advanced here is that different standards do or should apply
to lawyers, as opposed to police officers or government agents. An echo of this line of thinking appears in the
original panel opinion in United States v. Hammad. 846 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988). The panel held that Model Rule
4.2 had been violated because the prosecutor was involved in the planning of the activities of the informant, thus
making the informant the prosecutor's "alter ego." The odd, but unmistakable, implication of the panel opinion
was that, while undercover agents and informants can use deception to catch criminals, prosecutors must be
virginally unaware of the deception to be practiced on their behalf. In Hammad, the panel suggested, in effect,
that the more the prosecutor knows about what an informant is going to do, the closer he comes to an ethical
violation. Id. at 859. In its final opinion, the court abandoned this approach. United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d
834, 840 (2d Cir. 1988).
While agents and prosecutors perform different roles in the criminal justice system, the idea that different
standards of ethics should apply to each is a doubly dangerous one. As evidenced by the rules under examination
in this Article, the notion that lawyers should behave "better" than agents can be employed to impose
illegitimate controls on the entire criminal justice system. Just as dangerous, however, is the idea that police
officers should be allowed to get away with violations of the rights of suspects because we cannot expect them to
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has decided on a particular balance of social values, the effect is not to "improve"
ethics, but to alter the constitutional balance. Neither the ABA nor state ethics
regulators may make this adjustment.
The restriction of legal ethics rules to congruence with the law of the State is a
consequence of the "legalization" of the professional regulation process. As long
as ethics codes were composed partly of aspirational declarations and partly of
enforceable minimum standards,54 ° there was room for declarations that conduct
different than that required by law was considered by the bar to be ethically
superior. In such a case, an individual lawyer could decide to pursue the divergent
vision endorsed by the bar, even at the risk of being punished by the State for
doing so. But the bar never presumed to require either government5 41lawyers or
private practitioners to obey its law rather than the law of the nation.
The Model Rules differ, however, because virtually all the rules are minimum
standards enforceable by disciplinary sanctions.5 42 Thus, when the bar creates
ethics rules for government lawyers at variance with the law of the nation, the bar
inescapably places itself in the position of commanding the government itself,
through its agents, to change its practices, thus altering the balance of competing
values established and legitimated by constitutional processes.
Looked at in historical perspective, rules like the three examined here represent (to borrow from Tom Clancy) the "sum of all fears" of 19th century
democratic theorists. They distrusted elitist bar associations as gatekeepers to the
public profession of lawyering. Their concerns were largely social, in the sense
that they wanted to prevent class-based monopoly on access to the profession and
therefore on control of the courts and other organs of government. Nonetheless,
they would have been even more horrified at the idea that an organization of
lawyers would claim its own internal rules superseded the law of the constitutional government, I confess to thinking the concerns of Jacksonian democrats of
more than antiquarian interest here. In truth, rules like these could only have been
passed by a bar becoming estranged from the democratic process, a bar that has
forgotten its own history and the delicate balance upon which the courts' grant of
the power of self-regulation rests.
C.

A TEST OF LEGITIMACY

So long as the bar adheres to the concept of ethical rules as enforceable
adhere to the lofty standards of the bar. Cops and prosecutors are both agents of the government. While making
allowances for differences in role, both suspects and the public at large have the right to expect that all
government agents, with and without law licenses, will behave ethically and respect constitutional norms.
540. Both the 1908 Canons and the Model Code contained aspirational components along with the
enforceable rules. In the Canons, the two elements were mixed. The Code separated them. The "ECs" were
aspirational, while the "DRs" were enforceable.
541. See Professor Koniak's discussion of "texts of resistance," that is, pronouncements by the bar that
contemplate, even encourage, but do not require disobedience to the law. Koniak, supranote 5, at 1478.
542. MODEL RULES ANN. pmbl.
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minimum standards of conduct, in order for a rule to be considered legitimate
both inside the profession and by the legal system of the nation, it must satisfy
three requirements:
(1) its subject should be issues integrally related to fitness for membership in
the legal profession;
(2) it should reflect a consensus of the legal profession, and must, most
particularly, command the assent of the segment of the bar upon whom penalties
for violating it would fall; and
(3) it cannot invade the constitutional prerogatives of the national government.
III.

ETHICS AND THE FEDERAL COURTS

As noted above at the close of the discussion of the no contact rule,54 3 neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court has ventured to define the proper boundaries of
permissible and impermissible state regulation of federal government lawyers.
The fact that the federal judiciary has not yet intervened decisively in the ethics
debate is, in my view, another artifact of the enduring perception that ethics
regulation continues to be about fitness for membership in the profession. I
believe the Court's abstention flows from the fact that both the Court and the
Congress continue to think about attorney regulation in terms of the paradigm
that was created during the rise of the bar associations in the first half of this
century. In that period, as we have seen, the state courts, in effect, made a bargain:
they would yield to the bar practical control over the formulation and administration of ethics rules, reserving only what amounted to veto power over notably
objectionable rules or unpalatable individual results. In return, the state courts
received relief from the administrative burden of running the attorney licensure
and discipline systems. The federal courts have piggybacked themselves onto this
division of labor. By making state bar membership the sine qua non of admission
to federal practice, and by dealing with most ethical infractions by referral to state
bar agencies, the federal courts have avoided the creation of duplicative federal
systems of licensure and discipline. But this act of delegation has always rested
on the assumption implicit in the original transfer of power from the state courts
to the bar associations - that in regulating the licensure and conduct of lawyers,
the bar was concerned with the traditional question of fitness for membership in
the profession. So long as the regulatory activities of the bar have concerned
themselves with that topic, there has rarely been need for extensive independent
activity by federal judges. The judges have neither time, facilities, funding nor
inclination to do the administrative job of testing and admitting applicants. As for
the regulation of conduct, so long as the rules concerned fitness for membership
543. See supra note 450 and accompanying text (noting that while it is reasonable to think the Supreme
Court and Congress anticipated that federal prosecutors are regulated by states, the extent of state regulation has
not been defined).
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in the profession, conflict between bar rules and federal law was rare because the
two regimes regulated different spheres.
Ethical rules that violate the paradigm by extending beyond questions of
fitness to subjects federal judges consider their proper domain (such as the power
of grand juries, the scope of evidentiary privileges and the reach of the right to
counsel) may force federal judges into a reluctant re-examination of the delegation from which they have so long benefitted. 54
Several factors will be important in determining whether the final resolution of
the controversy discussed here will be a uniform code of professional conduct for
lawyers admitted to practice before the federal courts.
(1) The first factor will be the approach taken by the organized bar in the states.
If the bar continues to insist that it can change federal law through state ethics
rules, the impetus for intervention by the Supreme Court will grow. The actions
of the ABA House of Delegates at its August 1995 meeting send conflicting
signals. On the one hand, the deletion of the prior judicial approval provision of
Model Rule 3.8(f) suggests a recognition of limits on the ability of the bar to
regulate federal practice. On the other hand, the amendment to the comment of
Model Rule 4.2 to bring prosecutors within the broadest interpretation of the no
contact rule suggests either that the delegates were unaware of the degree to
which the amendment places the rule in conflict with federal law, or that the
organization is bent on confrontation.
(2) The second, and equally important, factor will be the approach of the
Justice Department. The department is certainly correct that state ethics regulators cannot use rules of professional conduct to modify federal criminal law.
Likewise, as a matter of law, the department is almost certainly correct that a
properly promulgated federal regulation preempts state ethics rules. Nonetheless,
the assertion implicit in the no contact regulation that the Justice Department
could preempt even local federal court rules and act as sole arbiter of the conduct
of its own lawyers is one that, if pressed, is likely to stimulate a judicial response.
Moreover, it is simply not healthy for any government institution, particularly
one as powerful as the U.S. Department of Justice, to be the only check on its own
probity.
The final question is whether uniform federal ethics rules, enforced by federal
courts, would be a good thing. They would certainly have several advantages
over the present system. There is a need for a neutral forum with neutral rules to
adjudicate allegations of federal prosecutorial misconduct. The criminal defense
544. Creation of a uniform federal code of ethics might require congressional authorization. There is a
serious question whether any federal court, including the Supreme Court, currently has the authority to
promulgate such rules, particularly if they had any impact on either grand jury practice or the law of evidentiary
privilege. See, for example, the comment of Judge Campbell in his Klubock dissent that any rule which modifies
federal privilege law is "arguably beyond even the Supreme Court's rule-making power." United States v.
Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, reh'g granted,832 F.2d 664, 670 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc).
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bar complains, with some justice, that in the current judicial climate even
established instances of government misconduct that offend constitutional norms
often are labeled harmless error, and thus give rise to no penalty in the case in
which they occur. 545 Federal prosecutors, on the other hand, are rightly concerned that their licenses not be placed in the hands of state bar authorities
operating under rules contrary to federal law. Uniform federal rules created and
administered by federal judges would ensure: (1) that the rules applicable in
federal court were nationally uniform; (2) that the rules were formulated by
persons aware of and sensitive to federal law who understand the unique role of
federal prosecutors; and (3) that the rules were enforced by a credible, neutral
authority.
CONCLUSION

Unless the bar as a body, including elements inside and outside the federal
government, can suppress the naturally adversarial instincts of its individual
members and cooperate to confine standards of professional ethics to rules that
(a) concern fitness for membership in the profession; (b) command a consensus
all across all sectors of the profession; and (c) do not invade the constitutional
prerogatives of the national government, the result in the federal courts at least
seems inevitable. The Supreme Court and Congress will be obliged, reluctantly,
to intervene by creating a national code of professional responsibility for the
federal courts.
Such a result would have undoubted practical advantages, but at a more
profound level federal preemption of ethical rulemaking would represent a
distressing failure of the legal profession's generally laudable enterprise of
self-regulation. Avoiding this unhappy result will require not only adherence to
tests of legitimacy for particular rules, but commitment to a more balanced vision
of the profession.
In a sense, the rules discussed here fail as ethical standards because they
proceed from a distorted view of the common story of "the bar." Those who
suggest that "the central theme" of the profession's role in the criminal justice
546
system is the story of the lone lawyer matched against the power of the state
are simply wrong. The story I know, the story I have shared with colleagues and
adversaries during sixteen years as both prosecutor and defense attorney, is the
story of two honorable advocates - a prosecutor powerfully committed to
545. See, e.g., United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986) (reversing dismissal and reinstating the
conspiracy portion of the grand jury indictment, where the petit jury's verdict removed any taint from the grand
jury indictment based in part upon the simultaneous testimony of two law enforcement officers in violation of
FederalRule of CriminalProcedure6(d)).
546. See supra note 537 and accompanying text (describing the belief that Model Rule 3.8(f) is an explicit
expression of the bar's ordering of values over those of govemment).
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seeking justice, and a defense lawyer equally committed to representing his client
vigorously, creatively, passionately, within the bounds of the law.
Unless ethics rules proceed from a vision of the bar that gives equal place to
both of these figures, such rules cannot achieve legitimacy or command respect.
The bar, all of us, should think well.
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